In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig. ( 2008 )

05-1760-cv
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig.
Also docket nos. 05-1509, 05-1693, 05-1694, 05-1695, 05-1696, 05-1698, 05-
1700, 05-1737, 05-1771, 05-1810, 05-1813, 05-1817, 05-1820, 05-2450, 05-2451
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2006
4 (Argued: June 18, 2007 Final Submission: August 3, 2007
5 Decided: February 21, 2008
6 Errata Filed: March 25, 2008)
7
8 -----------------------------------------------
9 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
10 Litigation
11 -----------------------------------------------
12 J. MICHAEL TWINAM,
13 Plaintiff-Appellant,
14 - v - 05-1509-cv
15 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, et al.,
16 Defendants-Appellees.
17 -----------------------------------------------
18 ROBERT S. BAUER and SANDRA J. BAUER,
19 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
20 - v - 05-1693-cv
21 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
22 Defendants-Appellees.
23 -----------------------------------------------
24 SHERYL A. WALKER, ERIC C. WALKER, A Minor, By his Mother and Next Friend on
25 behalf of SHERYL A. WALKER, STEPHEN J. WALKER, WILLIAM HAMILTON and ESTHER M.
26 HAMILTON, His Wife, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
27 Situated,
28 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
29 - v - 05-1694-cv
30 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
1 Defendants-Appellees,
2 DOES 1-100,
3 Defendants.
4 -----------------------------------------------
5 SHERMAN CLINTON STEARNS and DORTHA MONYENE STEARNS,
6 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
7 - v - 05-1695-cv
8 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, et al.,
9 Defendants-Appellees.
10 -----------------------------------------------
11 WILMER PLOWDEN JR.,
12 Plaintiff-Appellant,
13 - v - 05-1696-cv
14 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
15 Defendants-Appellees.
16 -----------------------------------------------
17 CHARLES T. ANDERSON,
18 Plaintiff-Appellant,
19 - v - 05-1698-cv
20 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, et al.,
21
22 Defendants-Appellees,
23 PFIZER, INC., et. al.,
24 Defendants.
25 -----------------------------------------------
26 LINDA FAYE CLOSTIO-BREAUX, RACHEAL M. BREAUX, JOEY M. BREAUX, APRIL R. BREAUX,
27 STACY M. BREAUX, ERIC J. BREAUX, and SCOTT M. BREAUX,
28 Plaintiffs,
29 CHARLES J. BREAUX,
30 Plaintiff-Appellant,
31 - v - 05-1700-cv
32 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, et al.,
-2-
1 Defendants-Appellees.
2 -----------------------------------------------
3 THOMAS G. GALLAGHER,
4 Plaintiff-Appellant,
5 - v - 05-1737-cv
6 DOW CHEMICAL CO. and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP.,
7 Defendants-Appellees.
8 ----------------------------------------------
9 DANIEL RAYMOND STEPHENSON, SUSAN STEPHENSON, DANIEL ANTHONY STEPHENSON and
10 EMILY ELIZABETH STEPHENSON,
11 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
12 - v - 05-1760-cv
13 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
14 Defendants-Appellees.
15 -----------------------------------------------
16 CASEY J. SAMPEY, JR.,
17 Plaintiff-Appellant,
18 - v - 05-1771-cv
19 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
20 Defendants-Appellees.
21 -----------------------------------------------
22 CHRISTINE NELSON, Individually and on behalf of her deceased husband, FRANKLIN
23 NELSON, REGINALD WILLIAMS, KAREN HOLLAND, FRANKLIN NELSON JR. and SHALISA
24 NELSON,
25 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
26 - v - 05-1810-cv
27 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
28 Defendants-Appellees.
29 -----------------------------------------------
30 HENRY C. KIDD and SHIRLEANE J. KIDD,
31 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
32 - v - 05-1813-cv
33 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
-3-
1 Defendants-Appellees.
2 -----------------------------------------------
3 WILLIE WILLIAMS JR., and RITA WILLIAMS,
4 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
5 - v - 05-1817-cv
6 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
7 Defendants-Appellees.
8 -----------------------------------------------
9 JOE ISAACSON and PHYLLIS LISA ISAACSON,
10 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
11 - v - 05-1820-cv
12 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
13 Defendants-Appellees.
14 -----------------------------------------------
15 VICKEY S. GARNCARZ,
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17 - v - 05-2450-cv
18 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
19 Defendants-Appellees.
20 -----------------------------------------------
21 JACK RICHARD PATTON,
22 Plaintiff-Appellant,
23 - v - 05-2451-cv
24 DOW CHEMICAL CO., et al.,
25 Defendants-Appellees.
26 -----------------------------------------------
27
28 Before: MINER, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
29 Appeals from final judgments of the United States
30 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Jack B.
31 Weinstein, Judge) granting summary judgment to the defendants,
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1 orders denying certain requests for discovery, and the order
2 denying the Stephenson plaintiffs' motion to amend their
3 complaint.
4 Affirmed.
5 JAMES BOANERGES, Cooper, Sprague, Jackson &
6 Boanerges, P.C., Houston, TX; MARK I. BRONSON,
7 Newman, Bronson & Wallis, St. Louis, Missouri;
8 GERSON H. SMOGER, Smoger & Associates, Oakland,
9 California; MARK R. CUKER, Williams Cuker
10 Berezofsky, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs-
11 Appellants;
12 Christopher E. Buckey, Shanley, Sweeney, Reilly,
13 & Allen, P.C., Albany, NY; David E. Cherry,
14 Campbell, Cherry, Harrison, Davis & Dove, P.C.,
15 Waco, TX; John H. Pucheu, Pucheu, Pucheu &
16 Robertson, L.L.P., Eunice, LA; Bernard F. Duhon,
17 Abbeville, LA; Robert B. Evans, III, Burgos,
18 Evans & Wilson LLC, Metairie, LA; Nira T.
19 Kersmich, Rochester, NY; Jeffrey D. Guerriero,
20 Guerriero & Guerriero, Monroe, LA; Morris E.
21 Cohen, Brooklyn, NY; James Russell Tucker,
22 Dallas, TX (on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-
23 Appellants.
24 ANDREW L. FREY, CHARLES A. ROTHFELD (Lauren R.
25 Goldman, Christopher J. Houpt, of counsel),
26 Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, New York, NY, for
27 Defendants-Appellees.
28 John C. Sabetta, Andrew T. Hahn, Sr., Seyfarth
29 Shaw LLP, New York, NY; Seth P. Waxman, Paul R.
30 Q. Wolfson, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale &
31 Dorr, Washington, DC; Richard P. Bress, Latham &
32 Watkins, Washington, DC; Michael M. Gordon, King
33 & Spaulding LLP, New York, NY; William A.
34 Krohley, William C. Heck, Kelley Drye & Warren
35 LLP, New York, NY; James L. Stengel, Laurie
36 Strauch Weiss, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
37 LLP, New York, NY; Steven Brock, James V. Aiosa,
38 Richard S. Feldman, Rivkin Radler LLP,
39 Uniondale, NY; Lawrence D'Aloise, Jr., Clark,
40 Gagliardi & Miller, White Plains, NY; Myron
41 Kalish, New York, NY (on the brief), for
42 Defendants-Appellees.
43 William A. Rossbach (Timothy M. Bechtel, of
44 counsel), ROSSBACH, HART, BECHTEL, P.C.,
45 Missoula, MT; P.B. Onderdonk, Jr., National
46 Judge Advocate, The American Legion,
47 Indianapolis, IN, for Amicus Curiae Veterans and
48 Military Service Organizations.
49 Ian Heath Gershengorn (Lise T. Spacapan and
50 Fazal R. Khan, on the brief), Jenner & Block
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1 LLP, Washington DC, for Amicus Curiae American
2 Chemistry Council and Chlorine Chemistry
3 Council.
4 Raphael Metzger, Metzger Law Group, Long Beach,
5 CA, for Amicus Curiae Drs. Brian G. Durie, Devra
6 Davis, Peter L. deFur, Alan Lockwood, David
7 Ozonoff, Arnold J. Schecter, David Wallinga,
8 Carl F. Cranor, The Council for Education and
9 Research on Toxic, and the Lymphoma Foundation
10 of America.
11
12 SACK, Circuit Judge:
13 More than thirty-five years ago, the United States
14 military stopped using Agent Orange and related chemicals as
15 defoliants to prosecute the war in Vietnam. This appeal is but
16 the latest chapter in a thirty-year struggle by the litigants,
17 their counsel, and judges of the United States District Court for
18 the Eastern District of New York and of this Court to bring to
19 just legal closure to the alleged consequences of that use.
20 We explain below why these sixteen unconsolidated
21 appeals are now before us and why, in our view, the government
22 contractor defense applies to bar these claims. In the course of
23 doing so, we consider the discovery limitations imposed by the
24 district court and that court's denial of the Stephenson
25 plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. By an opinion
26 written by Judge Hall also filed today, we decide that those of
27 the sixteen cases that were originally filed in state court were
28 properly removed by the defendants to federal court. A third
29 decision by the panel, written by Judge Miner, addresses the
30 separate issues related to the use of Agent Orange raised on
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1 appeal in Vietnam Assoc. for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v.
2 Dow Chemical Co., No. 05-1953-cv.
3 The plaintiffs pursuing this appeal are United States
4 military veterans or their relatives who allege that myriad
5 injuries, mostly forms of cancer, were caused by the veterans'
6 exposure to the chemical defoliant "Agent Orange" during service
7 in Vietnam.1 They assert that the district court erred in
8 concluding that the government contractor defense -- which
9 protects government contractors from state tort liability under
10 certain circumstances when they provide defective products to the
11 government -- applied to bar the plaintiffs' claims. The
12 plaintiffs contend further that the district court abused its
13 discretion by denying them discovery beyond what was available in
14 files from prior Agent Orange litigation. We disagree with the
15 plaintiffs on both counts.
16 We also conclude that it was error to deny the
17 Stephensons' motion to amend their complaint. In light of our
18 conclusion that the defendants are entitled to invoke the
19 government contractor defense, however, we find the error to be
20 harmless.
1
Plaintiff Garncarz is the only plaintiff who alleges
harmful exposure to Agent Orange outside of Vietnam. She
contends that her husband died from conditions resulting from his
exposure to Agent Orange along the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
She does not, however, raise any distinct arguments arising out
of her husband's alleged exposure in Korea. We therefore
consider her case, for present purposes, as indistinguishable
from the others before us.
-7-
1 We therefore affirm the judgments of the district court
2 in all respects.
3 BACKGROUND
4 The cases concerning the United States military's
5 acquisition and use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, of
6 which these are but a relative few, and their massive factual
7 records, have been addressed in so many different judicial
8 opinions over the years that we do not attempt even to list them
9 here. See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 304
10 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Agent Orange III Gov.
11 Contractor Def. Op."). Neither do we undertake a detailed
12 retelling of the history of or facts underlying this litigation.
13 See id. at 407-22 (describing the history of Agent Orange
14 lawsuits brought by Vietnam veterans).2 Instead, we set forth
15 below only what we think necessary for an understanding of our
16 resolution of these appeals.
17 Agent Orange was one of several chemically similar
18 herbicides3 used by the United States government during the
19 Vietnam War in connection with "Operation Ranch Hand," the code
2
The Court's opinion in Vietnam Assoc. for Victims of Agent
Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chem. Co., — F.3d —, 2008 WL —, 2008 LEXIS
App. —, No. 05-1953-cv (2d Cir. 2008), filed today, sets forth in
some detail, based on the record in that litigation, the history
of the employment of Agent Orange and related chemicals to
prosecute the war in Vietnam.
3
The several formulations were, like Agent Orange, named
according to the color-coded band on the drums containing the
chemicals. Since Agent Orange was the most widely deployed, the
parties refer to all the herbicides collectively as "Agent
Orange" unless the particular circumstance requires that the
agents be distinguished. We adopt the same convention.
-8-
1 name for the military's efforts to defoliate various areas in
2 Vietnam. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp.
3 2d 7, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Between 1961 and 1971, herbicide
4 mixtures . . . were used by the United States and Republic of
5 Vietnam . . . forces to defoliate forests and mangroves, to clear
6 perimeters of military installations and to destroy 'unfriendly'
7 crops, as a tactic for decreasing enemy armed forces[']
8 protective cover and food supplies."). The government purchased
9 the defoliants from the defendants-appellees in the instant
10 appeals pursuant to various government contracts.4 As the
11 defoliation campaign intensified, many of the contracts were
12 subjected to various government directives entered pursuant to
13 the Defense Production Act of 1950, see 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 et
14 seq., and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. The
15 government characterized delivery of Agent Orange as part of the
16 prosecution of military action, which enabled the defendants to
17 procure otherwise scarce materials and equipment necessary to
18 produce it. Agent Orange III Gov. Contractor Def. Op., 304 F.
19 Supp. 2d at 424-25.
20 The Agent Orange delivered to the government was a
21 mixture of two different herbicides: 2,4-D (2,4-
22 Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (2,4,5-
23 Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid). The contracts required that the
4
Most of these contracts have been produced to the
plaintiffs, but some are difficult to read in the form in which
they survive, and, as discussed below, some are missing.
-9-
1 chemicals be nearly 100% pure and that they be combined in
2 roughly equal proportions.
3 The manufacture of 2,4,5-T produced, as a byproduct,
4 trace elements of the toxic chemical dioxin (2,3,7,8-
5 Tetrachlorodibenzo para dioxin (TCDD)). The plaintiffs allege
6 that it is dioxin that caused the injuries of which they now
7 complain.
8 The amount of dioxin contained in a particular batch of
9 Agent Orange varied depending on the production method used by
10 its manufacturer. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
11 818 F.2d 145, 150, 173 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Agent Orange I Settlement
12 Op."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re "Agent Orange"
13 Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Agent
14 Orange I Opt-Out Op."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). The
15 defendants knew at the time they were manufacturing Agent Orange
16 that dioxin was a byproduct and that it could cause certain kinds
17 of harm under certain conditions. Various government agencies
18 and officers assessed the toxicity of the defoliating agents,
19 including Agent Orange, being used in Vietnam. Precisely what
20 knowledge the government and the defendants possessed and when
21 they came to have it is in dispute.
22 I. Overview of Agent Orange Litigation
23 The plaintiffs now before us on appeal represent a
24 small fraction of the many Americans who have pursued legal
25 claims arising out of the government's use of Agent Orange to
26 fight the Vietnam War. See generally Agent Orange III Gov.
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1 Contractor Def. Op., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 410-14 (listing more than
2 one hundred Agent-Orange-related decisions); see also, e.g., id.
3 at 407-23 (detailing the history of Agent Orange litigation
4 involving Vietnam veterans). Their claims find their roots in
5 the "Agent Orange I" litigation, the veterans' class action begun
6 in the late 1970s and settled in 1984.
7 In those cases, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
8 Litigation designated the United States District Court for the
9 Eastern District of New York as the Multidistrict Litigation
10 ("MDL") court for all federal Agent Orange-related cases brought
11 by military veterans of various countries. Thereafter, first
12 Judge Pratt and then Judge Weinstein presided over proceedings
13 involving approximately 600 litigants, hundreds of thousands of
14 putative class members, several years of motion practice
15 (including motions for class certification), and one appeal to
16 this Court. On the eve of trial of those cases, the defendants
17 and class representatives reached what was then thought by the
18 parties and the courts to be a final global settlement of Agent
19 Orange-related cases in the amount of $180 million. Agent Orange
20 I Settlement Op., 818 F.2d at 152-55.
21 Because of what we termed "formidable hurdles" to the
22 plaintiffs' claims, id. at 174, we affirmed the district court's
23 approval of the settlement at what -- even at a total of $180
24 million -- we termed "nuisance value," equivalent to "at best
25 only a small multiple of, at worst less than, the fees the
26 chemical companies would have had to pay to their lawyers had
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1 they continued the litigation." Id. at 171. The Plaintiffs in
2 287 cases opted out of the class and thereby the settlement.
3 Thereafter, the district court granted the defendants'
4 motion for summary judgment in those opt-out actions "on the
5 alternative dispositive grounds that no opt-out plaintiff could
6 prove that a particular ailment was caused by Agent Orange, that
7 no plaintiff could prove which defendant had manufactured the
8 Agent Orange that allegedly caused his or her injury, and that
9 all the claims were barred by the military contractor defense."
10 Agent Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at 189 (internal citations
11 omitted).
12 From 1987 through 1997, the settlement fund, which,
13 with interest and other augmentations, eventually grew to about
14 $330 million was distributed to, inter alios, some 291,000 class
15 members who filed claims prior to the 1994 cutoff date. Agent
16 Orange III Gov. Contractor Def. Op., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
17 Meanwhile, two sets of plaintiffs who had been members of the
18 original plaintiff class and who were therefore entitled to
19 receive settlement payments, but whose injuries had manifested
20 after their opportunity to opt out of the class action had
21 expired, filed class actions on behalf of themselves and other
22 similarly situated veterans. The district court decided that
23 because the plaintiffs were class members, their claims were
24 barred, and we affirmed. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
25 Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1439 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Agent Orange II"),
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1 overruled in part on other grounds by Syngenta Crop Protection,
2 Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002).
3 Shortly after the settlement fund distributions were
4 completed, the third, and instant, series of lawsuits was
5 initiated. These were brought by two of the sixteen plaintiffs
6 now before us, the Isaacsons and Stephensons, who had not been
7 members of the original plaintiff class. These veterans and
8 their families alleged injuries that resulted from exposure to
9 Agent Orange but did not manifest until after the 1994 cutoff
10 date for filing settlement claims in the original actions. In a
11 2001 opinion, we held that the district court had erred in
12 deciding that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Agent
13 Orange I settlement. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249,
14 261 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Agent Orange III").5 We concluded that a
15 conflict existed between the plaintiffs and the class
16 representatives because the representatives had permitted the
17 settlement fund to terminate without a provision for post-1994
18 claimants such as these plaintiffs. Id. at 260-61 (relying on
19 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) and Amchem Prods.,
20 Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)). As a result, the
21 plaintiffs were not adequately represented by the class, and
5
We also held that the defendants had properly removed the
Isaacson case from state to federal court. Id. at 256-57. As
explained in the companion opinion, see Stephenson v. Dow Chem.
Co., 346 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2003), this holding was
subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded to the
district court for a further determination as to the propriety of
removal. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 112
(2003).
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1 Agent Orange I did not prevent them from pursuing their claims.
2 Id. at 261.6
3 II. The Instant Appeals
4 On remand, the Stephensons and Isaacsons were
5 eventually joined by fourteen other sets of plaintiffs alleging
6 Agent Orange injuries first discovered after the 1994 cutoff
7 date. The cases were not consolidated, but the district court
8 conducted simultaneous proceedings and applied rulings in the
9 Stephenson and Isaacson cases to each of the others. Together,
10 the plaintiffs raised three tort claims under various state laws:
11 design defect, failure to warn, and manufacturing defect.
12 Six days after our mandate issued in Agent Orange III,
13 the defendants moved in the district court for summary judgment
14 against the Stephensons and Isaacsons.7 At about the same time,
15 the Stephensons moved to amend their complaint.
6
At oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing on
the question of whether we are bound by our decision in Agent
Orange III to conclude that these plaintiffs are not bound by the
settlement agreement addressed in Agent Orange I. We received
the parties' submissions on August 3, 2007. In light of our
disposition regarding the government contractor defense, however,
we decline to reach the issue.
7
Although not expressly raised by the appellants or noted
by the district court, the defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement
appears to have been in blatant violation of Local Rule 56.1,
which requires summary judgment movants to list each undisputed
material fact "followed by citation to evidence which would be
admissible . . . ." S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local R. 56.1(a), (d),
available at http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf. The
defendants' approach to compliance with this rule has rendered
our task of determining on appeal whether there are genuine
issues of disputed material fact considerably more difficult than
it should have been.
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1 On February 9, 2004, several days after receiving
2 voluminous submissions from the plaintiffs and two weeks after
3 oral argument, the district court issued four decisions, two of
4 which -- one granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment
5 and the other denying the Stephensons' motion to amend -- are now
6 before us on appeal.8 Even though only the motions for summary
7 judgment in Stephenson and Isaacson were before it, the district
8 court considered all the evidence put forth by the parties in
9 Agent Orange I in ruling on defendants' summary judgment motion.
10 Having done so, it concluded that the government contractor
11 defense barred both the design defect and failure-to-warn claims.
12 Agent Orange III Gov't Contractor Def. Op., 304 F. Supp. 2d at
13 441-42. As to plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims, the court
14 concluded that they were barred because the defendants' products
15 conformed to the government's specifications. Id. at 442.
16 In granting the motion for summary judgment, however,
17 the district court noted that the plaintiffs had complained of
18 "difficulties in obtaining evidence for their position," an
19 "understandable" problem in light of the passage of time between
20 exposure and injury. Id. "To ensure due process," id.,
21 therefore, Judge Weinstein charted a distinctly unusual course --
22 he permitted discovery, never undertaken by Agent Orange III
23 litigants in light of the timing of prior appeals and the
8
The district court also denied plaintiffs' motion to
strike certain of defendants' affidavits and exhibits -- a ruling
the plaintiffs did not appeal -- and found removal of the state
court cases proper. Judge Hall's companion opinion addresses
this latter ruling.
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1 defendants' motion, to continue through August 10, 2004, and he
2 set a motion schedule for an anticipated motion for
3 reconsideration based on the results of that discovery. Id.
4 Thereafter, the district court ordered that all files
5 relating to Agent Orange sent to the National Archives pursuant
6 to court order following Agent Orange I be returned to the
7 district court and made available to the plaintiffs for their
8 review. The magistrate judge assigned to the case then denied
9 all requests for additional non-MDL discovery, although the
10 district court subsequently granted the plaintiffs access to "up
11 to six complete deposition transcripts utilized in non-MDL 381
12 cases claimed by plaintiffs to shed light on relevant knowledge
13 of defendants."
14 On November 3, 2004, the plaintiffs in Stephenson and
15 Isaacson, as anticipated, filed a motion for reconsideration of
16 the district court's order granting summary judgment. On
17 November 16, 2004, the district court, without awaiting response
18 from the defendants, denied the plaintiffs' motion. In re "Agent
19 Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d 873, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y.
20 2004). It further ordered the defendants to "submit a specific
21 judgment in favor of each named defendant against each named
22 plaintiff whose claims arise from service in the Armed Forces of
23 the United States," thereby rendering the court's judgment in
24 Stephenson and Isaacson applicable to each of the fourteen
25 additional plaintiffs now before us on appeal. Id. at 875.
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1 Following a motion by the Bauer plaintiffs, who argued
2 that granting the motion for summary judgment was inappropriate
3 because, inter alia, the procedural posture of their case had
4 rendered them unable to respond to the defendants' motion, all
5 plaintiffs were ultimately given until February 28, 2005, to
6 submit additional papers supporting their position that summary
7 judgment should not have been granted. Oral argument was held on
8 February 28. On March 2, 2005, the district court summarily
9 reaffirmed its November 16, 2004 Order. In re "Agent Orange"
10 Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 79 MD 381, 2005 WL 483416, at *1
11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005). Separate judgments of dismissal in each
12 action were then filed.
13 More than a year before, in February 2004, the district
14 court had denied the Stephensons' motion to amend their complaint
15 to add additional defendants and several new causes of action.
16 Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 220 F.R.D. 22, 25-26 (E.D.N.Y.
17 2004). Although the defendants had never answered the
18 Stephensons' original complaint, filed pro se in the Western
19 District of Louisiana, the motion to amend was denied on a
20 variety of grounds. Id.21 The plaintiffs appeal. Before us are challenges to (1)
22 the district court's grant of the motion for summary judgment as
23 to their design claim only;9 (2) the denial of their requests for
9
Because the plaintiffs' briefs make no arguments regarding
the district court's findings as to their failure-to-warn or
manufacturing defect claims, we deem these claims to have been
abandoned. See Hughes v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local
#45, 386 F.3d 101, 104 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004).
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1 additional discovery; and (3) the denial of the Stephensons'
2 motion to amend.10
3 DISCUSSION
4 I. Summary Judgment
5 A. Standard of Review
6 We review the district court's grant of summary
7 judgment de novo, "construing the evidence in the light most
8 favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable
9 inferences in its favor." Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d
10 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). "We will affirm the judgment only if
11 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and if the
12 moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.13 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
14 B. The Government Contractor Defense
15 Almost twenty years ago, in Boyle v. United
16 Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the Supreme Court
17 recognized the government contractor defense,11 a federal common
18 law doctrine. The Court concluded that the "uniquely federal
10
Not all of the plaintiffs have raised the same arguments
on appeal. Because the defendants have grouped the plaintiffs
together as one unit in opposing this appeal, and because by
Order dated September 15, 2005, we granted the plaintiffs
permission to rely on the arguments made by one another, we here
treat each issue raised on appeal by one plaintiff, with the
exception of the Stephensons' motion to amend, as having been
raised by all.
11
The defense is referred to in the case law as the
"government contractor defense" or the "military contractor
defense." For purposes of this opinion, we refer to it as either
the "government contractor defense" or simply the "contractor
defense."
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1 interest[]" of "getting the Government's work done" requires
2 that, under some circumstances, independent contractors be
3 protected from tort liability associated with their performance
4 of government procurement contracts. Id. at 504-05.
5 The Court looked to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
6 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. ("FTCA"), for guidance. Id. at 509-12.
7 Under the FTCA, Congress waived sovereign immunity for the
8 government insofar as Congress "authorized damages to be
9 recovered against the United States for harm caused by the
10 negligent or wrongful conduct of Government employees, to the
11 extent that a private person would be liable under the law of the
12 place where the conduct occurred." Id. at 511 (citing 28 U.S.C.
13 § 1346(b)). The Act's discretionary function exception, however,
14 carves out from that authorization "'[a]ny claim . . . based upon
15 the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
16 a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
17 or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
18 involved be abused.'" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a))
19 (brackets in original).
20 The Boyle Court concluded that the protection for
21 discretionary action taken by federal agencies and employees
22 implies some measure of similar protection for government
23 contractors even though they are themselves non-governmental
24 entities. The Court noted that the exercise of government
25 discretion is inherent to military contracting:
26 We think that the selection of the
27 appropriate design for military equipment to
-19-
1 be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a
2 discretionary function within the meaning of
3 this provision. It often involves not merely
4 engineering analysis but judgment as to the
5 balancing of many technical, military, and
6 even social considerations, including
7 specifically the trade-off between greater
8 safety and greater combat effectiveness.
9 Id. Accordingly, the Court said,
10 permitting "second-guessing" of these
11 judgments through state tort suits against
12 contractors would produce the same effect
13 sought to be avoided by the FTCA
14 exemption. . . . To put the point
15 differently: It makes little sense to
16 insulate the Government against financial
17 liability for the judgment that a particular
18 feature of military equipment is necessary
19 when the Government produces the equipment
20 itself, but not when it contracts for the
21 production.
22 Id. at 511-12 (citation omitted). The defense thus protects
23 government contractors from the specter of liability when the
24 operation of state tort law would significantly conflict with the
25 government's contracting interest. Id. at 507.
26 Adopting the reasoning employed in several previous
27 court of appeals decisions, the Court limited "the scope of
28 [state law] displacement" to instances in which "(1) the United
29 States approved reasonably precise specifications [for the
30 allegedly defectively designed equipment]; (2) the equipment
31 conformed to those specifications; and (3) the [contractor who
32 supplied the equipment] warned the United States about the
33 dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
34 supplier but not to the United States." Id. at 512. The first
35 two requirements "assure that the suit [from which protection is
36 sought] is within the area where the policy of the 'discretionary
-20-
1 function' would be frustrated -- i.e., they assure that the
2 design feature in question was considered by a Government
3 officer, and not merely by the contractor itself." Id. The
4 third requirement is imposed because "in its absence, the
5 displacement of state tort law would create some incentive for
6 the manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since conveying
7 that knowledge might disrupt the contract but withholding it
8 would produce no liability." Id. The Court therefore "adopt[ed]
9 this provision lest [its] effort to protect discretionary
10 functions perversely impede them by cutting off information
11 highly relevant to the discretionary decision." Id. at 512-13.
12 The plaintiffs here contend that the defendants cannot,
13 at least as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage,
14 satisfy any one of the three requirements.
15 1. Reasonably Precise Specifications.
16 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have not
17 established the first Boyle requirement -- that "the United
18 States approve[] reasonably precise specifications," 487 U.S. at19 512 -- because: (1) Agent Orange procurement contracts contained
20 no specifications regarding the defective feature, dioxin; (2)
21 there is at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding
22 whether Agent Orange was a commercially available product whose
23 specifications were created by the defendants rather than the
24 government, whose involvement was minimal; and (3) the alleged
25 defect was unrelated to the contractual specifications for
26 2,4,5-T because it was the defendants' chosen manufacturing
-21-
1 processes -- with which the government was not involved and which
2 were not integral to contract compliance -- that caused dioxin to
3 be present.12
4 The first argument concerns the proper conception of
5 the complained-of defect and can readily be resolved. The second
6 and third arguments are, in distinct ways, about how the
7 government exercised its discretionary authority: The second
8 argument asks whether the government was involved in the
9 contractual process to the extent that Boyle requires; while the
10 third asks us to determine in what context the government must
11 exercise its discretion for the government contractor defense to
12 apply. To conduct this third inquiry, we must determine the
13 source of the "conflict" between the government's interests and
14 state tort law that is required for the defense to apply.
15 a. The complained-of defect
12
The plaintiffs also complain that because the defendants
cannot produce every contract between them and the government for
Agent Orange, it is impossible for the defendants to prove what
contractual specifications they were subject to under the missing
contracts and, therefore, impossible for the defendants to meet
their burden of proof under the government contractor defense.
This argument is without merit for many reasons. We note
here only that although it is true that a defendant who had no
way to demonstrate what specifications were within the contract
or contracts at issue would likely have difficulty successfully
asserting the contractor defense, the plaintiffs here do not
attempt to rely on particular contracts or to distinguish one
contract from another. None of their arguments regarding the
first Boyle prong rely on the specifications of a particular
contract versus the specifications of another. The plaintiffs
therefore have not demonstrated that the inability to produce
each and every contract is relevant to the applicability of the
government contractor defense for the Agent Orange contracts as a
whole.
-22-
1 The plaintiffs assert that because the contracts at
2 issue contain no specifications whatsoever with regard to the
3 dioxin, the government exercised no discretionary authority over
4 that which is the subject of their state tort litigations, as a
5 successful defense based on Boyle requires. Their argument
6 misconceives the nature of what the contracts in question were
7 about and defines the alleged defective design too narrowly.
8 The contracts at issue provided for the defendants to
9 supply Agent Orange. The Agent Orange was allegedly defective
10 because it contained excessive trace amounts of dioxin, which
11 were present as a result of the manufacture of a specified Agent
12 Orange component, 2,4,5-T. The dioxin -- while a defect of
13 2,4,5-T -- was not itself defective, nor did it exist within
14 Agent Orange apart from the 2,4,5-T therein.13 It was therefore
15 the 2,4,5-T that was alleged to be defective, not the dioxin.
16 b. The government approved specifications for a
17 uniquely tailored product
18 The plaintiffs contend that the defendants cannot
19 demonstrate that the government exercised its discretionary
20 authority to create the Agent Orange specifications that are
21 contained in the contracts. The government contractor defense
22 protects federal contractors solely as a means of protecting the
23 government's discretionary authority over areas of significant
24 federal interest such as military procurement. Defendants
25 asserting the defense must demonstrate that the government made a
13
Pure lead, without defect, may be a defect of a child's
painted toy.
-23-
1 discretionary determination about the material it obtained that
2 relates to the defective design feature at issue. Where the
3 government "merely rubber stamps a design, . . . or where the
4 [g]overnment merely orders a product from stock without a
5 significant interest in the alleged design defect," the
6 government has not made a discretionary decision in need of
7 protection, and the defense is therefore inapplicable. Lewis v.
8 Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir.) (citing Trevino
9 v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480, 1486 (5th Cir.),
10 cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989), and Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509)
11 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 92412 (1993). If the government buys a product "off-the-shelf" -- "as-
13 is" -- the seller of that product cannot be heard to assert that
14 it is protected from the tort-law consequences of the product's
15 defects. Where the government is merely an incidental purchaser,
16 the seller was not following the government's discretionary
17 procurement decisions.
18 Here, the plaintiffs contend that the government
19 rubber-stamped its approval of the defendants' suggested
20 specifications, which, in turn, were simply combinations of off-
21 the-shelf, commercially available herbicides. They say that Dow
22 Chemical owned the patents for certain aspects of the herbicides'
23 component parts and that many different defendants manufactured
24 and sold 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D in various combinations as early as
25 1948, with some of the formulations including the same 50%
26 mixture as Agent Orange. As a result, the plaintiffs assert,
-24-
1 there are at least triable issues of fact as to whether (1) Agent
2 Orange and related herbicides were "stock" products, rather than
3 products tailored to the government's needs; and (2) even if the
4 herbicides were not commercially available products, Agent
5 Orange's components were devised by the defendants without the
6 significant government input necessary to meet the first Boyle
7 requirement.
8 As to the former, the plaintiffs do not dispute the
9 defendants' assertions that 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D were not
10 commercially available at the same high concentrations as that
11 contained in Agent Orange. The Stephensons, for example, concede
12 that 2,4,5-T was not commercially available in concentrations
13 greater than 55%. See Final Reply Br. for Pl.-Appellants, 05-
14 1760-cv, at 67-68. Agent Orange, by contrast, contained 2,4,5-T
15 at greater than 90% purity levels. See, e.g., Aff. of William A.
16 Krohley, counsel for defendant Hercules Inc., Oct. 27, 2004
17 ("Krohley Aff."), Exh. 11 (July 19, 1963 military specification).
18 Moreover, as the Fifth Circuit aptly noted in unrelated
19 Agent Orange litigation, the fact that a product supplied to the
20 government comprises commercially available component parts says
21 nothing about whether the finished product resulted from the
22 exercise of governmental discretion as to its design. "[A]ll
23 products can eventually be broken down into various off-the-shelf
24 components." Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 420
25 (5th Cir. 2001); see also In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist.
26 New York Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 638 (2d Cir. 1990)
-25-
1 ("Grispo") (Miner, J., concurring) ("[T]he [g]overnment
2 prescription of how [stock] items should be combined and packaged
3 [is] the key to the military contractor defense . . . .").
4 As to the latter argument -- the plaintiffs' contention
5 that there was no significant government input -- the plaintiffs
6 misperceive the nature of the government involvement necessary to
7 invoke the contractor defense. That the component chemicals were
8 not developed for military use in the first instance, that some
9 aspects of their composition were patented, and that the
10 defendants may have proposed certain specifications to the
11 government, are not determinative. Boyle explicitly contemplated
12 government reliance on manufacturers' expertise in making a fully
13 informed decision as to what to order. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at14 513. "[I]t is necessary only that the government approve, rather
15 than create, the specifications . . . ." Carley v. Wheeled
16 Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 86817 (1993); see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513 ("The design ultimately
18 selected may well reflect a significant policy judgment by
19 [g]overnment officials whether or not the contractor rather than
20 those officials developed the design.").
21 The extent of the defendants' involvement in suggesting
22 specifications or the defendants' reliance on previously attained
23 industry expertise in doing so is thus not conclusive. The
24 government exercises adequate discretion over the contract
25 specifications to invoke the defense if it independently and
26 meaningfully reviews the specifications such that the government
-26-
1 remains the "agent[] of decision." Grispo, 897 F.2d at 630; see
2 also Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir.)
3 (government issued reasonably precise specifications when it
4 reviewed contractor's detailed drawings several times and
5 evaluated test models), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991);
6 Harduvel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir.
7 1989) (government issued reasonably precise specifications for F-
8 16 fighter aircraft having approved its design following
9 "continuous back and forth" with contractor), cert. denied, 494
10 U.S. 1030 (1990).
11 With respect to Agent Orange, the record contains, for
12 example, a memorandum dated February 22, 1963, regarding "Ester
13 Specifications for U.S. Army Biological Laboratories," written by
14 an employee of one of the defendants, that discussed a February
15 8, 1963, meeting called "to satisfy the U.S. Army about
16 specifications and typical physical properties on the next type
17 of blend they [sic] will be purchasing." Mem. from I.F. Hortman
18 to, inter alios, S.D. Daniels and W.A. Kuhn (Feb. 22, 1963), at
19 1. It indicated that an effort to permit use of a different n-
20 butyl ester from 2,4,5-T was "impossible at this time because the
21 Army had studied only the normal esters," and that, therefore,
22 the chemical company would have to present the proposed change
23 directly to "the commanding officer, U.S. Army Biological
24 Laboratories and Dr. Charles Minarick, Chief of Crops Division"
25 for approval. Id. And notes from a 1968 meeting between
26 government officials and representatives of several of the
-27-
1 defendants indicate that the government insisted on a test for
2 chemical composition despite "much resistance to this added
3 requirement on the part of the Industry [sic]" as well as on a
4 98% purity level for the 2,4,5-T ester. Memorandum of R.A.
5 Guidi, Diamond Alkali Co. (Feb. 20, 1968), at 1-2.
6 We conclude, based on the evidence in the extensive
7 record that has been brought to our attention,14 that no
8 reasonable jury could find that the government did not exercise
9 sufficient discretion for it to have been said to have "approved"
10 specifications for the herbicides. The government was plainly
11 the "agent[] of decision," Grispo, 897 F.2d at 630, with respect
12 to Agent Orange's contractually specified composition.
13 c. The government made a discretionary
14 determination regarding Agent Orange's toxicity
15 The next question, and we think it to be a more
16 difficult one, is whether the government made a discretionary
17 determination that created the conflict between the federal
18 government's interests and the defendant's state law duties that
19 is necessary to invoke the government contractor defense. The
20 plaintiffs argue that the defendants could have manufactured
21 Agent Orange that produced either dioxin-free or nearly dioxin-
22 free 2,4,5-T by employing the lower-temperature manufacturing
23 process developed and used by a German manufacturer, C.H.
14
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not impose an obligation [on the
court considering a motion for summary judgment] to perform an
independent review of the record to find proof of a factual
dispute." Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d
467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
-28-
1 Boehringer Sohn. This process, the plaintiffs say, would have
2 permitted the defendants to comply with their federal contractual
3 duties and deliver a less toxic defoliating agent, albeit at a
4 somewhat slower rate. As a result, the plaintiffs argue, the
5 defendants could have met both their federal duties and their
6 state tort-law duties; the direct conflict contemplated by Boyle
7 is absent; and the first requirement for the contractor defense
8 therefore cannot be established.15
9 (i) Analysis. In determining whether the government
10 made a discretionary decision that would create the type of
11 conflict between tort law and government interests contemplated
12 by Boyle, we are not called upon to assess the merits of the
13 alleged state tort law violation.16 We are tasked only with
15
The plaintiffs at times refer to the defendants' failure
to use the Boehringer process as resulting in a "manufacturing"
defect. Not so. The plaintiffs allege a defective process, not
that the process used was somehow erroneously applied. They
therefore allege a design defect. As the Eleventh Circuit noted,
[the] distinction between "aberrational" defects and
defects occurring throughout an entire line of products
is frequently used in tort law to separate defects of
manufacture from those of design. Stated another way,
the distinction is between an unintended configuration,
[a manufacturing defect], and an intended configuration
that may produce unintended and unwanted results[,] [a
design defect].
Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1317 (internal citation omitted).
16
Although not dispositive here, we nonetheless note that
the plaintiffs' argument regarding the defendants' purported
failure to use state-of-the-art manufacturing processes would
appear problematic in ways that do not affect our decision as to
the applicability of the government contractor defense as a
matter of law, but which might present insurmountable obstacles
were we to remand for consideration of the plaintiffs' claims on
-29-
1 determining whether the government's discretionary actions with
2 respect to the allegedly defective design and the alleged state
3 law tort duty conflict. If they do, the first Boyle requirement
4 is met; if they do not, the government contractor defense does
5 not apply, and we must return the case to the district court for
6 trial on its merits. Cf. Grispo, 897 F.2d at 627 n.1 (noting
7 that appeal of summary judgments pertaining to applicability of
8 the contractor defense did "not raise the question whether New
9 York law imposes a duty to warn under the[] facts [of the case],
10 or whether a failure to warn was the proximate cause of the
11 [plaintiffs'] alleged injuries.").
12 The first Boyle requirement is designed to ensure that
13 "a conflict with state law exists." Lewis, 985 F.2d at 86. We
14 have observed that, therefore, "answering the question whether
their merits. For example, documents that are part of the record
on appeal indicate that the Dow Chemical Company purchased the
proprietary information for the Boehringer process in December
1964 and began using it in its chemical plants two years later.
See Mem. from J.D. Doedens, Chemicals Dep't, Dow Chem. Co. (Mar.
1, 1965), at 2; Mem. from K.E. Coulter, Midland Division Research
& Dev., Dow Chem. Co. (Apr. 25, 1967), at 2. The plaintiffs do
not explain how they can seek to hold Dow Chemical liable for
Agent Orange produced using the method they now contend should
have been used by all manufacturers at all relevant times, or how
they might seek to distinguish among manufacturers or between
particular manufacturers' batches of herbicides in proving that
their exposure to the defoliants caused the injuries about which
they now complain. See Agent Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at
189 (noting the "undisputed facts that the amount of dioxin in
Agent Orange varied according to its manufacturer and that the
government often mixed the Agent Orange of different
manufacturers and always stored the herbicide in unlabeled
barrels"). Nor is it clear that under these circumstances, the
defendants' knowledge dating from the late 1950s that the
Boehringer plant was using a new manufacturing process would
necessarily translate into a state law tort duty to have adopted
it themselves.
-30-
1 the [g]overnment approved reasonably precise specifications for
2 the design feature in question necessarily answers the question
3 whether the federal contract conflicts with state law." Id. at
4 87. If such specifications are present, the contractor's federal
5 contractual duties will inevitably conflict with alleged state
6 tort duties to the contrary because complying with the federal
7 contract will prevent compliance with state tort law as the
8 plaintiffs have alleged that it exists. See id. Alternatively,
9 where a "contractor could comply with both its contractual
10 obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care," displacement
11 "generally" would not be warranted, and state law would apply.
12 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509.
13 The defendants do not contest that the government's
14 contractual specifications for Agent Orange were silent regarding
15 the method of manufacture or that the government harbored no
16 preference, expressed or otherwise, regarding how the herbicides
17 were to be produced. See, e.g., Appellees' Br. at 36-37.
18 Indeed, they admit that they were under no federal contractual
19 duty to produce Agent Orange using any particular manufacturing
20 process or with any particular reference to the resulting
21 toxicity levels. See id. at 96-97, 99 (characterizing lack of
22 specifications regarding method of manufacture or toxicity levels
23 as discretionary omission and conceding that "omitted
24 specifications do not constitute contractual duties"). The
25 defendants argue instead that the government's Agent Orange
26 procurement contracts nevertheless created a conflict with their
-31-
1 alleged state tort duty to manufacture the herbicides
2 differently. The defendants reason that the documentary evidence
3 establishes as a matter of law that the manufacture of dioxin-
4 free Agent Orange was impossible and that, in any event, they
5 could not have complied with their procurement contracts with the
6 government had they used the slower, less efficient, Boehringer
7 method. They contend further that the government ordered the
8 herbicides with full knowledge of the relevant dangers, which,
9 they say, is equivalent to the government having approved a
10 reasonably precise specification about that danger. Id. at 91-
11 99, 102-04.
12 But the documents cited by the defendants as to the
13 inevitability of dioxin content in Agent Orange -- including
14 declarations by the Environmental Protection Agency that dioxin
15 in some very small amounts was "unavoidable" and that the
16 "potential risks" of harm to humans outweighed any benefits of
17 continued use of commercially available 2,4,5-T, see EPA Notice
18 of the Denial of Applications for Federal Registration of
19 Intrastate Pesticide Products Containing 2,4,5-T, 45 Fed. Reg.
20 2,898, 2,899 (Jan. 15, 1980); EPA Decision and Emergency Order
21 Suspending Registrations for the Forest, Rights-of-Way, and
22 Pasture Uses in 2,4,5-T, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,874, 15,874 n.1 (Mar.
23 15, 1979) -- do not refute what we understand to be the thrust of
24 the plaintiffs' argument: that had the defendants used the
25 Boehringer method, the Agent Orange they produced would have
26 contained no then-detectable amounts of dioxin. In that event,
-32-
1 the plaintiffs allege, the lower levels of dioxin would have
2 avoided much, if perhaps not all, of the harm allegedly suffered
3 as a result of the presence of dioxin in Agent Orange.
4 The documents submitted to the district court also do
5 not establish as a matter of law that there was an inherent
6 conflict between use of the Boehringer process and compliance
7 with defendants' contractual obligation to the government. Dow
8 Chemical adopted and used the Boehringer method, or something
9 like it, see Mem. from J.D. Doedens, Chemicals Dep't, Dow Chem.
10 Co. (Mar. 1, 1965), at 2; Mem. from Alex Widiger, Midland
11 Division Research & Dev., Dow Chem. Co. (Apr. 25, 1967), at 2, at
12 the time the government was requesting Agent Orange in increasing
13 quantities and sequestering the entire domestic market for 2,4,5-
14 T. This change in manufacturing method and its timing at least
15 raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants could
16 have complied with their contractual obligations to the
17 government while using what the plaintiffs contend was a process
18 that would have resulted in a defoliating agent substantially
19 less dangerous to military personnel.
20 And so we must determine whether the government did in
21 fact, as the defendants argue, approve of the toxicity levels
22 present in Agent Orange in a manner that would create the
23 necessary conflict with the alleged state law tort duty such that
24 the latter must be displaced. We think that it did.
25 We have previously concluded that where the government
26 contracts for the purchase of a product with knowledge that the
-33-
1 product has an arguable defect, it is considered to have approved
2 "reasonably precise specifications" for that product, with the
3 known defect, for purposes of the first Boyle requirement.
4 Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89. In Lewis, the government reordered a
5 cable that connected a parachute to the crew module of an Air
6 Force fighter jet with knowledge that the coating that protected
7 the steel cable was prone to cuts, resulting in cable corrosion.
8 Id. at 85. Although the government during its initial order had
9 not made a discretionary decision about which materials should be
10 used in constructing the cable, it subsequently ordered
11 replacement cables even after an Air Force investigation into the
12 corroded cables had revealed the problem with the protective
13 coating, reasoning that changes to its maintenance manual would
14 sufficiently alleviate the risk of harm. Id. In light of this
15 considered attention by the government to the precise defect
16 alleged, we concluded that the cable could not be characterized
17 as a stock item and that the "contractor's decision regarding the
18 materials to be used for the cable" could not be "second-
19 guess[ed]." Id. at 89. We did not discuss whether or how the
20 contractor had been alerted to the government's investigation or
21 the reasons for its reordering, nor whether the contract for
22 replacement cables also omitted reference to the material used to
23 construct them, as had the original cable contract. "Based on
24 the reorder" alone, we said, "the contractor c[ould] claim: 'The
25 [g]overnment made me do it.'" Id. (quoting Grispo, 897 F.2d at26 632).
-34-
1 Here, similarly, the record discloses that the
2 government explicitly evaluated the alleged design defect (toxic
3 2,4,5-T), and thereafter continued to order "replacement"
4 herbicides. The government examined the toxicity of what the
5 plaintiffs contend was the most toxic Agent Orange variant used
6 in Vietnam -- Agent Purple -- and determined that it posed no
7 unacceptable hazard. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 24 (plaintiffs'
8 attorney's comments regarding Agent Purple's toxicity). On April
9 26, 1963, the Army conducted a meeting at its Edgewood (Maryland)
10 Arsenal "to evaluate the toxicity of a[n herbicide] mixture known
11 as 'Purple.'" Minutes of a Meeting Held to Discuss and Evaluate
12 the Toxicity of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T Compounds (Apr. 26, 1963)
13 ("April 1963 Meeting Minutes"), at 3. Their analysis required
14 reaching a conclusion "about dose levels and hazards to health of
15 men and domestic animals from 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T based on the
16 medical literature and unpublished data of various research
17 laboratories." Id. Those in attendance included officials from
18 various branches of the military and various other government
19 agencies, and representatives from manufacturers Dow Chemical and
20 AmChem Products. Id. at 2. The group heard various
21 presentations on the subject. At the end of the meeting, the
22 participants adopted "acute toxicity" figures for Agent Purple.
23 They concluded
24 in summary and after careful review of
25 toxicological data related to 2,4-D and
26 2,4,5-T plus the knowledge as to the manner
27 these materials have been used for
28 defoliation in military situations in
29 Southeast Asia, . . . that no health hazard
-35-
1 is or was involved to men or domestic animals
2 from the amounts or manner these materials
3 were used . . . .
4 Id. at 5. Thereafter, the government continued to contract with
5 the defendants for purchase of the same and similar defoliating
6 agents.17
7 In other words, the Army examined the toxicology data
8 available to it and concluded that Agent Orange's components,
9 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D -- in the formulation that the government, in
10 its discretion, used when ordering it, and as it was then being
11 manufactured -- posed "no health hazard" and were, at least under
12 the circumstances of international armed conflict, suitable for
13 use in Southeast Asia. Since the government continued to order
14 Agent Orange after having evaluated its toxicity levels and
15 declared them acceptable, we "cannot second-guess" the
16 manufacturers' decision to produce the agents in the manner that
17 they did. Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89. Because "[t]he imposition of
18 liability under state law would constitute a significant conflict
19 with the [g]overnment's decision" that the defoliants used in
20 Vietnam as they were produced by the defendants posed no
17
The government also evaluated the toxic effects of 2,4,5-
T at other points during its use in Vietnam. For example, just
several weeks after the Edgewood meeting, on May 9, 1963, the
President's Scientific Advisory Committee was briefed on the
"Possible Health Hazard of Phenoxyacetates As Related to
Defoliation Operations in Vietnam." The Bionetics Study -- a
government-sponsored research project that included research into
the health effects of 2,4,5-T -- also began in 1963. It was this
research that ultimately triggered, among other curtailments of
2,4,5-T's use, cessation of the defoliation campaign. Dr. R.A.
Darrow, Fort Detrick, "Historical, Logistical, Political and
Technical Aspects of the Herbicide/Defoliant Program, 1967-1971,"
at 20-22.
-36-
1 unacceptable hazard, id., we conclude that the first Boyle
2 requirement is met.
3 (ii) The Grispo language. There is language in Grispo
4 that seems to require something more: that when the government
5 "mak[es] a discretionary, safety-related military procurement
6 decision contrary to the requirements of state law," it
7 "incorporate[] th[e] decision into a military contractor's
8 contractual obligations." Grispo, 897 F.2d at 632. But we
9 concluded in Lewis that the government's order of replacement
10 Babcock cables with knowledge of the risks to pilots associated
11 with the defect in question was itself sufficient to prevent
12 "second-guess[ing]" of the manufacturer's choice to continue
13 using the same cable coating, even though nothing in Lewis
14 suggests either (1) that the government included in the re-order
15 contract a specification instructing that the suspect material be
16 used, or (2) that the defendant manufacturer had been apprised of
17 the government's investigation of the alleged corrosion problem.
18 See Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89 ("We hold that when the [g]overnment
19 reordered the specific Babcock cable, with knowledge of its
20 alleged design defect, the [g]overnment approved reasonably
21 precise specifications for that product such that the
22 manufacturer qualifies for the military contractor defense for
23 any defects in the design of that product." (emphasis added)).
24 Insofar as there is a tension between the two cases, we
25 think it is resolved by Boyle. In framing the first Boyle
26 requirement, the Boyle Court sought to "assure that the suit [in
-37-
1 which the contractor defense is asserted] is within the area
2 where the policy of the 'discretionary function' would be
3 frustrated" absent the availability of the defense. Boyle, 487
4 U.S. at 512. Although the Court used the term "reasonably
5 precise specifications," we think that, as in Lewis, reordering
6 the same product with knowledge of its relevant defects plays the
7 identical role in the defense as listing specific ingredients,
8 processes, or the like.
9 In Boyle, the alleged state law duty of care was
10 "precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the [g]overnment
11 contract." Id. at 509. But the opinion did not hold that a
12 conflicting, express contractual duty was required for the
13 contractor defense to preempt state law. The issues as framed by
14 the Boyle Court were not narrowly about duties imposed by
15 contract; they were more broadly about federal policies and
16 interests and the exercise of federal discretion, in the face of
17 contrary state law, in furthering them. See id. at 507
18 ("Displacement will occur only where . . . a 'significant
19 conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal policy or
20 interest and the [operation] of state law.'" (quoting Wallis v.
21 Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (brackets in
22 original) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 509 (stating that
23 even where federal contractual and state tort duties were
24 "precisely contrary," "it would be unreasonable to say that there
25 is always a 'significant conflict' between the state law and a
26 federal policy or interest" (emphasis added)).
-38-
1 The government's "uniquely federal interest," id. at
2 504, in fully taking advantage of its ability to determine what
3 level of risks and dangers must be tolerated in order to achieve
4 a particular military goal need not be belabored. See Agent
5 Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at 191 ("Civilian judges and
6 juries are not competent to weigh the cost of injuries caused by
7 a product against the cost of avoidance in lost military
8 efficiency. Such judgments involve the nation's geopolitical
9 goals and choices among particular tactics . . . ."). We pause
10 only to note that the federal interest implicated by the lawsuits
11 here is not only the ordinary need to ensure the government's
12 "work" gets "done," Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505, but the ability to
13 pursue American military objectives -- in this case, protection
14 of American troops against hostile fire.
15 The government made an express determination, based on
16 the knowledge available to it at the time, that Agent Orange as
17 then being manufactured posed no unacceptable hazard for the
18 wartime uses for which it was intended, and that the product
19 should continue to be manufactured and supplied to it. In light
20 of this exercise of discretion, we read Boyle to require
21 displacement of any alleged state law rules to the contrary.18
18
We note that the second and third Boyle requirements
remain essential to proving the government contractor defense
even where, as here, the defendants do not rely on a contractual
duty to demonstrate the required conflict between federal
interests and state law. The government's discretionary
determination about the design defect alleged was necessarily
made in the shadow of the government's expectations regarding the
product it expected to receive. Defendants therefore must
demonstrate that the product it delivered to the government was
-39-
1 2. Compliance with Specifications. The plaintiffs'
2 challenge to the defendants' ability to demonstrate the second
3 requirement for Boyle protection -- compliance with the
4 contracts' specifications -- does not warrant extensive
5 discussion. Nothing about the presence of dioxin in trace
6 amounts within the 2,4,5-T component of Agent Orange rendered the
7 Agent Orange delivered to the government non-compliant with its
8 contractual obligations. The plaintiffs' own expert agrees.
9 See Aff. of Harry Ensley (Feb. 6, 2004), at ¶ 20 ("[T]he 2,4,5-T
10 the government purchased could contain varying amounts of such
11 impurities as . . . dioxin . . . , yet still be in compliance
12 with the government's specifications . . . ."). There is no
13 allegation that the government received Agent Orange with 2,4,5-T
14 present in anything other than the proportions and purity levels
15 called for by the terms of the contracts. The second requirement
16 is therefore met as a matter of law. See Miller, 275 F.3d at
17 420-21 (rejecting same argument made by civilian plaintiffs
18 seeking compensation for injuries allegedly caused by Agent
19 Orange).
20 3. Defendants' Warnings About Known Dangers. The final
21 Boyle requirement for the invocation of the government contractor
22 defense is that the defendants demonstrate that they "warned the
23 United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
24 were known to [them] but not to the United States." Boyle, 487
precisely what the government requested. The third prong is
likewise unaffected: The government's discretionary
determination must be a fully informed one.
-40-
1 U.S. at 512. The plaintiffs make essentially two arguments in
2 this regard: (1) that the defendants knew more about the hazards
3 of 2,4,5-T than did the government, but failed to warn the
4 government about them; and (2) that even if some members of the
5 government had some knowledge regarding the dangers of dioxin,
6 Boyle requires that for the defense to be applicable, the actual
7 contracting officials must have such knowledge, and those
8 involved in the specification process for Agent Orange knew
9 nothing about 2,4,5-T's hazards.
10 The thrust of the defendants' response is that (1) none
11 of the plaintiffs claim an injury of the sort that was a danger
12 known by anyone at the time of Agent Orange's production; (2) as
13 to dangers about which the defendants were aware, the evidence
14 demonstrates as a matter of law that they shared that knowledge
15 with the government; and (3) irrespective of what the defendants
16 knew about Agent Orange in general, the government had far
17 greater knowledge than the defendants about Agent Orange and the
18 dangers posed by its intended use in Vietnam.
19 We doubt that the defendants can establish as a matter
20 of law on the present record either the second or third of their
21 contentions -- that they shared the knowledge of dangers of which
22 they were aware with the government and that the government had
23 far more knowledge about the dangers of Agent Orange in its
24 planned use. Each is intensely factual and hotly disputed.19 We
19
We concluded in Agent Orange I, based on much the same
record now before us, that "the critical mass of information
about dioxin possessed by the government during the period of
-41-
1 think that the record is clear, however, that the defendants did
2 not fail to inform the government of known dangers at the time of
3 Agent Orange's production of the type that would have had an
4 impact on the military's discretionary decision regarding Agent
5 Orange's toxicity. We therefore conclude that the defendants
6 have established Boyle's third requirement as a matter of law.
7 Boyle mandates that to obtain the benefit of the
8 government contractor defense, a contractor must inform the
9 government about known "dangers in the use of the equipment."
10 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. But the Boyle Court was silent as to
11 what types of risks rise to the level of dangers that must be
12 disclosed. Prior to Boyle, we were of the view that
13 manufacturers need disclose to the government only those hazards
14 that (1) are "based on a substantial body of scientific
15 evidence"; and (2) create dangers likely "serious enough to call
16 for a weighing of the risk against the expected military
17 benefits," that is, "substantial enough to influence the military
18 decision to use the product." Agent Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818
19 F.2d at 193. Until now, neither we nor the Supreme Court has
20 been called upon to decide, post-Boyle, what constitutes
Agent Orange's use in Vietnam was as great as or greater than
that possessed by the chemical companies." Agent Orange I Opt-
Out Op., 818 F.2d at 193. The Fifth Circuit, relying in large
part on our Agent Orange I determination, concluded the same.
See Miller, 275 F.3d at 421. But we are required to review the
factual record anew as it is presented to us, not as it was
presented to a different panel twenty years ago. And we note, as
we did in Agent Orange I, that we were in 1987 without the
benefit of briefing by the parties on this subject. Agent Orange
I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at 190.
-42-
1 "knowledge" of a "danger" that would trigger a duty to inform as
2 to the "equipment" being ordered.
3 This much is plain: Boyle did not contemplate
4 requiring disclosure of any and all potential risks by the
5 contractor to the government, irrespective of their relation to
6 the governmental discretionary decision at issue. The Boyle
7 Court was concerned primarily with protecting the government's
8 ability to assume certain kinds of risks without assuming the
9 costs of liability for those risks. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-
10 12. It protected this ability by ensuring that where the
11 government accepts such a risk knowingly, a state law that would
12 require finding that same risk unacceptable must be displaced.
13 We therefore do not think that the Boyle Court meant that a
14 defendant seeking the protection of the defense was required to
15 demonstrate that it had shared all known hazards with the
16 government, irrespective of whether those hazards allegedly not
17 conveyed would have had an impact on the government's exercise of
18 discretion about the design defect alleged. It would be
19 impractical to require that a manufacturer compile and present to
20 the government in advance a list of each and every risk
21 associated with a product it is producing for the government.
22 The operation of a tank or a transport plane -- more so the
23 manufacture and use of a chemical agent -- involves, at the
24 extremities, virtually limitless risks. Even if it were possible
25 to generate such complete lists, their comprehensiveness would
26 overwhelm government decision makers with largely irrelevant
-43-
1 data, extending the time and costs associated with federal
2 contracting and obscuring those risks most likely to have an
3 impact on contracting decisions. A rule that required full
4 disclosure of all possible risks to anyone would be contrary to
5 Boyle's underlying rationale of protecting the federal interest
6 in "getting the Government's work done." Id. at 505.
7 We therefore adhere to our pre-Boyle precedent. We
8 conclude, much as we did before Boyle was decided, that a
9 defendant may satisfy the third Boyle requirement if it
10 demonstrates that it fully informed the government about hazards
11 related to the government's exercise of discretion that were
12 "substantial enough to influence the military decision" made.
13 Agent Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at 193. The defendants can
14 demonstrate a fully informed government decision by showing
15 either that they conveyed the relevant known and "substantial
16 enough" dangers, id., or that the government did not need the
17 warnings because it already possessed that information,
18 see Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89-90 ("There is no requirement that
19 appellees inform the Air Force of dangers already known to the
20 Air Force.").
21 Here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants knew of
22 dioxin's hazards but failed to inform the government of them.
23 The documents to which they cite for this proposition, however,
24 pertain almost universally to the risk of chloracne (a severe
25 skin disease) and liver damage to workers manufacturing Agent
26 Orange. These risks, the manufacturers thought, were created by
-44-
1 the dioxin "impurity" that resulted from producing
2 trichlorophenol, a component of 2,4,5-T. See, e.g., V.K. Rowe,
3 Test. for the 2,4,5-T Hr'g (undated), at 28 (referring to dioxin
4 build-up in trichlorophenol manufacture), PA 3501-02.; Mem. of
5 V.K. Rowe, Dow Chemical Co., at 1 (Jun. 24, 1965) ("Rowe Jun.
6 1965 Mem.") (referring to dioxin "impurities" present in
7 trichlorophenol that could be "carried through into the T acid").
8 There is, indeed, ample evidence that the defendants
9 were concerned about the health effects of dioxin, specifically
10 chloracne20 and liver damage,21 on their workers. Tests were
11 conducted that involved exposing animals to pure dioxin, which
20
As to the dangers related to chloracne, the documents
submitted show that knowledge of the risk varied among
manufacturers. Not all manufacturers had experienced chloracne
outbreaks. Among those that did, it was not clear that dioxin
was in the final products emanating from the contaminated plant.
See V.K. Rowe, Test. for the 2,4,5-T Hr'g (undated), at 28-29
(indicating testing of Dow trichlorophenol and 2,4,5-T following
1964 chloracne outbreak in manufacturing plant revealed no
"chloracnegens," and that source of outbreak was contaminated
waste oil, "not exposure to trichlorophenol"). Dow thought that
dioxin concentrations of less than one part per million presented
no chloracne hazard to workers or consumers, Rowe Jun. 1965 Mem.,
at 1, and changed its production process such that the
concentration of dioxin in its Agent Orange would be reduced to
the point where, in its view, the hazard would be eliminated.
21
Variance among the defendants regarding their knowledge
of the risks of liver damage to humans was similar to that
related to chloracne, with some, but not all, of the defendants
aware that animal tests showed liver damage was a possible result
of direct exposure to dioxin and that there was liver damage
among workers engaged in manufacturing 2,4,5-T. There were also
isolated instances of other health concerns arising from
manufacturing processes -- for example, temporary nerve damage
(Monsanto) and unspecified "systemic injury" (Dow). See
Deposition Excerpts of Dr. Wallace, at 2468; Rowe Jun. 1965 Mem.
at 1. None of the documents reveal knowledge of any such danger
to non-workers.
-45-
1 revealed some "severe response[s]," see Report on the Chloracne
2 Problem Meeting on March 24, 1965 (Mar. 29, 1965) ("Mar. 29
3 Report"), at 5; similar tests performed on humans some years
4 later using a one-percent dioxin solution that resulted in skin
5 lesions, see Letter of Albert M. Kligman to V.K. Rowe, Dow
6 Chemical Co. (Jan. 23, 1968) PA 3732. At least two defendants
7 considered whether the dioxin in trichlorophenol's manufacture
8 would be manifest in the trichlorophenol itself or in the end
9 products containing trichlorophenol, see, e.g., id. at 4; Mem.,
10 Dow Chem. Co. (Mar. 10, 1965) ("Mar. 10 Dow Mem."), Mem. from
11 E.L. Chandler, Diamond Shamrock Co. ("Chandler Mem.") (Jul. 9,
12 1962), but the danger with which they were concerned was limited
13 to the possibility of a chloracne outbreak among those handling
14 it, see Mar. 10 Dow Mem. (discussing possible need to take
15 precautions that would "prevent injury" akin to what had been
16 taken following past incidents of chloracne outbreaks); Chandler
17 Mem. (indicating two commercial customers had claimed chloracne
18 problems with "Diamond esters," one of which had no similar
19 problems with other manufacturers' product). There is no
20 evidence to which we have been directed or that we have otherwise
21 found that the defendants' knowledge of 2,4,5-T's risks extended
22 to dioxin as a carcinogen, as a toxin that potentially might
23 cause diseases long after exposure, or as a significant health
24 risk (apart from chloracne) to those exposed to herbicides
25 containing 2,4,5-T being used as such, in wartime conditions or
-46-
1 otherwise, except for workers manufacturing them or their
2 component chemicals.22
3 How much the government knew about the workplace
4 dangers associated with production of 2,4,5-T while it was
5 considering the use of and ordering Agent Orange is unclear. The
6 minutes from the 1963 meeting at Edgewood Arsenal contained
7 references to a lack of workplace incidents involving 2,4-D and
8 2,4,5-T. April 1963 Meeting Minutes at 4, Appendix A. The
9 domestic safety record of herbicides containing these two
10 chemicals, including the manufacturers' alleged reports to the
11 Department of Agriculture regarding the absence of ill effects
12 from the herbicides on their workers, was also relayed to the
13 President's Science Advisory Committee in a May 1963 briefing
22
As to the specific subject of dioxin as a carcinogen, the
Dow Chemical Company testified before Congress that its numerous
tests and experiments regarding dioxin's toxicity did not examine
the chemical's carcinogenicity. Test. of Dr. Julius E. Johnson,
Vice President, Dow Chemical Co., Apr. 7 and 15, 1970, at 371.
The plaintiffs do point us to a memorandum written by Monsanto's
medical director, R. Emmet Kelly, in which he expresses the need
to "minimize the presence of this known chloracne agent" because
dioxin "[v]ery conceivably [could] be a potent carcinogen." Mem.
from R. Emmet Kelly, Monsanto Company (Mar. 30, 1965). But this
"conception" alone -- without any context as to its basis or the
relationship between the harms of dioxin in its pure form versus
the trace amounts of the chemical found within Agent Orange -- is
not enough to convince a reasonable factfinder that dioxin was a
known carcinogen at the time of Agent Orange's production or,
more importantly, that the defendants knew that the trace amounts
of dioxin in Agent Orange might prove to be a carcinogen for
those not involved in its manufacture or direct handling. See
Agent Orange I Opt-Out Op., 818 F.2d at 193 ("[T]he fact that
dioxin may injure does not prove the same of Agent
Orange . . . ."). We express no view regarding whether the
defendants might have done more to investigate dioxin's dangers,
as it is well beyond the purview of our inquiry. Cf. Kerstetter
v. Pac. Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing
relationship between contractor defense and latent defects).
-47-
1 entitled "Possible Health Hazard of Phenoxyacetates as Related to
2 Defoliation Operations in Vietnam." At least two domestic
3 manufacturers, however, had already experienced chloracne
4 breakouts and other problems among its workers.
5 The documents make clear, however, that the military
6 was concerned about the likely effect on those exposed to the
7 herbicides in the manner in which they were, and were to be, used
8 in Vietnam. This is hardly surprising. The principal purpose of
9 Agent Orange was to attempt to protect American troops from
10 attack by limiting vegetation around American facilities and
11 emplacements that could provide cover to enemy combatants. To
12 that extent, the chemical agents were to be used on American and
13 allied positions, not those of the Viet Cong.
14 And the undisputed record with respect to dangers that
15 were posed by the use of Agent Orange is that during the entirety
16 of the production of Agent Orange, the defendants knew only that
17 it was possible that those handling herbicides containing 2,4,5-T
18 might develop the skin disease chloracne. The Edgewood
19 participants, including delegates from various branches of the
20 government, military and civil, were aware of this type of risk.
21 See April 1963 Meeting Minutes at 5 (AmChem representative
22 related experiences of "industrial firms making . . . continuous
23 field applications over very large areas" and noted "skin
24 sensitization was the maximum effect produced" in "probably one
25 out of a thousand persons"). Yet the government continued to
-48-
1 order Agent Orange in the manner specified in the procurement
2 contracts.
3 If the government had decided to manufacture Agent
4 Orange, as it considered doing for a period during the late
5 1960s, the defendants might well have been required more fully to
6 inform the government of all the possible dangers associated with
7 the manufacture of the chemical (none of them, incidentally,
8 being malignancies). The record suggests that they were prepared
9 to do so. See "Plan 'Orange' Production," Dow Chemical Co. (Apr.
10 20, 1967), at 3 (stating that "[a] serious potential health
11 hazard to production workers is involved in the production of
12 2,4,5-T" and noting that its "knowhow regarding elimination of
13 the hazard" could be made available to the government), attached
14 to Letter from A.P. Beutel, Vice Pres., Dir. of Gov't Affairs,
15 Dow Chemical Co., to H.G. Fredericks, Deputy Dir. of Procurement
16 and Production, Edgewood Arsenal (Apr. 20, 1967).
17 We conclude, however, that no reasonable factfinder
18 could find that the defendants had knowledge of a danger that
19 might have influenced the military's conclusion that "operational
20 use" of Agent Orange posed "no health hazard . . . to men or
21 domestic animals," April 1963 Meeting Minutes, at 3, 5, and its
22 presumably related decision to continue to purchase Agent Orange
23 as it was then being produced by the defendants. We find nothing
24 in the record to support an assertion that the defendants "cut[]
25 off information highly relevant to . . . discretionary
26 decision[s]" of the government, Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513, i.e.,
-49-
1 that they possessed knowledge of dangers unknown to the
2 government that, had they been shared, might have influenced the
3 government's decision regarding the extent of the hazard posed by
4 use of Agent Orange or its choice to continue its use.
5 We acknowledge that there may well have been some
6 aspects of the dangers of Agent Orange resulting from the trace
7 presence of dioxin that personnel of one or more of the
8 defendants were aware of that members of the military may not
9 have known, at least contemporaneously. We cannot conceive of a
10 long-term relationship between the military and a civilian
11 contractor in which complete equivalence of knowledge at all
12 times in the relationship can be expected or could be
13 established. But nothing in the record of which we are aware
14 would create a triable issue of fact as to whether there was
15 never-disclosed knowledge of a sort that might have influenced
16 the government's decision-making process regarding Agent Orange
17 as it was used in Vietnam.
18 Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants have
19 established as a matter of law the third requirement of Boyle.
20 ***
21 We feel obliged to note, finally, what seems to us to
22 be obvious: The question raised by government contractor defense
23 cases arising in the context of contracts for military agents and
24 equipment is the extent to which contractors are protected when
25 they provide materials designed to assist the government in
26 obtaining what are ultimately military objectives -- in this case
-50-
1 the principal objective being to protect members of the armed
2 forces from enemy attack. Considerations of the validity of
3 those objectives and the reasons for which the military seeks
4 them are far beyond the competence of this Court. Our
5 determination as to the protection of a military contractor must
6 be made using the same principles regardless of the nature of the
7 military conflict in which they are pursued, or the extent to
8 which it is controversial or enjoys popular support.
9 II. Discovery Rulings
10 The plaintiffs also appeal from the discovery
11 limitations imposed by the district court during the months
12 following its initial February 9, 2004, decision granting the
13 defendants' motion for summary judgment. We review discovery
14 rulings for abuse of discretion. Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 82
15 (2d Cir. 2005).
16 As we have noted, the district court's February 9,
17 2004, government contractor defense opinion granted the
18 plaintiffs a six-month discovery period and permission to seek
19 reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling. Shortly
20 thereafter, the plaintiffs requested "the documents from all of
21 the other litigation that these [defendants] have been involved
22 in, involving the same pesticides and the same type of claims."
23 Tr. of Civil Conference Before The Hon. Joan M. Azrack at 10.
24 They did so without having attempted review of the MDL record.
25 Id. at 16. The defendants objected on the grounds that documents
26 from other cases were likely to be largely irrelevant to the
-51-
1 question of the applicability of the government contractor
2 defense, duplicative of MDL materials where relevant in any
3 event, and overly burdensome to produce. Id. at 13-14.
4 On March 2, 2004, Magistrate Judge Azrack denied the
5 request, ruling that the plaintiffs first had to familiarize
6 themselves with the MDL record before requesting additional
7 documents. On March 19, 2004, Judge Weinstein granted the
8 plaintiffs access to six deposition transcripts from non-MDL
9 cases.
10 The plaintiffs now argue that the district court abused
11 its discretion by limiting the plaintiffs to the documents
12 produced in the MDL during the 1980s and six subsequent
13 depositions. They assert that in the intervening period, the
14 defendants have been sued by other end-users of their commercial
15 herbicides, citizens exposed to industrial contamination from the
16 herbicides' production, and their workers. Discovery in these
17 cases, they contend, was more extensive than the discovery
18 against the defendants that occurred during the 1980s and would
19 be germane to the defendants' knowledge of the adverse health
20 effects caused by their herbicides. They list thirteen other
21 cases involving three defendants (Dow Chemical, Monsanto, and
22 Hercules) and various government hearings from which they suspect
23 discovery and papers would be helpful. Beyond broad claims that
24 the discovery in those cases was more focused on the defendants'
25 knowledge as compared with the MDL, however, the plaintiffs do
26 not cite specific bases for a conclusion on our part that the
-52-
1 documents would differ materially from the voluminous documents
2 available to them through the MDL. The defendants do not respond
3 to the plaintiffs' discovery-related arguments.
4 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to
5 "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
6 relevant to the claim or defense of any party," Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 26(b)(1), but a district court may limit discovery if, among
8 other things,
9 it determines that: (i) the
10 discovery sought is unreasonably
11 cumulative or duplicative, or is
12 obtainable from some other source
13 that is more convenient, less
14 burdensome, or less expensive; (ii)
15 the party seeking discovery has had
16 ample opportunity by discovery in
17 the action to obtain the
18 information sought; or (iii) the
19 burden or expense of the proposed
20 discovery outweighs its likely
21 benefit . . . .
22 Id. R. 26(b)(2)(C). A district court has wide latitude to
23 determine the scope of discovery, and "[w]e ordinarily defer to
24 the discretion of district courts regarding discovery matters."
25 Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, Div. of W.R. Grace & Co., 964 F.2d
26 106, 114 (2d Cir. 1992). A district court abuses its discretion
27 only "when the discovery is so limited as to affect a party's
28 substantial rights." Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779
29 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985). A party must be afforded a
30 meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary to
31 support his claim. Id.-53-
1 The plaintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that the
2 district court's rulings limiting the scope of discovery
3 constituted an abuse of discretion. We think the district court
4 reasonably concluded that the MDL files were likely the best
5 source regarding the information the plaintiffs' sought:
6 defendants' knowledge of 2,4,5-T's risks at the time of
7 production. The plaintiffs' motion to Judge Azrack was an
8 unlimited and unfocused request for many thousands of additional
9 documents, made without any attempt to review what was already
10 available to them or to tailor their request to materials
11 reasonably expected to produce relevant, non-duplicative
12 information. Accordingly, the district court's limitations were
13 well within its discretion under Rule 26.
14 III. Stephensons' Motion to Amend
15 Finally, the Stephensons challenge the district court's
16 denial of their motion to amend their complaint. Federal Rule of
17 Civil Procedure 15(a), as in effect at the time of the court's
18 order, provided that "[a] party may amend the party's pleading
19 once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
20 pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend the
21 party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
22 the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice
23 so requires." Id. "We review the determination of a district
24 court to deny a party leave to amend the complaint under Fed. R.
25 Civ. P. 15(a) for abuse of discretion." McCarthy v. Dun &
26 Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007).
-54-
1 Here, at the time of the Stephensons' motion, the
2 defendants had not filed an answer to their complaint.
3 Stephenson, 220 F.R.D. at 24. Accordingly, the Stephensons were
4 entitled to amend their complaint as a matter of right without
5 leave of the district court, because "a motion is not a
6 responsive pleading," 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
7 Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1483, at 584 (2d
8 ed. 1990); see id. at 586 ("Nor does a summary judgment motion
9 made before responding [to plaintiff's complaint] have any effect
10 on a party's ability to amend under the first sentence of Rule
11 15(a)."); accord, e.g., Zaidi v. Ehrlich, 732 F.2d 1218, 1219-20
12 (5th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 313 F.2d 218,
13 218-19 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1963). Because the defendants had not
14 filed a responsive pleading when the Stephensons sought to amend
15 their complaint, the district court erred in denying the
16 amendment.
17 We conclude, however, that in light of our finding
18 regarding the government contractor defense, the district court's
19 erroneous denial of the Stephensons' motion was harmless.
20 Repleading could not avoid the application of the government
21 contractor defense and, therefore, remand to permit the amendment
22 would be futile. See Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60, 62
23 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that even if district court had erred
24 in denying motion to amend, any error would be harmless because
25 the proposed amendment would have been barred by res judicata),
26 cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979); cf. Unlaub Co., Inc. v.
-55-
1 Sexton, 568 F.2d 72, 78 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding any abuse of
2 discretion by district court in failing to permit defendant to
3 amend his answer was harmless because "[n]one of the matters set
4 forth in the proposed amended answer would affect the result").
5 CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of
7 the district court.
-56-