Davis v. Peake ( 2012 )


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  •      11-4781
    Davis v. Peake
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 13th day of December, two thousand twelve.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                              Chief Judge,
    8                RALPH K. WINTER,
    9                              Circuit Judge,
    10                LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN,
    11                              District Judge.*
    12
    13       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    14       GEORGE DAVIS,
    15                Plaintiff-Appellant,
    16
    17                    -v.-                                               11-4781
    18
    19       HONORABLE JAMES A. PEAKE, SECRETARY,
    20       UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
    21       AFFAIRS,
    22                Defendant-Appellee,
    23       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    *
    Judge Laura Taylor Swain, of the United States
    District Court for the Southern District of New York,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    1
    2   FOR APPELLANT:             MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman &
    3                              Watkins, Goshen, New York.
    4
    5   FOR APPELLEE:              JOSEPH A. PANTOJA (Benjamin H.
    6                              Torrance, on the brief),
    7                              Assistant United States
    8                              Attorneys, for Preet Bharara,
    9                              United States Attorney for the
    10                              Southern District of New York,
    11                              New York, New York.
    12
    13        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    14   Court for the Southern District of New York (Duffy, J.).
    15
    16        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    17   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    18   AFFIRMED.
    19
    20        Plaintiff George Davis appeals from the judgment of the
    21   United States District Court for the Southern District of
    22   New York (Duffy, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of
    23   Defendant James A. Peake, on behalf of the Department of
    24   Veterans Affairs (“VA”), dismissing the complaint. We
    25   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
    26   the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
    27
    28        This Court reviews de novo an order granting summary
    29   judgment, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the
    30   non-moving party. Costello v. City of Burlington, 
    632 F.3d 31
       41, 45 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when
    32   “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    33   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
    34   Civ. P. 56(a).
    35
    36        Davis failed to establish a prima facie case of race or
    37   age discrimination, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
    38   of 1964 (“Title VII”) or under the Age Discrimination in
    39   Employment Act (“ADEA”). See James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n,
    40   
    233 F.3d 149
    , 153-54 (2d Cir. 2000). Critically, Davis
    41   could not raise an inference that his race or his age was
    42   the reason he was passed over for a job, because he was not
    43   similarly situated to those that were ultimately hired
    44   (i.e., they were better qualified). See Shumway v. United
    45   Parcel Service, Inc., 
    118 F.3d 60
    , 64 (2d Cir. 1997). The
    46   racial makeup of the interviewing panel and alleged
    2
    1   departures from procedure in the hiring process do not
    2   suffice to raise an inference of invidious discrimination.
    3
    4        Even if Davis could establish a prima facie case--which
    5   he cannot--he utterly fails to show that the
    6   nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the VA for passing him
    7   over were pretextual. The Title VII and ADEA discrimination
    8   claims fail for that reason as well. James, 
    233 F.3d at
    9   154.
    10
    11        Likewise, Davis cannot establish a prima facie case of
    12   retaliation under Title VII for want of any causal link
    13   between his activity filing Equal Employment Opportunity
    14   (“EEO”) complaints and the VA’s adverse action. Manoharan
    15   v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 
    842 F.2d 16
       590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988). Even if Davis could establish a
    17   prima facie claim for retaliation, he fails to show that the
    18   VA’s nonretaliatory reasons for passing him over were
    19   pretextual.
    20
    21        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    22   Davis’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
    23   the district court.
    24
    25                              FOR THE COURT:
    26                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    27
    28
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-4781

Judges: Jacobs, Winter, Swain

Filed Date: 12/13/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024