Santos-Garcia v. Barr ( 2019 )


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  •      17-1560
    Santos-Garcia v. Barr
    BIA
    Weisel, IJ
    A206 793 723/724
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 14th day of August, two thousand nineteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    8            PETER W. HALL,
    9            DENNY CHIN,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   NORMA ELOGIA SANTOS-GARCIA,
    14   SHELSON EDUARDO MELENDEZ-SANTOS,
    15            Petitioners,
    16
    17                      v.                                       17-1560
    18                                                               NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONERS:                   Heather Y. Axford, Central
    26                                      American Legal Assistance,
    27                                      Brooklyn, NY.
    28
    29   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
    30                                      Attorney General; Nelle M.
    31                                      Seymour, Trial Attorney, Office of
    32                                      Immigration Litigation, United
    1                                        States Department of Justice,
    2                                        Washington, DC.
    3
    4          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7    is DENIED.
    8          Petitioners       Norma   Elogia        Santos-Garcia       and     her   son,
    9    Shelson Eduardo Melendez-Santos, natives                        and citizens of
    10   Honduras, seek review of an April 12, 2017, decision of the
    11   BIA affirming a July 29, 2016, decision of an Immigration
    12   Judge (“IJ”) denying Santos-Garcia’s application for asylum,
    13   withholding     of     removal,     and       relief    under    the    Convention
    14   Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re Norma Elogia Santos-Garcia,
    15   Shelson      Eduardo    Melendez-Santos,          Nos.    A 206     793    723/724
    16   (B.I.A. Apr. 12, 2017), aff’g Nos. A 206 793 723/724 (Immig.
    17   Ct.   N.Y.    City     July   29,   2016).         We    assume    the    parties’
    18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    19   in this case.
    20         Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered
    21   the entirety of the IJ’s decision as well as the BIA’s
    22   additional statement regarding social group.                       See Ming Xia
    23   Chen v. BIA, 
    435 F.3d 141
    , 144 (2d Cir. 2006); Yan Chen v.
    24   Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).                       The applicable
    2
    1    standards of review are well established.                   See 8 U.S.C.
    2    § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 
    762 F.3d 191
    , 195 (2d Cir.
    3    2014)(reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and
    4    questions of law and application of law to fact de novo).
    5           To demonstrate eligibility for asylum and withholding
    6    of removal, an “applicant must establish that race, religion,
    7    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
    8    political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
    9    for       persecuting       the         applicant.”             8 U.S.C.
    10   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also 
    id. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
    Matter of
    11   C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010).             An applicant
    12   who has not suffered past harm must establish a well-founded
    13   fear    of   future     persecution,      which    is   a    “reasonable
    14   possibility of future persecution” for asylum and a “clear
    15   probability”    of    persecution   in    the     withholding   context.
    16   Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 140, 143 (2d Cir.
    17   2008) (quoting Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 
    445 F.3d 554
    , 565
    18   (2d Cir. 2006)).
    19          Santos-Garcia asserts that the agency erred in finding
    20   that she failed to establish past persecution.                   We can
    21   identify no error in the agency’s decision because Santos-
    22   Garcia was not harmed or threatened by the gang and any harm
    3
    1    to her husband is not past persecution of her.    See Tao Jiang
    2    v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 137
    , 141 (2d Cir. 2007) (“As a general
    3    principle, an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution
    4    based solely on harm that was inflicted on a family member on
    5    account of that family member’s political opinion or other
    6    protected characteristic.”).
    7         Absent past persecution, Santos-Garcia had the burden to
    8    show an “objectively reasonable” fear that she would be harmed
    9    in   the   future   on   account   of   a   protected   ground.
    10   Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 169
    , 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
    11   To be objectively reasonable, a fear must be more than
    12   speculative.   See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    ,
    13   129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the
    14   record . . . [a] fear is speculative at best.”).    As Santos-
    15   Garcia argues, the IJ used the clear probability and well-
    16   founded fear standards interchangeably.     Although the agency
    17   errs if it applies the wrong standard, the IJ’s decision as
    18   a whole does not support a conclusion that the wrong standard
    19   was applied: the IJ set out the well-founded fear standard
    20   initially and ultimately concluded that Santos-Garcia had not
    21   shown a well-founded fear of persecution.     Moreover, as the
    22   IJ found there was no evidence to support Santos-Garcia’s
    4
    1    claim as neither she nor her husband were harmed, she was not
    2    directly threatened, and she did not allege that the gang
    3    knew of her existence.         See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of
    4    Justice, 
    293 F.3d 61
    , 68-69 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that
    5    BIA did not apply a more stringent burden of proof than a
    6    well-founded fear because its language that an applicant had
    7    not shown “that he would be subject to persecution upon his
    8    return to China . . . simply fault[ed] the applicant for
    9    failing    to   show    that   any     of       [his]   actions    would   even
    10   potentially subject [him] to persecution upon his return to
    11   China”).
    12        Because these findings are dispositive of asylum and
    13   withholding     of     removal,   we       do    not    reach   the   agency’s
    14   alternative findings whether Santos-Garcia’s social groups
    15   were cognizable or whether she could show a nexus between her
    16   alleged fear and those grounds.                 See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429
    
    17 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies
    18   are not required to make findings on issues the decision of
    19   which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).                    We note,
    20   however, that that BIA’s reasoning is unclear.                    To the extent
    21   that the BIA stated that membership in a family cannot, as a
    22   matter of law, constitute a particular social group, it
    5
    1    misstates the law.      See Vumi v. Gonzales, 
    502 F.3d 150
    , 155
    2    (2d Cir. 2007); see also Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
    3    40, 42-43 (B.I.A. 2017), held pending further review by the
    4    U.S. Att’y Gen., 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018).
    5           Because the BIA denied CAT relief for the reasons given
    6    by the IJ, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision.          See Ming Xia
    7    
    Chen, 435 F.3d at 144
    .      An applicant for CAT relief must show
    8    that “it is more likely than not that . . . she would be
    9    tortured.”     8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).      Although there is no
    10   protected ground requirement for CAT relief, Santos-Garcia’s
    11   CAT claim fails for the same reasons as asylum and withholding
    12   of removal: she did not establish the required fear of future
    13   harm.    See Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 119–20 (2d Cir.
    14   2010) (holding that failure to show possibility of future
    15   harm    for   asylum   means    applicant   “necessarily   fails   to
    16   demonstrate” the higher standard for withholding of removal
    17   and CAT relief).       Santos-Garcia asserts that the IJ ignored
    18   country conditions evidence demonstrating that the Honduran
    19   government    acquiesces   in    torture.    However,   her   country
    20   conditions evidence did not demonstrate that an individual in
    21   her “particular alleged circumstances” would more likely than
    22   not be tortured, or that the government would acquiesce in
    6
    1   her torture.   Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 
    320 F.3d 130
    , 144 (2d
    2   Cir. 2003).
    3       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    4   DENIED.
    5                                FOR THE COURT:
    6                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    7                                Clerk of Court
    8
    7