United States v. Spencer , 516 F. App'x 53 ( 2013 )

12-1914-cr
United States v. Spencer
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 26th day of March, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 CHESTER J. STRAUB,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 12-1914-cr
17
18 STACEY T. SPENCER, SR.,
19 Defendant-Appellee.
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21
22 FOR APPELLANT: MONICA J. RICHARDS, Assistant
23 United States Attorney, for
24 William J. Hochul, Jr., United
25 States Attorney for the Western
26 District of New York, Buffalo,
27 New York.
28
1
1 FOR APPELLEE: EDWARD EARL KEY, Law Office of
2 Edward Early Key, Buffalo, New
3 York.
4
5 Appeal from an order of the United States District
6 Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.).
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
9 AND DECREED that the order of the district court be
10 AFFIRMED.
11
12 The United States of America appeals from the order of
13 the United States District Court for the Western District of
14 New York (Skretny, C.J.), adopting the report and
15 recommendation of the magistrate (Scott, M.J.), granting
16 Stacey T. Spencer, Sr.’s motion to suppress evidence
17 discovered pursuant to a search of his car. We assume the
18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
19 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
20
21 In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to
22 suppress, we review the factual findings for clear error,
23 viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
24 prevailing party, and we review legal conclusions de novo.
25 United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182, 188-89 (2d Cir.
26 2012).
27
28 When a search is conducted pursuant to a subject’s
29 purported consent, the government must “demonstrate that the
30 consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of
31 duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth v.
32 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). “The standard for
33 measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
34 Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness--what would
35 the typical reasonable person have understood by the
36 exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v.
37 Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, the magistrate
38 judge made a finding (which the district court adopted) that
39 Spencer “ambiguously consented to search a vehicle
40 he . . . did not possess, a truck,” or that Spencer “was
41 making a glib statement not intended to consent to
42 anything.” J.A. 188. Those findings are not clearly
43 erroneous. We therefore cannot hold that Spencer consented
44 to the search at issue, and the government has declined to
45 press on appeal any argument premised on abandonment.
46
2
1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the
2 government’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of
3 the district court.
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
7
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