United States v. Alhakk ( 2012 )


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  • 12-155-cr
    United States v. Alhakk
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY
    ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
    York, on the 12th day of December, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:  DENNY CHIN,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges,
    JOHN GLEESON,
    District Judge.*
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v.-                           12-155-cr
    YUSEF ALHAKK, AKA JOSEPH DANIELS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
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    FOR APPELLEE:                         JOSEPH J. KARASZEWSKI, Assistant
    United States Attorney, for William
    J. Hochul, Jr., United States
    Attorney for the Western District
    of New York, Buffalo, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:              JAYME L. FELDMAN (Marianne Mariano,
    on the brief), Federal Public
    Defender's Office, Buffalo, New
    York.
    *
    The Honorable John Gleeson, of the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by
    designation.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Defendant-appellant Yusef Alhakk was convicted,
    following a plea of guilty, of one count of receipt of child
    pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A).    The
    district court (Arcara, J.) sentenced him principally to 120
    months' imprisonment, a sentence that was substantially below the
    Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months, as determined by the
    district court.
    On appeal, Alhakk challenges the procedural and
    substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   We review the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court's
    sentence for abuse of discretion.   United States v. Cavera, 
    550 F.3d 180
    , 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).   We apply de novo review
    to the district court's rulings on questions of law, including
    Guidelines interpretation, and clear-error review to its rulings
    on questions of fact, including those that inform Guidelines
    application.   See United States v. Legros, 
    529 F.3d 470
    , 474 (2d
    Cir. 2008).
    We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying
    facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues
    presented for review.
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    1.   Procedural Reasonableness
    Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    ("U.S.S.G.") § 3E1.1(a), a defendant may receive a two-level
    reduction in his offense level calculation if he "clearly
    demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).   In addition, a defendant who qualifies for
    a reduction under § 3E1.1(a) may receive an additional one-level
    reduction under § 3E1.1(b) if his offense level is 16 or greater
    and the government makes a motion stating that he "timely
    notif[ied] authorities of his intention to enter a plea of
    guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for
    trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate
    their resources efficiently."    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
    Alhakk argues that the district court committed
    procedural error in denying him the additional one-level downward
    adjustment pursuant to § 3E1.1(b).       He asserts that he was
    entitled to the additional one-point reduction "because [he] did
    not force the government to prepare needlessly for trial and has
    fully accepted responsibility for his actions since his 2010
    arrest."   Br. for Def.-Appellant at 14.     The claim fails.
    "[A] government motion is 'a necessary prerequisite' to
    the granting of the third point" under § 3E1.1(b).      United States
    v. Lee, 
    653 F.3d 170
    , 173 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
    v. Sloley, 
    464 F.3d 355
    , 359 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1, cmt. n.6.   This requirement may be excused (1) where the
    government's refusal to move is based on an unconstitutional
    motive; or (2) when the government acts in bad faith in failing
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    to so move.   Lee, 
    653 F.3d at
    173 (citing Sloley, 
    464 F.3d at 360-61
    ).    Ordinarily, a sentencing court's decision not to grant
    a defendant a decrease pursuant to § 3E1.1 is "'entitled to great
    deference on review.'"   United States v. Taylor, 
    475 F.3d 65
    , 68
    (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5).
    The record in this case contains no evidence to suggest
    that the government's refusal to make a § 3E1.1(b) motion was
    based on an unconstitutional motive or made in bad faith.    Cf.
    Lee, 
    653 F.3d at 174
     (government may not refuse to move for
    additional one-point reduction because defendant invoked his due
    process right to contest errors in the PSR).   Moreover, Alhakk
    violated the terms of his bond by fleeing the United States,
    conduct warranting an obstruction of justice enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.   Only in "extraordinary cases" will a defendant
    who engages in obstruction of justice be entitled to a reduction
    under § 3E1.1, as such conduct "ordinarily indicates that the
    defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal
    conduct."   U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4.   Although the government
    agreed in the plea agreement not to oppose Alhakk's request for a
    two-level downward adjustment pursuant to § 3E1.1(a), it made no
    promise to move for the additional one-point reduction, and
    Alhakk has shown no reason why this Court should view his case as
    "extraordinary."
    To the extent Alhakk argues that it unfairly compounds
    his punishment to use his conduct in fleeing the country both to
    apply an obstruction enhancement and to deny an acceptance-of-
    responsibility reduction, the claim lacks merit.   "The Guidelines
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    explicitly permit the same act to be counted both for an
    obstruction enhancement under section 3C1.1 and for denial of an
    acceptance of responsibility decrease under section 3E1.1."
    United States v. Castellanos, 
    355 F.3d 56
    , 60 (2d Cir. 2003)
    (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4).    Accordingly, the district
    court did not commit procedural error.
    2.   Substantive Reasonableness
    Alhakk contends that his 120-month sentence was
    substantively unreasonable because (1) the district court applied
    a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) for
    sexual exploitation of a minor involving sadistic or masochistic
    conduct; and (2) the district court did not properly consider the
    concerns articulated in United States v. Dorvee, 
    616 F.3d 174
     (2d
    Cir. 2010), and the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).      We
    reject both challenges.
    First, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4), "[i]f the
    offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic
    conduct or other depictions of violence," a defendant's offense
    level will be increased by four levels.   U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).
    Alhakk admits that two of the images discovered on his computer
    qualified procedurally for the enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4),
    but he argues that the district court committed substantive error
    by applying the four-level enhancement on the basis of only two
    images out of the 436 still images and 314 videos found on his
    computer.    We have upheld the application of a § 2G2.2(b)(4)
    enhancement, however, where the offense involved only one image
    depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct.   See, e.g., United
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    States v. Hotaling, 
    634 F.3d 725
    , 731 (2d Cir. 2011); United
    States v. Delmarle, 
    99 F.3d 80
    , 83 (2d Cir. 1996).    The district
    court concluded that the fact that only two sadistic or
    masochistic images were found "does not sufficiently mitigate the
    harm caused by those images."    Sentencing Tr. at 16:3-4, United
    States v. Alhakk, No. 06-cr-165 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No.
    42.   We find no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.
    Second, Alhakk's assertion that the district court
    failed to justify the reasonableness of the imposed sentence is
    misplaced.    At sentencing, defense counsel emphasized Alhakk's
    serious health problems, his troubled childhood, and his efforts
    to reconnect with his family.    In response, the government noted
    that Alhakk's case was unusual in that, unlike many defendants
    charged with child pornography crimes, Alhakk had an extensive
    criminal history.    The government also noted that Alhakk had been
    "difficult throughout [the] case," and remarked that Alhakk had
    fled for five years to Thailand, "a country that is known for a
    prevalent sex trade among children."     Sentencing Tr. at 9:21,
    10:10-11.
    The record reflects that the district court considered
    the parties' arguments, the advisory Guidelines range, and the
    factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).    The court specifically
    addressed and acknowledged, inter alia, Alhakk's difficult
    childhood, his age, his poor health, his extensive history of
    substance abuse, and the absence of any evidence that he had
    engaged in sexual contact with a minor.    Against these factors,
    the court balanced the seriousness of Alhakk's conduct, the risk
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    he would offend again, and the need for specific and general
    deterrence.   Further, the court noted that it had given "special
    consideration" to the concerns expressed in Dorvee.    Sentencing
    Tr. at 18:6-7.   Based on all of these considerations, the court
    concluded that a below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months'
    imprisonment was sufficient but not greater than necessary to
    fulfill the requirements of § 3553(a).    Nothing in the record
    demonstrates that the court failed adequately to balance the
    § 3553(a) factors, or that its sentence was "shockingly high,
    shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law."
    United States v. Rigas, 
    583 F.3d 108
    , 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
    We have considered Alhakk’s remaining arguments and
    find them to be without merit.    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
    judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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