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11-1430(L) Kimber v. Tallon UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 26th day of February, two thousand fourteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 KEVIN KIMBER, 13 Plaintiff-Appellant, 14 15 -v.- 11-1430(L) 16 11-1554(Con) 17 18 KEITH TALLON, Superintendent, Southern 19 State Correctional Facility, 20 individually and in his official 21 capacity, CELESTE GIRRELL, 22 Superintendent, Northern State 23 Correctional Facility, individually 24 and in her official capacity, ROBERT 25 HOFMANN, JOHN GORCZYK, KATHLEEN 26 LANMAN, MICHAEL O’MALLEY, ANITA 27 CARBONELL, STUART GLADDING, DANIEL 28 FLORENTINE, RAYMOND FLUM, CAROL 1 1 CALLEA, ANDREW PALLITO, Commissioner, 2 Vermont Department of Corrections, 3 individually and in his official 4 capacity, 5 Defendants-Appellees, 6 7 JACOB SEXTON, and all other inmates 8 similarly situated, RICHARD PAHL, and 9 all others similarly situated, JOSE 10 TORRES, and all others similarly 11 situated, DANIEL MUIR, and all others 12 similarly situated, JAMES ANDERSON, 13 and all others similarly situated, 14 DAVID MCGEE, and all other inmates 15 similarly situated, 16 Plaintiffs. 17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 18 19 FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY W. HOOVER (William J. 20 Simon, on the brief), Phillips 21 Lytle LLP, Buffalo, New York. 22 23 FOR APPELLEES: DAVID MCLEAN, on behalf of 24 William H. Sorrell, Attorney 25 General for the State of 26 Vermont, Waterbury, Vermont. 27 28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 29 Court for the District of Vermont (Murtha, J.). 30 31 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 32 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 33 VACATED AND REMANDED. 34 35 Kimber, on behalf of a class of Vermont prisoners, 36 appeals from the judgment of the United States District 37 Court for the District of Vermont (Murtha, J.), granting 38 summary judgment dismissing his claim that 24-hour security 39 lighting in the cells violates the Eighth Amendment’s 40 prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment. The 2 1 district court appointed the Prisoner Rights Office (“PRO”) 2 of the Vermont Defender General to serve as class counsel. 3 Kimber, as a class representative, argues here (and in the 4 district court) that the PRO’s performance was deficient. 5 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 6 facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for 7 review. 8 The state contests Kimber’s standing to represent the 9 class in this appeal because he is pro se and unable to 10 understand the complex issues in the case. Generally, it is 11 inappropriate for a pro se litigant to represent the 12 interests of a class. See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers,
570 F.3d 13146, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2009). However, Kimber appears before 14 us with counsel. The consequences of disallowing Kimber 15 from challenging the PRO’s representation are also troubling 16 when the class counsel has abandoned any appeal and the 17 class consists of inmates who may otherwise have trouble 18 retaining counsel. We conclude Kimber has standing to raise 19 the issues before us. 20 The state also argues that Kimber’s appeal was mooted 21 when he was released from incarceration. While release 22 might moot Kimber’s individual claim for injunctive relief, 23 his release did not occur until after the class was 24 certified, and “class certification will preserve an 3 1 otherwise moot claim.” Comer v. Cisneros,
37 F.3d 775, 798 2 (2d Cir. 1994). The state contends that the district court 3 erred in the initial certification of the class, since not 4 all of the named plaintiffs were subjected to 24-hour 5 security lighting at the time of certification. The 6 district court properly concluded, however, that the 7 prisoners’ claims are “inherently transitory,” such that the 8 class certification relates back to the filing of the 9 complaint. See Amador v. Andrews,
655 F.3d 89, 100-01 (2d 10 Cir. 2011); see also Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 126
11 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting, in a prison conditions 12 case, that there is an exception to the mootness doctrine 13 “generally invoked to preserve a class action in which some 14 members of the class retain a cognizable interest in the 15 outcome after the claim of the named representative has 16 become moot”). As a result, the class claim is not moot. 17 We review a district court’s appointment and 18 supervision of class counsel for abuse of discretion. See 19 Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.,
67 F.3d 1072, 20 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1995); Foe v. Cuomo,
892 F.2d 196, 198 (2d 21 Cir. 1989) (“[T]he question of whether the district judge 22 abused his discretion in supervising the counsel before him 23 must be considered in light of the judge’s obligation to 24 insure that the plaintiff class is adequately represented 4 1 throughout the litigation.”). In appointing the PRO, the 2 district court failed to address the mandatory factors set 3 forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). The court therefore did not 4 consider the PRO’s inexperience litigating class actions or 5 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more generally 6 (such as discovery requirements). Moreover, the court was 7 aware at the time of appointment–-and throughout the 8 litigation below--that the PRO lacked the resources 9 necessary to litigate this case properly. The PRO’s 10 deficiencies as class counsel became more apparent as it 11 blew through filing deadlines, requested numerous filing 12 extensions, and failed to communicate with the named 13 plaintiffs. 14 The PRO generously volunteered to take on this case 15 after the earlier withdrawal of two other attorneys. 16 However, its lack of resources and its inexperience in 17 federal class actions are significant considerations. We 18 recognize that the district court had few options, or none, 19 but we must conclude that it abused its discretion in 20 appointing and retaining the PRO as class counsel. We, 21 therefore, vacate the judgment of the district court. On 22 remand, the district court will consider an appropriate way 23 forward. The law of the case doctrine does not foreclose 24 any option to achieve this goal–-including decertification 5 1 of the class or appointing new class counsel for the 2 currently certified class.1 3 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby VACATE AND REMAND 4 the judgment of the district court. 5 6 FOR THE COURT: 7 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 8 1 We note that appointed counsel for appellants indicated to the Court at oral argument a willingness to accept an appointment to continue the representation if this Court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Of course, we leave this to the district court to consider on remand. 6
Document Info
Docket Number: 11-1430 (L), 11-1554(Con)
Citation Numbers: 556 F. App'x 27
Judges: Jacobs, Lohier, Droney
Filed Date: 2/26/2014
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/6/2024