United States v. Doe , 356 F. App'x 488 ( 2009 )

08-4064-cr
United States v. Doe
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUM M ARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUM M ARY
ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED B Y THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER
PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUM M ARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A
CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION M UST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
BE ACCOM PANIED BY THE NOTATION: (SUM M ARY ORDER). A PARTY CITING A SUM M ARY
ORDER M UST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUM M ARY ORDER TOGETHER W ITH THE PAPER IN
W HICH THE SUM M ARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
UNLESS THE SUM M ARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE W HICH IS
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE W ITHOUT PAYM ENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT
HTTP://W W W .CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY
OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION M UST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT
DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUM BER OF THE CASE IN W HICH THE ORDER W AS ENTERED.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Theodore Roosevelt United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New
York, on the 14 th day of December, two thousand nine.
PRESENT:
JOSE A. CABRANES,
REENA RAGGI,
Circuit Judges,
RAYMOND J. DEARIE,
Chief District Judge.1
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 08-4064-cr
JOHN DOE,2
1
Chief District Judge Raymond J. Dearie of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2
While pending, this case has been captioned as “United States v. John Doe” with all
briefing maintained under seal. Although we affirm the decision of the district court,
1
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT [SEALED]
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: ELIZABETH KRAMER, Assistant United States
Attorney (Peter A. Norling, Jo Ann M. Navickas,
Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief),
for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York.
APPEARING AS AMICUS CURIAE: LEE G. DUNST (Anne M. Champion, Daniel J.
Chirlin, Brian D. Mogck, Aaron Simowitz, on the
brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York,
New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(John Gleeson, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant John Doe appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for total and
permanent sealing of his sentencing transcript. Because the United States joins Doe in
urging reversal of the challenged denial, this court appointed amicus counsel to defend the
district court judgment so that the appeal could be considered in an adversarial context. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings.
In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to seal judicial proceedings or
pending further proceedings on remand that could result in partial sealing, we continue to
denominate appellant as “John Doe,” and we place the appellate record and the identity of
Doe’s counsel under seal. The United States is directed to report to this court at ninety (90)
day intervals from the date of this order as to the status of proceedings in the district court.
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records, we examine findings of fact for clear error, legal determinations de novo, and the
decision to grant or deny sealing for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d
121, 125 (2d Cir. 1995). Where First Amendment rights are implicated, our abuse-of-
discretion review of a decision granting sealing is “more rigorous” than usual. Id. But
where, as here, we review a district court decision denying sealing, the decision presents no
First Amendment concerns, and we will affirm unless the district court “based its ruling on
an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or
rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims
v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We identify no such abuse of discretion in this case.
While acknowledging the public’s right of access to sentencing proceedings, see
United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2005), and to the transcripts of such
proceedings, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986), United States
v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (3d Cir. 1994), Doe contends that the district court
committed legal error by treating this right as absolute rather than qualified. The record does
not support this contention. At the very start of its discussion of the law relevant to Doe’s
motion, the district court observed that the First Amendment grants the public and the press
a “‘qualified right of access’” to criminal court proceedings. Dist. Ct. Op. at 9 (quoting
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Moreover, the district court did not treat the public right of access as absolute in
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balancing it against competing interests as required by the four-step analysis articulated in
United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d at 128. In doing so, the district court correctly recognized that
the public right of access to criminal proceedings – deeply rooted in the common law and
guaranteed by the First Amendment – is presumptive.3 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
606-07 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-70 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). A party seeking to overcome this presumption bears a
heavy burden. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. at 510 (observing that
presumption of open criminal proceedings may be overcome “only by an overriding interest
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest”). Moreover, as we cautioned in Doe, the burden “increases the more
extensive the closure sought.” 63 F.3d at 129.
Where, as in this case, a party seeks to seal the record of criminal proceedings totally
and permanently, the burden is heavy indeed. The district court’s calibration of the analytic
balance to reflect Doe’s particularly heavy burden hardly qualifies as legal error, much less
abuse of discretion. The district court determined that the first two Doe factors – (1) the
identification of a compelling interest subject to a substantial risk of prejudice and (2) the
3
The Sixth Amendment provides a distinct but related guarantee of public access to
criminal proceedings. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979).
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existence or absence of reasonable and adequate alternatives to sealing 4 – weighed in favor
of Doe, but it concluded that the weight these factors bore was insufficient to support the
requested permanent and total denial of public access to Doe’s sentencing transcript. This
conclusion fell well within the scope of the district court’s discretion. Indeed, at oral
argument, the parties effectively conceded that the identified interests did not require that any
sealing be either total or permanent.
Nevertheless, even if total and permanent sealing is unjustified, it may be possible to
protect the “compelling interest” at issue here by sealing the sentencing transcript in a way
that is less than total and permanent. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial
of the application for a total and permanent sealing of the sentencing transcript, but we
REMAND the case to the district court to afford the parties an opportunity to apply for a
sealing of the sentencing transcript that is partial, non-permanent, or both. If the parties
make such an application, the district court should determine, in the first instance, whether
such a partial or non-permanent sealing is justified under the four-step analysis set forth in
United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121.5 Any renewed appeal following the disposition of the
4
While the district court found that no alternatives to sealing existed by which the
court itself might address the identified compelling interests, it properly recognized that such
alternatives were available to the executive branch, and it reasonably considered that fact in
reaching its ultimate decision to deny Doe’s sweeping application for sealing.
5
Because certain alternatives were discussed at oral argument, the court hereby
unseals the transcript of argument for the limited purpose of allowing the United States to
provide the district court with a copy. That transcript will otherwise remain sealed pending
further order of this court.
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remand shall be referred to this panel.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
By:_______________________
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