Toma v. Holder , 359 F. App'x 210 ( 2010 )


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  •     08-3462-ag
    Toma v. Holder
    BIA
    Rohan, IJ
    A099 599 253
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.     CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS
    FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1
    AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1.     IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A
    LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST
    ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION:
    “(SUMMARY ORDER).” A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER
    TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
    BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS
    PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT
    HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
    ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE
    DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.
    At a stated term of the United            States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the            Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl            Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 5 th day of January,           two thousand ten.
    PRESENT:
    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    GUIDO CALABRESI,
    REENA RAGGI,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    ALBERT TOMA, ALSO KNOWN AS BRUNO
    ORNELLA,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                    08-3462-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Saul C. Brown, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:        Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General, Civil Division; Cindy S.
    Ferrier, Senior Litigation Counsel,
    Office of Immigration Litigation;
    Timothy G. Hayes, Trial Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Albert Toma, a native and citizen of
    Albania, seeks review of a June 16, 2008 order of the BIA
    affirming the August 23, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge
    (“IJ”) Patricia A. Rohan denying his application for asylum,
    withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).   In re Albert Toma, No. A099 599
    253 (B.I.A. Jun. 16, 2008), aff’g No. A099 599 253 (Immig.
    Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 23, 2006).       We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    in this case.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1)
    because the denial of relief in “asylum only” proceedings is
    the “functional equivalent of a removal order.”       Kanacevic
    v. INS, 
    448 F.3d 129
    , 134-35 (2d Cir. 2006).       When, as in
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    this case, the BIA affirms without addressing each aspect of
    the IJ’s decision, we review the decisions of both the BIA
    and the IJ.   See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 
    435 F.3d 141
    , 144 (2d
    Cir. 2006).   We review the agency’s factual findings for
    substantial evidence, see 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Jian Hui
    Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 157-58 (2d Cir. 2008), and
    its legal conclusions and application of law to undisputed
    fact de novo, see Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    , 110
    (2d Cir. 2008).
    I.   Asylum and Withholding of Removal
    Although Toma did not argue before the BIA that the IJ
    erred in finding that changed country conditions in Albania
    rebutted any presumption of a well-founded fear of future
    persecution, because the BIA nonetheless considered the
    issue, we deem it exhausted.   See Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 
    446 F.3d 289
    , 296-97 (2d Cir. 2006).
    When an applicant for asylum has been found to have
    suffered past persecution, the presumption of a well-founded
    fear of future persecution may be rebutted if an IJ finds
    that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances
    such that the applicant’s life or freedom would no longer be
    threatened in the country of removal on account of one of
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    the five statutory grounds.     
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(i)(A);
    see also Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 179
    , 188 (2d Cir.
    2006) (“[T]here is no doubt that there has been a
    fundamental change in the political structure and government
    of Albania, beginning in 1990.      While Democrats have not
    been continuously in power, the IJ's perfunctory finding of
    changed conditions in Albania is adequate.”).
    Here, the agency assumed Toma’s credibility and found
    that, even if he had established past persecution on account
    of his involvement with the Legality Movement Party, the
    government successfully rebutted any presumption of a well-
    founded fear by demonstrating a significant change in
    country conditions.     This determination is supported by
    substantial evidence, namely, (1) in Albania’s 2005
    election, a coalition comprising, inter alia, the Democratic
    Party and the Legality Movement Party won 46 seats in
    parliament; and (2) Toma’s father, who also belongs to
    Legality Movement Party, has continued living peacefully in
    Albania.
    Toma does not challenge these findings before this
    Court.     Instead, he argues that, because the 2005 Country
    Report discusses police violence and corruption in Albania,
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    “conditions remain unsafe and dangerous . . . regardless of
    the fact that the Democratic Party has formed a coalition
    government and now controls a majority of seats in
    Parliament.”   Pet’r’s Br. at 18.   Such general allegations,
    however, are insufficient to establish eligibility for
    asylum.   See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 
    191 F.3d 307
    , 314 n.3
    (2d Cir. 1999).
    Accordingly, the agency’s finding that changed country
    conditions rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear
    of future persecution is supported by substantial evidence.
    As Toma was unable to carry his burden for asylum, he has
    necessarily failed to carry the heavier burden required for
    withholding of removal.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    ,
    155-56 (2d Cir. 2006).    Because the changed country
    conditions finding is dispositive, see 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13
    (b)(1)(i)(A), 1208.16(b)(1)(1)(A), we need not
    address the agency’s additional findings.
    II.   CAT Relief
    Although Toma asserts that he also seeks review of the
    denial of CAT relief, his brief confines any CAT argument to
    a single sentence, which does not address the agency’s
    conclusion that neither his testimony nor any other evidence
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    in the record established a likelihood of torture upon
    return to Albania.   Accordingly, we deem any CAT challenge
    waived.   See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 541
    n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any pending motion
    for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is
    DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    By:___________________________
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