Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments Inc. ( 2009 )

07-4074-cv
Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments Inc .
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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5
6
7 August Term, 2008
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9 (Argued: August 4, 2009 Decided: September 10, 2009)
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11 Docket No. 07-4074-cv
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13
14
15
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17 MICHAEL HALPERT,
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19 Plaintiff-Appellant,
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21 -v.-
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23 MANHATTAN APARTMENTS, INC.
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25 Defendant-Appellee.
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27
28
29
30 Before:
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32 CALABRESI, PARKER, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
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34 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
35 New York (Jones, Judge) granting Manhattan Apartments, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment
36 as to Halpert’s claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. We hold that an
37 employer may be held liable for discrimination by third parties, including independent
38 contractors, that the employer authorizes to make hiring decisions on its behalf. Because the
39 question of whether Manhattan Apartments, Inc. actually or apparently authorized a third-party to
40 make hiring decisions for it with respect to Mr. Halpert turns on disputes of material fact, we
41 VACATE and REMAND.
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1 MICHAEL HALPERT, pro se, New York, N.Y.
2
3 LOUIS R. SATRIALE, JR.(Joseph E. Gehring, Jr., of
4 counsel), Gehring, Tatman & Satriale, LLC, New York,
5 N.Y.
678
9
10
11 PER CURIAM:
12 Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Halpert, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United
13 States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones, J.), granting summary
14 judgment to Defendant-Appellee Manhattan Apartments, Inc. (“MAI”) on Halpert’s claim under
15 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
16 the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
17 A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, construing the
18 evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Miller v. Wolpoff &
19 Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).
20 I.
21 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
22 any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
23 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §
24 623(a)(1). Relying on our decision in Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502,
25 509 (2d Cir. 1994), the District Court stated that the ADEA “does not apply to independent
26 contractors.” ROA doc 31 at 4. The District Court determined on the basis of undisputed facts
27 that Robert Brooks, who interviewed Halpert and allegedly told Halpert that he was “too old” for
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1 a position showing rental apartments, was an independent contractor and not an employee of
2 MAI. The Court also found that Halpert had failed to present facts creating a material dispute as
3 to whether Brooks had apparent authority to interview Halpert on behalf of MAI. As a result, the
4 District Court concluded that MAI was not an employer under the definition of the ADEA, and
5 that MAI was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
6 Robinson does not, in fact, resolve this case. In Robinson, the district court concluded
7 that there was no genuine issue of material fact suggesting that Robinson was an employee of the
8 federal agency or the federal individual defendants that he had named in his suit. Accordingly,
9 we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Robinson’s ADEA claims
10 against those defendants, explaining that “[t]he ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating
11 on the basis of age against their employees” and therefore does not cover claims brought by
12 independent contractors. Robinson, 21 F.3d at 509 (emphasis in original). Here, by contrast, the
13 controversy is not whether MAI was liable for discrimination against an independent contractor.
14 Rather, the issue is whether—assuming for the moment that Brooks interviewed Halpert for a
15 position with MAI or that MAI led Halpert to believe that he was applying for a position with
16 them, rather than Brooks—an employer (MAI) can potentially be held liable for discrimination
17 by an independent contractor (Brooks) who acts for the employer. The answer to this question is
18 yes.
19 By its terms, employer liability under the ADEA is direct: an employer may not “fail or
20 refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
21 That prohibition applies regardless of whether an employer uses its employees to interview
22 applicants for open positions, or whether it uses intermediaries, such as independent contractors,
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1 to fill that role. As the Seventh Circuit has explained in the context of Title VII, when liability
2 for discrimination is direct rather than derivative, “it makes no difference whether the person
3 whose acts are complained of is an employee, an independent contractor, or for that matter a
4 customer.” Dunn v. Wash. County Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005). If a company
5 gives an individual authority to interview job applicants and make hiring decisions on the
6 company’s behalf, then the company may be held liable if that individual improperly
7 discriminates against applicants on the basis of age.
8 A company is not, of course, liable for the hiring decisions made by independent
9 contractors who are hiring on their own behalf. Nor is a company liable simply because a job
10 applicant unreasonably (and incorrectly) believes that he is interviewing for a job with the
11 company and that the independent contractor has the authority to make hiring decisions on behalf
12 of the company. General principles of agency law determine whether the independent contractor
13 or other third party has been given actual authority to hire on behalf of the company, or whether
14 the company, through its own words or conduct, has created apparent authority in that individual
15 in the eyes of the job applicant. See Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 98 F.3d
16 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1996). Significantly, however, the company’s potential liability does not
17 depend on whether the individual hiring for the company as its agent is an employee or an
18 independent contractor under the broadest meaning of those words as they are determined by the
19 common law agency test.1 An independent contractor can act as an agent, or an apparent agent,
1
We embraced the common law agency test in Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90
(2d Cir. 1993) for the purposes of determining whether the party asserting a discrimination claim
under the ADEA was an employee or an independent contractor.
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1 of the company for the limited purpose of interviewing and potentially hiring job applicants
2 while still retaining his independence for any number of other purposes.
3
4 II.
5 MAI’s potential liability in this case thus turns on whether Brooks was acting as the
6 hiring agent, or apparent hiring agent, for MAI when he interviewed Halpert for the position of
7 showing apartments (“Shower”) or whether Brooks was simply hiring on his own account.
8 Because we find that this question depends on disputed questions of fact, summary judgment is
9 inappropriate.
10 The District Court observed that Halpert has not disputed MAI’s evidence that Brooks
11 was paid on commission, set his own hours, could work from home, and paid taxes as an
12 independent contractor. ROA doc 31 at 5–7. As explained above, this is not determinative.
13 Halpert’s submissions dispute MAI’s assertion that it had no control over the manner and means
14 by which Brooks conducted interviews and made hiring decisions related to the Shower position.
15 Evidence adduced by Halpert indicates (a) that MAI sponsored a “training program to show
16 rental apartments,” ROA doc 17 ¶ 22, and that those chosen from the program would receive
17 commissions from MAI, and (b) that MAI enlisted sales associates like Brooks to interview
18 candidates for this program. In support of that contention, Halpert has presented evidence (1)
19 that Laura Nielson, the career counselor who arranged the interview for Halpert, believed that
20 Halpert would be interviewing for a position with MAI, not Brooks; (2) that the interview took
21 place at MAI’s offices; and (3) that after the interview, Brooks and another MAI associate told
22 Nielson “they were looking for someone younger.” That Brooks and another MAI associate
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1 informed Nielson that they (not just Brooks) were looking for someone younger tends to support
2 Halpert’s allegation that Brooks was interviewing Halpert not for himself but on behalf of MAI.
3 We also note that an agreement between MAI and Brooks, which sets forth in great detail the
4 rights and duties of both parties in connection with Brooks’s work as a sales associate, indicates
5 that Brooks is to pay “his own expenses,” including “automobile, travel and entertainment
6 expenses,” but does not indicate that Brooks is to compensate Showers directly.
7 MAI has presented affidavits from Brooks and an MAI representative asserting that
8 Halpert, if hired, would have been compensated by Brooks, not MAI. But MAI has not presented
9 evidence corroborating that contention, and we construe Halpert’s submissions to dispute it. Nor
10 has MAI established that it was not involved in advertising the Shower position or in establishing
11 the parameters of that role. Accordingly, we conclude, contrary to the District Court, that
12 disputed issues of material fact remain as to whether MAI’s degree of control over the interview
13 and hiring process for the Shower position rendered Brooks MAI’s agent with respect to that
14 process.
15 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the matter is
16 REMANDED to the district court.2
2
During oral argument before this Court, Halpert indicated that he would like
appointed counsel. On remand, the district court is encouraged to revisit the question of whether
it is appropriate to appoint pro bono counsel for Halpert. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
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