Wakim v. Michael Cetta, Inc. ( 2014 )

13‐1951‐cv
Wakim v. Cetta et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS  BY  SUMMARY  ORDER  DO  NOT  HAVE  PRECEDENTIAL  EFFECT.    CITATION  TO  A  SUMMARY  ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER  JANUARY  1,  2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY  FEDERAL  RULE OF  APPELLATE
PROCEDURE  32.1  AND  THIS  COURT’S  LOCAL  RULE  32.1.1.  WHEN  CITING  A  SUMMARY  ORDER  IN  A
DOCUMENT  FILED  WITH  THIS  COURT,  A  PARTY  MUST  CITE  EITHER  THE  FEDERAL  APPENDIX  OR  AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE  (WITH THE NOTATION  “SUMMARY ORDER”).   A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of March, two thousand
fourteen.
PRESENT:  RALPH K. WINTER,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges,
______________________
IBRAHIM T. WAKIM,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
‐v.‐            No. 13‐1951‐cv
MICHAEL CETTA, INC., DBA Sparks
Steak House, Inc., MICHAEL CETTA,
individually,
Defendants‐Appellees.
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______________________
FOR APPELLANT:   LOUIS PECHMAN (Jessica N. Tischler, on the brief),
Berke-Weiss & Pechman LLP, New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEES:   TIMOTHY J. PASTORE (Allan N. Taffet, Bryon S.
Moser, on the brief), Duval & Stachenfeld LLP, New
York, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Paul A. Crotty, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Ibrahim T. Wakim appeals from two orders entered on May 17, 2012 and
April 22, 2013, respectively, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Paul A. Crotty, Judge).  As relevant to this appeal, the two
orders granted summary judgment in favor of defendants‐appellees as to
Wakim’s claims alleging (a) disability discrimination under the New York State
Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290, et seq. and the New
York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-10, et
seq., and (b) retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §
201, et seq. and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), § 215.
The district court properly determined that Wakim’s successful disability
benefits application to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) judicially
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estopped Wakim from satisfying his discrimination and retaliation claims.
Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a factual position in a legal
proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by [that party] in a prior
legal proceeding.” Bates v. Long Island R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir.
1993).
Wakim is correct that his successful disability benefits application does not
per se preclude him from establishing a subsequent discrimination or retaliation
claim. See, e.g., DeRosa v. Nat’l Envelope Corp., 595 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2010).
Nonetheless, we see no reason why the district court erred in applying judicial
estoppel in this instance. Fundamentally, Wakim’s benefits application claimed
that he could no longer perform the job of “runner,” while his discrimination claim
identifies the “runner” position as the reasonable accommodation Wakim should
have received. Due to this complete overlap, judicial estoppel is appropriate here.
While it certainly is the case that the SSA does not consider reasonable
accommodation in determining applications for disability benefits, Wakim
represented that he was unable to perform the accommodation job, not that he was
unable to perform a task from which he sought accommodation. See generally
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999).
Wakim’s retaliation claim, which requires proving, inter alia, that an
employment action disadvantaged the plaintiff, fails for similar reasons.  See
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Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010).  As the district court
explained, because Wakim was judicially estopped from establishing that he
could work as a runner after his SSA‐determined disability date, yet the
challenged conduct did not occur until after that date, defendants’ conduct could
not have disadvantaged Wakim.
We have considered Wakim’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit.  For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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