Sotomayor v. City of New York , 713 F.3d 163 ( 2013 )

12-2319-cv
Sotomayor v. City of N.Y.
U NITED S TATES C OURT OF A PPEALS
FOR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT
August Term 2012
(Submitted: February 20, 2013 Decided: April 11, 2013)
Docket No. 12-2319-cv
____________________
G LADYS S OTOMAYOR ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , N EW Y ORK C ITY D EPARTMENT OF E DUCATION , F RED
W ALSH , J EANETTE S MITH ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Before:
W INTER , C HIN , and D RONEY , Circuit Judges.
____________________
Appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Weinstein, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants-appellants and dismissing plaintiff-appellant's
discrimination and retaliation claims under federal, state,
and New York City law.
A FFIRMED .
____________________
ALAN E. WOLIN, Wolin & Wolin,
Jericho, New York, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
E DWARD F.X. H ART & D RAKE A. C OLLEY ,
of Counsel, for Michael A.
Cardozo, Corporation
Counsel of the City of New
York, New York, New York,
for Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
P ER C URIAM :
Plaintiff-appellant Gladys Sotomayor appeals from
the district court's judgment dismissing her claims of
employment discrimination and retaliation under federal,
state, and New York City law. We hold that the district
court properly granted summary judgment dismissing her
claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sotomayor, a schoolteacher, is a fifty-six year
old woman of Hispanic descent. She has been employed by
the New York City Department of Education since 1999.
Sotomayor claims that, beginning in the 2007-2008 school
year, defendants unfairly reprimanded her, observed her
classroom with unusual frequency, evaluated her classroom
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performance negatively, and gave her less desirable
classroom assignments and duties. She argues that these
actions were unwarranted and motivated by discriminatory
and retaliatory animus. Defendants acknowledge that they
increased their supervision of and attention toward
Sotomayor, but they contend they did so to address her
performance and behavioral issues.
Sotomayor filed a complaint against defendants
raising claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the New
York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.;
and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§ 8-101 et seq., claiming that she was discriminated and
retaliated against on the basis of her age, race, and
national origin. In addition, she asserts that defendants
violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601 et seq.
After discovery, defendants moved for summary
judgment. On May 24, 2012, the district court issued a
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Memorandum, Order & Judgment granting the motion in favor
of defendants and dismissing all of plaintiff's claims.
Sotomayor v. City of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y.
2012). This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court's grant of
summary judgment after construing all evidence, and drawing
all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving
party. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d
92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate
only when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We have conducted a de novo review of the record,
and we conclude that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants for substantially
the reasons articulated by the district court in its
thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum, Order & Judgment.
See Sotomayor, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226.
With respect to Sotomayor's retaliation claims,
however, the district court discussed retaliation only in
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the context of the FMLA. See id. at 261-62 (declining to
otherwise address allegations of retaliation because
plaintiff never alleged that she had participated in other
"protected activity" under federal, state, or city laws).
We note that Sotomayor asserted a broader claim of
retaliation; her Amended Complaint contends that defendants
retaliated against her after she filed a notice of claim,
filed a discrimination charge with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and began this action.
SDNY ECF No. 13. Nonetheless, we have independently
reviewed the record and conclude that, even if we assumed
defendants' actions resulted in an adverse employment
action, no reasonable jury could find that such actions
were motivated by a retaliatory animus. See, e.g., N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8-107(7) (prohibiting retaliation "in any
manner," even absent an adverse employment action) ; Terry
v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2003) (Title VII
& ADEA); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir.
1997) (claims brought under New York state law are
"analytically identical" to those raised under Title VII).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.
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