In re Jorge Guttlein ( 2010 )


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  •     07-9085-am
    In re Jorge Guttlein
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32. 1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32. 1 . 1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER") •
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
    States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
    the 20~ day of May, two thousand ten.
    PRESENT:
    Jose A. Cabranes,
    Robert D. Sack,
    Richard C. Wesley,
    rcui t Judges.
    07 90BS-am
    In re Jorge Guttl
    Attorney. 	                            ORDER OF
    GRIEVANCE PANEL
    FOR JORGE GUTTLEIN:              Richard M. Maltz,         ., New York, New
    York.
    1         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    2   DECREED that the               of this Court's Committee on Admissions
    3   and Grievances ("the Committee") is adopted, and Jorge Guttlein
    1   is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for the misconduct des                   in the
    2   Committee's report.
    3        By       0      rs filed in December 2007 and March 2008, this Court
    4   referred Guttlein to the Committee for investigation of the
    5   matters             cribed in those orders and preparat       of a report on
    6   whether             should be subject to disciplinary or          corrective
    7   measures.
    8        During              Committee's proceedings, Guttlein had
    9   opportunity to address the matters discussed in the Court's
    10   re        1              and to testify under oath at a              held on
    11   September 19, 2008.           Guttlein was represented during the
    12   Committee's proceedings by Richard M. Maltz, Esq.              Presiding over
    13   the hearing were Committee members Paul Curnin, Esq., Terrence M.
    14   Connors,             ., and Eileen M. Blackwood, Esq.     In May 2009, the
    15   Committee           1    with the Court the record of the Committee's
    16   proceedings and            s report and recommendations.    Therea        , the
    17   Court provided Guttlein with a copy of the Committee's report,
    18   and Gutt          in responded.
    19        In           s report, the Committee concluded that there was
    20   and convincing evidence that Guttlein had engaged in conduct
    21   warranting              imposition of discipline.   See Report at 1, 10.
    22   After noting                 sence of various aggravating and mit
    23   factors,          id. at 10, the Committee recommended that               be
    24   publicly reprimanded and subject to certain reporting
    2
    1   requirements, id. at 11-12.      In his response, Guttlein does not
    2   take issue with any of the Committee's factual findings, but
    3   requests that a private, rather than publ        ,reprimand be imposed
    4   and that certain of the recommended reporting requirements be
    5   modified.    See Response at 1-5.
    6        Guttlein's referral to the Committee was based on his
    7   history of defaulting on deadlines set by this Court and his
    8   deficient briefing in one case.      Guttlein's compliance with this
    9   Court's deadlines has improved.      A review of this Court's records
    10   indicates that, since September 1, 2008, Guttlein has had 13 open
    11   cases in this Court and has complied with the applicable
    12   deadlines in most      them.    As far as can be determined, his
    13   recent defaults are limited to the following three cases.
    14        In Ai Muntasr v. Mukasey, 08-0995-ag, Guttlein submitted his
    15   brief three days after the July 2009 deadline set in this Court's
    16   scheduling order.l   See       Muntasr,   08-0995-ag, order filed June
    17   3, 2009 (setting deadline of July 3, 2009 for brief); entry
    18   noting receipt of brief on July 6, 2009; brief         led Aug. 6, 2009
    19   at 31 (a    idavit of service for brief, noting delivery to Court
    I The July 2009 default in Ai Muntasr was preceded by a June
    2008 default.   See Ai Muntasr, 08-0995-ag, order filed May 15,
    2008 (setting June 2008 deadline for brief); government motion
    led Aug. 22, 2008 (requesting dismissal based on petitioner's
    failure to file brief); response to motion    led Sept. 3, 2008,
    affirmation at `` 3-8, 10 (noting law office's mishandling of
    scheduling order). However, since the June 2008 default preceded
    the Committee's     ring and was discussed by Guttlein in his
    post-hearing submission to the Committee, we do not consider it
    our review     Guttlein's recent   story.
    3
    1   by hand on July 6, 2009).       In Hasan v. Holder, 08-4756-ag,
    2   Guttlein failed to timely fi        Form CIA, causing this Court to
    3   issue an order to show cause why the appeal should not be
    4   dismissed based on his default.         See Hasan, 08-4756-ag, order
    5   filed Oct. 16, 2008.     After Guttlein timely responded to the
    6   order and submitted the missing form, the case proceeded.         See
    7   id., responses      led Oct. 21 and 23, 2008.      In Rahman v. Mukasey,
    8   08-1484-ag, Guttlein successfully moved to fi          his reply brief
    9   out of time, stating that the former associate who had drafted
    10   the opening brief had failed to discuss a relevant precedent and,
    11   after that associate's departure from the firm, the case was not
    12   reassigned to another associate.        See Rahman, 08 1484-ag, motion
    13   filed Sept. 24, 2008, at 1-2.
    14       Additionally, the quality of Guttlein's briefing was called
    15   into question in one recent case.        In Mej   -Carrasco v. U.S.
    16   Department of Jus     ce, 08-4136-ag, the Court found that Guttlein
    17   had waived any challenge to the immigration judge's adverse
    18   credibility determination, which stood as a valid basis for the
    19   agency's denial of reI     f.   See Mejia-Carrasco,    08-4136-ag, brief
    20     led Feb. 3, 2009; order filed Aug. 31, 2009, at 2-3.         The Court
    21   noted that Guttlein's
    22       only mention of the IJ's credibility determination
    23       his somewhat baffling assertion that the IJ's
    24       credibility determination was not suf ciently
    25       explained because the IJ's oral decision was not
    26       initially included in the record. He does not assert
    27       that the absence of the oral decision from the record
    4
    1        prevented him from challenging the IJ's credibility
    2        determination or that he lacks a copy of that decision.
    3        Moreover, once the government provided an amended
    4        certified administrative record that included the IJ's
    5        decision, [Guttlein] made no effort to submit a revised
    6        brief addressing the IJ's explicit adverse credibility
    7        determination.
    8   Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).   It is our hope that Guttlein will
    9   make further improvements in the above-noted areas.
    10        Upon due consideration of the Committee's report, the
    11   underlying record, and Guttlein's submissions, it is hereby
    12   ORDERED that Guttlein is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for the misconduct
    13   described in the Committee's report and DIRECTED to comply with
    14   the reporting requirements described on pages 11 and 12 of the
    15   Committee's report.
    16        We deny Guttlein's request to impose a private reprimand.
    17   Guttlein's misconduct included the    ling of a petition for
    18   review in this Court without a good faith basis for believing any
    19   nonfrivolous issue might be raised, see Report at 7, 10, failing
    20   to address the dispositive issue in that same case, see id., at
    21   7-8, and failing to comply with numerous scheduling orders, which
    22   caused both the dismissal of many cases based on his defaults,
    23   and significant inconvenience to the judges and staff of this
    24   Court, see id., at 8-10.   Additionally, whi   no concrete
    25   prejudice to his clients or others has been shown, his pattern of
    26   misconduct created a significant risk of prejudice.   Although
    27   Guttlein stated that most of the defaulted cases were not pursued
    5
    1   due to the clients' abandonment of their cases or the clients'
    2   agreement to discontinue, Guttlein unsuccessfully requested
    3   reinstatement of several of the dismissed cases.        See cases
    4   docketed under 03-4394, 05-1515, 05-3398, 06-4989, 06-5791.         This
    5   suggests that he and/or his clients believed that those cases
    6   were worth pursuing and that, at the very least, the clients may
    7   have been prejudiced by the forfeiture of their right to review
    8   of their cases by Article III judges.        See, e.g., Saldarriaga v.
    9   U.S. Department of Justice, 05-3398-ag, motion to reinstate filed
    10   June 28, 2006, affirmation at ! 9 ("the instant case raises
    11   important issues and should be considered on its merits") .
    12   Although we acknowledge the mitigating factors found by the
    13   Committee, we find that Guttlein's misconduct warrants at least a
    14   public reprimand.
    15        We also decline to modify the reporting requirements to
    16   relieve Guttlein    the need to report on his practice before
    17   federal administrative agencies.        In the present case, we view
    18   Guttlein's ability to properly handle his administrative agency
    19   caseload as relevant to his ability to meet his professional
    20   obligations to this Court.   As a practical matter, an attorney
    21   who cannot meet his professional obligations in other venues
    22   bears watching in this Court.   As an ethical matter, the Court
    23   may legitimately question whether such an attorney should
    24   continue to possess this Court's imprimatur obtained through
    6
    --   ._-------­
    1   membership in its bar.   See Theard v. United States,     
    354 U.S. 2
       278, 282 (1957) ("The power of disbarment is necessary for
    3   the protection of the public in order to strip [an attorney]
    4   of the implied representation by courts that [an attorney]
    5   who is allowed to hold himself out to practice before them
    6   is in 'good standing' so to do."); In re Jaffe, 
    585 F.3d 118
    ,
    7   121 (2d Cir. 2009) ("even where 'discipline' is not appropriate,
    8   the Court may nonetheless determine, based on an attorney's prior
    9   behavior, that she will be unable to conform her future conduct
    10   to expected professional norms, and, as a result, that her
    11   ability to practice in this Court should be barred as a
    12   corrective measure in order to protect the public, other
    13   attorneys and litigants, the Court, and the administration of
    14   justice").   In any event, as exemplified by Porras v. INS, 06­
    15   3067-ag, where Guttlein's conduct before both the Board of
    16   Immigration Appeals and this Court was at issue, we see a close
    17   relationship between Guttlein's performance before that agency
    18   and his performance here.
    19        Finally, we direct Guttlein to file the periodic reports
    20   described in the Committee's report even if he has no defaults to
    21   report.
    22        The text of this panel's December 2007 and March 2008 orders
    23   and the Committee's report are appended to, and deemed part of,
    24   the present order for the following disclosure purposes.
    7
    1   Guttlein must disclose this order to all courts and bars of which
    2   he is currently a member, and as required by any bar or court
    3   rule or order.   Furthermore, the Clerk of Court is directed to
    4   release this order to the public by posting it on this Court's
    5   web site and providing copies to members of the public in the
    6   same manner as all other unpublished decisions of this Court, and
    7   to serve a copy on Guttlein, this Court's Committee on Admissions
    8   and Grievances, the attorney disciplinary committee for the New
    9   York State Appellate Division, First Department, and all other
    10   courts and jurisdictions to which this Court distributes
    11   disciplinary decisions in the ordinary course.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    By: 	 Michael Zachary
    Counsel to the Grievance Panel
    APPENDIX 1
    Text of December 2007 order
    For the reasons that follow, Jorge Guttlein is referred to
    this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances for
    investigation of the matters described below and preparation of a
    report on whether he should be subject to disciplinary or other
    corrective measures.  See Second Circuit Local Rule 46(h). We
    express no opinion here as to an appropriate disposition. The
    Committee may, of course, in the first instance, determine the
    appropriate scope of its investigation.
    Since September 2005, this Court has dismissed 32 of the 50
    8
    petitions for review for which Guttlein was counsel of record for
    the petitioners, based on the petitioners' failure to comply with
    this Court's scheduling orders.  See Second Circuit cases
    docketed under 03-4107; 03-4394; 03-40429; 03-40942; 04-0913; 04­
    4127; 04-4829; 04-4957: 04-5128: 04-5726; 04-5861; 05-0245; 05­
    0978; 05-1243; 05-1515; 05-2072; 05-2467; 05-3519; 05-3398; 05­
    5218; 05-5280; 05-5791; 05-6073; 05-6307; 05-6642; 05-6718; 06­
    0990; 06-2001; 06-3363; 06-4989; 06-5791; 07-0464. This Court
    also has dismissed three additional petitions for review for
    which Guttlein was counsel of record for the petitioners, based
    on the petitioners' failure to   1e form C/A pursuant to this
    Court's Civil Appeals Management Plan.  See Second Circuit cases
    docketed under 05-4957; 06-1247; 06-2109. This Court's records
    for the cited cases do not indicate that, prior to the respective
    deadlines for filing of the briefs or forms, Guttlein requested
    an extension of time to comply, a stay of proceedings, leave to
    withdraw as counsel, or withdrawal of the appeal.
    Upon due consideration of the matters described above, it is
    ORDERED that Jorge Guttlein is referred to this Court's Committee
    on Admissions and Grievances for investigation and preparation of
    a report, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46,
    this Court's Local Rule 46(h), and the Rules of the Committee on
    Admissions and Grievances.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    By:          /s
    Michael Z
    Counsel to the Grievance Panel
    APPENDIX 2
    Text of March 2008 order
    By order entered in December 2007, Jorge Guttlein was
    referred to this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances
    for investigation of the matters described in that order.  Since
    that time, additional information regarding Guttlein has come to
    the attention of this panel.
    First, in an order filed on January 23, 2008, in Porras v.
    INS, 06-3067-ag, the Court stated the following:
    We are troubled by the poor quality of Porras's
    brief in this case. Attorney Jorge Guttlein
    represented Porras both before the agency and in this
    9
    --   --   --------
    Court.  Here, Guttlein submitted a brief of poor
    quality that, inter alia, did not address the actual
    basis for the BlA's decision. Additionally,
    Guttlein's failure to exhaust Porras's application for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
    deprived Porras of the opportunity to meaningfully
    challenge the lJ's denial of this relief.
    Accordingly, we transfer the matter of Guttlein's
    conduct in this case to this Court's Grievance Panel
    for its determination of whether the matter should be
    referred to the Court's Committee on Admissions and
    Grievances.
    Porras v. INS,   06-3067-ag, order filed Jan. 23, 2008, at 4.
    Second, in an order filed on February 13, 2008, in Vargas­
    Gonzalez v. United States Department of Justice, 05-3562-ag, the
    Court granted the motion for reinstatement filed by Guttlein
    despite the untimeliness of the request.  The order states the
    following on the subject of Guttlein's untimeliness:
    [T]he records of this Court indicate that the tardiness
    of the appellant's counsel, Jorge Guttlein, in the
    present appeal was not an isolated incident, as he has
    failed to meet deadlines in a number of other cases in
    which he is counsel of record. The issue of whether
    that history of delay constitutes sanctionable
    misconduct is transferred to this Court's Grievance
    Panel for such action as it deems advisable under the
    circumstances.
    Vargas-Gonzalez v. United States Department of Justice, 05-3562­
    ag, order filed Feb. 13, 2008, at 1-2. Neither Porras nor
    Vargas-Gonzalez was mentioned in the December 2007 referral
    order.
    Upon due consideration, it is ORDERED that the additional
    information described above is referred to this Court's Committee
    on Admissions and Grievances for its consideration in conjunction
    with the information provided in this panel's December 2007
    referral order.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    By:
    --``-~----~-------------------
    Michael Zachary
    Counsel to the Grievance Panel
    10
    APPENDIX 3
    May 2009 Report of the Committee
    on Admissions and Grievances
    REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
    Re: In re Jorge Guttlein, # 07-9085-am
    I.     Introduction
    By orders dated December 18, 2007 and March 10, 2008, the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court") referred Jorge Guttlein to this Committee for
    investigation of his conduct before the Court and for preparation of a report on whether he
    should be subject to disciplinary or other corrective measures.
    Guttlein primarily practices immigration and criminal law (and the intersection of the
    two). The Court's two referral orders raise two principal areas of concern. First, the Court has
    dismissed several petitions for review for which Guttlein was counsel of record for failure to
    comply with scheduling orders. Second, the Court recently criticized Guttlein's brief, which
    failed to address the basis for the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") ruling from which
    his client was appealing.
    The Committee concludes that Guttlein has committed misconduct and that his
    misconduct warrants a sanction. The Committee recommends that Guttlein be publicly
    reprimanded. In addition, Guttlein should be required, in connection with his practice in any
    federal court in the Second Circuit or in any federal administrative agency whose action is
    subject to the Second Circuit's review, to submit to the Committee sworn statements identifying
    under oath each and every instance during each of the four reporting periods described below in
    which (1) a submission is not filed or filed out of time; or (2) an application is made for
    permission to make a late filing only after the due date has passed. The following constitutes the
    Committee's report and recommendation to impose discipline on Guttlein.
    II.    The Referral Orders
    The Court initially referred Guttlein to the Committee by order dated December 18, 2007
    ("Referral Order I"). Referral Order I noted that between September 2005 and the date of
    Referral Order I, the Court had dismissed 32 of 50 petitions for review for which Guttlein was
    counsel of record for the petitioners. These dismissals were the result of the petitioners' failure
    1
    to comply with the Court's scheduling orders.! According to Referral Order I, the Court also had
    dismissed three additional petitions for review for which Guttlein was counsel of record, based
    on the petitioners' failure to file form C/A pursuant to the Court's Civil Appeals Management
    Plan. 2
    In a subsequent order dated March 10, 2008 ("Referral Order II," and together with
    Referral Order I, the "Referral Orders"), the Court again referred Guttlein to the Committee.
    According to Referral Order II, in an order filed on January 23, 2008 in Porras v. INS, 06-3067,
    the Court stated:
    We are troubled by the poor quality of Porras's brief in this case.
    Attorney Jorge Guttlein represented Porras both before the agency
    and in this Court. Here, Guttlein submitted a brief of poor quality
    that, inter alia, did not address the actual basis for the BIA' s
    decision. Additionally, Guttlein's failure to exhaust Porras's
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
    deprived Porras of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the
    !J's denial of this relief. Accordingly, we transfer the matter of
    Guttlein's conduct in this case to this Court's Grievance Panel for
    its determination of whether the matter should be referred to the
    Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances.
    Referral Order II also noted that in Vargas-Gonzalez v. United States Department of
    Justice, 05-3562, the Court granted a motion for reinstatement filed by Guttlein on behalf of his
    client despite the untimeliness of the request. The February 13,2008 order states:
    [T]he records of this Court indicate that the tardiness of the
    appellant's counsel, Jorge Guttlein, in the present appeal was not
    an isolated incident, as he has failed to meet deadlines in a number
    of other cases in which he is counsel of record. The issue of
    whether that history of delay constitutes sanctionable misconduct
    is transferred to this Court's Grievance Panel for such action as it
    deems advisable under the circumstances.
    According to Referral Order I, the 32 cases that had been dismissed were docketed under
    03-4107; 03-4394; 03-40429; 03-40942; 04-0913; 04-4127; 04-4829; 04-4957; 04-5128;
    04-5726; 04-5861; 05-0245; 05-0978; 05-1243; 05-1515; 05-2072; 05-2467; 05-3519;
    05-3398; 05-5218; 05-5280; 05-5791; 05-6073; 05-6307; 05-6642; 05-6718; 06-0990;
    06-2001; 06-3363; 06-4989; 06-5791; and 07-0464.
    2
    Those three cases were docketed under 05-4957; 06-1247; and 06-2109.
    2
    III.   This Disciplinary Proceeding
    On March 17,2008, the Committee issued an Order to Show Cause regarding Guttlein's
    conduct as set forth in Referral Orders. A copy of the Referral Orders and the Committee's rules
    were attached to the Order to Show Cause. On May 12, 2008, Guttlein submitted a declaration
    in response to the Order to Show Cause.
    A hearing in this matter was held on September 18, 2008 before a sub-committee
    consisting of Eileen M. Blackwood, Terrence M. Connors, and Paul C. Cumin. Guttlein was
    represented at the hearing by Richard Maltz.
    Mr. Maltz requested and received permission to submit additional information and
    character evidence after the hearing on Guttlein's behalf. The Committee also asked Guttlein to
    submit additional information about his prior disciplinary history and any currently pending
    cases after the hearing.
    After the hearing, Guttlein submitted the information requested by the Committee as well
    as several character letters from both federal and state judges and other lawyers. A brief
    summary of a few of the character letters, which are generally representative, follows.
    The Honorable Denny Chin, a United States District Court Judge for the Southern
    District of New York, who has known Guttlein since they served together as Assistant United
    States Attorneys, believes that Guttlein "is a capable, responsible attorney of high moral
    character and integrity" who represents his clients "diligently and capably." Judge Chin is
    confident that any misconduct in which Guttlein has engaged is "uncharacteristic of the type of
    lawyer he actually is and has been over the years."
    The Honorable Edward J. McLaughlin, a New York Supreme Court Justice before whom
    Guttlein has appeared often, wrote that Guttlein "is an effective advocate who is much sought
    after for his legal skills, his familiarity with federal and state criminal and immigration law and
    his ability to converse with clients in their native Spanish language." Justice McLaughlin is
    "confident that [Guttlein's prior] troubles will not interfere with his ability to comply with the
    Circuit's rules in the future."
    The Honorable James A. Yates, a New York Supreme Court Justice, wrote that Guttlein
    has appeared before him on various matters for 16 years. Justice Yates noted Guttlein's "very
    active practice; perhaps too active a practice," and indicated that there have been several
    instances in which Guttlein has requested adjournments "frequently to [Justice Yates'] dismay."
    Nevertheless, Justice Yates indicated that Guttlein's reasons for requesting adjournments have
    been because of legitimate competing obligations, not "simple neglect." When Guttlein has
    appeared before Justice Yates, he was "prepared to discuss the case and [had] a current
    knowledge of his client's legal position" and "was a zealous and professional advocate,
    knowledgeable in the law and concerned for his client's welfare." Justice Yates wrote:
    3
    In sum, while I do believe that Mr. Guttlein may have over­
    committed himself in cases to a point which calls into question his
    ability to realistically appraise the time available or necessary to
    handle all his obligations, I don't believe that it was for lack of
    competence or caring, he is not a neglectful or callous person, in
    my opinion, he just has too many "balls in the air." I hope the
    Committee can address this problem without depriving the defense
    bar of a skilled and zealous advocate.
    Thomas E. Moseley, an immigration lawyer, has known Guttlein since he supervised
    Guttlein as the Chief of the Immigration Unit in the United States Attorney's Office for the
    Southern District of New York. Moseley is "firmly convinced" that Guttlein "is a highly capable
    attorney and a practitioner of both utmost integrity and good moral character" and "is committed
    to providing effective representation to his clients."
    Telesforo Del Valle, Jr., a criminal defense lawyer, has known Guttlein for over thirty
    years and has "witness[ed] Mr. Guttlein's legal work on numerous occasions." According to Del
    Valle, Guttlein is "a hard working and zealous advocate, with a firm command of the applicable
    law, and with a sincere and honest concern for the welfare of his clients." Del Valle believes that
    the conduct which is the subject of the Referral Orders is "truly uncharacteristic.,,3
    IV.    Factual Background
    Guttlein has been admitted to practice law in New York since 1980, and he started his
    career in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. In 1982, he began working as an
    Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, where he remained until
    1987. In 1985 and 1986, Guttlein was a special assistant for the immigration service. During his
    time as an Assistant United States Attorney, Guttlein received Justice Department achievement
    awards as well as commendations from the immigration service.
    Guttlein left the Government and opened his own firm, Aranda & Guttlein, with Andres
    Aranda in 1987. Initially, 10-15% of the firm's practice was immigration cases. In 2000, that
    percentage began increasing and at the present time, 50-60% of his cases are immigration
    matters. Guttlein believes his firm is one of the few in New York City that do both criminal and
    immigration work and he currently focuses much of his practice on immigration proceedings
    after a criminal conviction.
    3
    Guttlein also submitted character letters from the Honorable William A Wetzel, a New
    York Supreme Court Justice; the Honorable Lawrence M. McKenna, a United States
    District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York; Verena C. Powell, a private
    practitioner; and Theodore S. Green, a private practitioner.
    4
    Guttlein estimated that he currently has close to 1,000 pending cases. Many of those
    cases are inactive because, for example, he is waiting for a ruling from an administrative agency
    or a court.
    Guttlein's only prior discipline is a private letter of admonition he received in 1988 for
    failing to timely file a complaint. Guttlein has been the subject of additional disciplinary
    complaints that have been dismissed.
    According to Mr. Maltz, Guttlein's prior finn, Aranda & Guttlein, has also been the
    subject of disciplinary complaints. In particular, Guttlein's fonner partner, Andres Aranda, was
    suspended by New York State disciplinary authorities for conduct that did not implicate Guttlein.
    In light of the confidentiality requirements of New York Judiciary Law § 90(10), as well as Mr.
    Maltz's confidentiality obligations to Aranda,S Mr. Maltz and Guttlein were hesitant to disclose
    to the Committee details of prior disciplinary complaints against Aranda & Guttlein because
    such complaints would could also implicate Aranda. In light of these concerns, the Committee
    accepted Mr. Maltz's representation that in the years in which he has been representing Guttlein
    and his fonner finn, Mr. Maltz knows of no discipline that has been issued to Mr. Guttlein
    individually or as a member of his fonner finn.6
    V. 	   Legal Standard
    Under the Rules of this Committee,
    An attorney may be subject to discipline or other corrective
    measures for any act or omission that violates the rules of
    professional conduct or responsibility of the state or other
    jurisdiction where the attorney maintains his or her principal
    office, or the rules of professional conduct of any other state or
    jurisdiction governing the attorney's conduct. An attorney may
    also be subject to discipline or other corrective measures for any
    failure to comply with a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, a
    4
    New York Judiciary Law § 90( 10) states, in relevant part: "Any statute or rule to the
    contrary notwithstanding, all papers, records and documents upon the application or
    examination of any person for admission as an attorney and counsellor at law and upon
    any complaint, inquiry, investigation or proceeding relating to the conduct or discipline
    of an attorney or attorneys, shall be sealed and be deemed private and confidential."
    S
    Mr. Maltz represented Mr. Aranda.
    6
    Mr. Maltz worked at the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the New York
    Appellate Division First Department from 1989 through 2000 as a staff attorney, Deputy
    Chief Counsel, and First Deputy Chief Counsel, and the Committee has no reason to
    question his representation.
    5
    Local Rule of the Court, an order or other instruction of the Court,
    or a rule of professional conduct or responsibility of the Court, or
    any other conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
    Rules of the Committee on Admissions and Grievances, Rule 4.
    "A court of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it for conduct
    unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court rule." Fed. R. App. P.
    46(c). "Conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" may include any conduct "contrary to
    professional standards that show[s] an unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to clients or
    courts, or conduct inimical to the administration ofjustice." In re Snyder, 
    472 U.S. 634
    ,645
    (1985). For "[m]ore specific guidance," the Committee and the Court may look to "case law,
    applicable court rules, and 'the lore of the profession,' as embodied in codes of professional
    conduct." Id at 646 n.7.
    Courts have consistently treated neglect of client matters and ineffective or incompetent
    representation as sanctionable conduct. See, e.g., Gadda v. Ashcroft, 
    377 F.3d 934
    ,940 (9th Cir.
    2004); Amnesty Am. v. Town ofW, Hartford, 
    361 F.3d 113
    , 133 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Rabinowitz,
    
    596 N.Y.S.2d 398
    , 402 (App. Div. 1993); United States v. Song, 
    902 F.2d 609
     (7th Cir. 1990); In
    re Kraft, 
    543 N.Y.S.2d 449
     (App. Div. 1989); In re Bithoney, 
    486 F.2d 319
     (1st Cir. 1973). Such
    conduct is also sanctionable under the applicable professional rules and standards. The
    American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards") call
    for a range of sanctions from reprimand to disbarment for various forms of "lack of diligence"
    and "lack of competence." ABA Standards §§ 4.4, 4.5. The Disciplinary Rules of New York's
    Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility require that "[a] lawyer shall not ... [n]eglect a
    legal matter entrusted to the lawyer." D.R. 6-101 (a)(3). In addition, the Code's Ethical Canons
    require that the lawyer should represent his or her client "zealously," Canon 7-1, and that he or
    she "be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments," Canon 7-38.
    "Any finding that an attorney has engaged in misconduct or is otherwise subject to
    corrective measures must be supported by clear and convincing evidence." Rules of the
    Committee on Admissions and Grievances, Rule 7(h). Once misconduct has been established, in
    determining the sanction to be imposed, the Committee should consider: (a) the duty violated;
    (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's
    misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. ABA Standards § 3.0.
    The Committee may recommend to the Court's Grievance Panel a range of sanctions, including
    disbarment, suspension, public or private reprimand, monetary sanction, removal from pro bono
    or Criminal Justice Act panels, referral to other disciplinary bodies, supervision by a special
    master, counseling or treatment, or "such other disciplinary or corrective measures as the
    circumstances may warrant." Rules of the Committee on Admissions and Grievances, Rule 6.
    6
    VI.     The Alleged Misconduct
    A.     Briefing in Porras
    Guttlein represented the petitioner, Yulieht Redon Porras, in Porras v. INS, 06-3067. The
    BIA had denied Porras's appeal because Guttlein failed to file a brief on her behalf. In the brief
    tiled with the Court in support of Porras's petition for review, however, Guttlein failed to address
    the default before the BIA and instead argued the merits of Porras's request for asylum.
    According to Guttlein, he began representing Porras more than ten years ago, when she
    was arrested for attempting to purchase a green card. After immigration proceedings began,
    Guttlein pursued multiple avenues of potential relief to keep Porras in the country. One of those
    avenues - but not the primary avenue - was asylum.
    Guttlein testified that Porras panicked at her asylum hearing and was unable to testify
    effectively. The immigration judge denied her request for asylum. Guttlein appealed that
    determination to the BIA at Porras's insistence. Guttlein explained that he considered the appeal
    to the BIA to be a "protective notice of appeal" because he hoped that one of the more promising
    avenues of potential relief he was pursuing would be successful while the appeal was pending.
    He did not file a brief with the BIA because he "thought it would be difficult to make any type of
    cogent argument." He could not simply withdraw the BIA appeal because Porras would, at that
    point, be potentially subject to immediate deportation.
    After the BIA denied Porras's appeal for failure to file a brief, Guttlein claims he did not
    want to file a petition for review but Porras's family pressed him to do so, "even though they
    were informed that the appeal was extremely weak." Despite claiming that he did not file a brief
    with the BIA because he had nothing to argue, he filed a brief with the Court. He testified that
    doing so was "a massive error" because he "really had no argument in the Second Circuit," and
    he admitted that the brief was frivolous. He also testified that Porras and her family knew
    throughout the proceedings that there was "no basis" for her asylum appeal and that its main
    purpose was to buy time to pursue alternative forms of relief.
    Guttlein explained that he "improperly allowed the family of the client to influence [his]
    decision to continue to prosecute their case." He "do[es] not disagree that [his] brief did not
    properly address an important issue," and he "understand[s] that [he] should have not filed an
    appeal with the BIA or submitted a proper brief, regardless of whether the case was weak." He
    "further understand[s] that if an appeal has no merit [he] should not file an appeal regardless if a
    client insists." He claims that if a similar situation happens again, he would decline to pursue the
    appeal.
    With respect to Guttlein's failure to address in the brief he filed with the court the reason
    for the BIA decision under review - his failure to file a brief in support of the appeal- Guttlein
    testified that the associate he assigned to draft the brief "obviously didn't address the key issue of
    what arguments can [he] raise when he didn't raise anything in front of the BIA." Guttlein
    admitted that he failed to "carefully review" the brief before it was filed. He attributes that
    7
    failure to the personal problems he was going through at the time, which are discussed below.
    That associate no longer works for Guttlein.
    B.      Untimely Motion to Reinstate in Vargas-Gonzalez
    In Vargas-Gonzalez v. United States Department ojJustice, 05-3562, the case referenced
    in Referral Order II, Guttlein filed an untimely motion for reinstatement of his client's petition
    for review. According to Guttlein, at the time of the filing of the petition for review in Vargas­
    Gonzalez, another case, Blake v. Carbone, was sub judice before the Court and would determine
    the outcome in Vargas-Gonzalez. Therefore, Guttlein entered into a stipulation with the
    Government by which his client's petition for review would be dismissed without prejudice
    pending a decision in Blake. The stipulation required Guttlein to notify the Clerk of Court that
    his client wished to reinstate the petition for review within 60 days after the Court's decision in
    Blake.
    The Court issued an opinion in Blake on June 1,2007. Blake v. Carbone, 
    489 F.3d 88
    (2d Cir. 2007). Guttlein did not move to reinstate the petition for review in Vargas-Gonzalez
    until November 8, 2007. The Court denied the motion because Guttlein filed it more than 60
    days after the Blake decision. Guttlein filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
    granted. At the same time he was moving to reinstate the petition for review, Guttlein filed a
    motion with the BIA to re-argue the case based on the decision in Blake, which was granted.
    Ultimately, the petition for review was dismissed by stipulation in light of the BIA's decision to
    grant the motion to re-argue.
    Guttlein claims that he failed to timely move for reinstatement because he "did not
    become immediately aware of the Blake decision." Other than reading the Law Journal each
    day, Guttlein was unable to recall any steps he took to monitor Blake.
    C.      Failure to Comply with Scheduling Orders
    Guttlein has failed to comply with the scheduling order in numerous cases since
    September 2005. Referral Order I lists 32 petitions for review that were dismissed because
    Guttlein failed to comply with the scheduling orders and three additional cases in which the
    petitions were dismissed for failure to file form CIA. Guttlein does not dispute that he defaulted
    in these cases. 7 Instead, he offers several reasons for his failure to perfect these appeals.
    Guttlein claims that the "most common reason" he failed to proceed with these cases was
    that his "clients were not interested in proceeding and lost touch with [his] office." He notes that
    it "is not uncommon in [his] type of practice, and the type of aliens [he] represents, for the clients
    to abandon their cases." A large percentage of his clients are aliens accused of criminal conduct
    with whom it is frequently difficult to stay in contact.
    7
    Guttlein correctly notes that one of the cases appears to have been included mistakenly.
    He was not the attorney of record in the case docketed under 05-5791.
    8
    Guttlein also claims that he did not proceed with some of the cases because they lacked
    merit. For example, several of the cases involved appeals of denials of discretionary relief,
    which were filed before the REAL ID Act of 2005 limited reviewed of discretionary denials by
    Courts of Appeal. See 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Guttlein indicated that in such cases, his
    client agreed not to proceed with the petition for review.
    Guttlein further claims a number of non-case specific issues affected his ability to comply
    with the scheduling orders. He notes that systemic changes in the handling of immigration
    appeals led to a rapid increase in his case load of Second Circuit petitions for review and his
    "office was not properly equipped to handle this new volume of cases." Guttlein was unable to
    hire sufficient staff to assist with this increase in Second Circuit cases because his law firm was
    not producing enough income. "This resulted in the short cut of abandoning cases instead of
    making a proper application and, in some instances, the late filing of briefs."
    Additionally, Aranda, Guttlein's partner, was suspended from the practice of law in 2006,
    and Guttlein had to deal with Aranda's case load, both by handling some matters himself and by
    paying other lawyers to handle other matters.
    Guttlein also faced a number of personal issues at this time. He went through an
    "acrimonious separation and divorce" beginning sometime in 2004. In October 2004, Guttlein's
    mother died after a long illness. In 2005 or 2006, Guttlein filed for bankruptcy, in part because
    of his divorce and in part because of financial problems with his law practice. Guttlein testified
    that his divorce and bankruptcy were not resolved until late spring or early summer 2007.
    According to Guttlein, each time a petition for review was dismissed because of failure to
    comply with the scheduling order, he notified his clients. None of his clients in those cases filed
    a complaint with any disciplinary authority. He continues to represent more than half of those
    petitioners.
    Guttlein believes, and the Committee has no evidence to the contrary, that none of his
    clients were prejudiced in these cases. He noted that many of their cases involved discretionary
    decisions by the BIA which, after the REAL ID Act, are not reviewable by Circuit Courts. He
    continues to pursue other forms of relief for many of these clients, and none has raised claims of
    ineffective assistance against him.
    Even after the issues noted above were resolved, however, it appears that Guttlein has
    had some more recent issues with respect to scheduling orders. In Alejo v. US. Department of
    Justice, 07-2074, Guttlein timely sought an extension of the deadline to file the petitioner's brief.
    The Court granted the request and indicated that no further extensions would be granted.
    Nonetheless, on October 23,2007, three days before his brief was due, Guttlein sought an
    additional extension. lbe Court denied the request but granted a brief grace period to file the
    brief. Guttlein filed his brief within that grace period. Guttlein indicated to the Committee that
    the same associate who was responsible for the brief in Porras, and who is no longer in
    Guttlein's employ, was responsible for the brief in Alejo.
    9
    In Segura v. u.s. Department ofJustice, 08-1485, the initial scheduling order required
    Guttlein to file the petitioner's brief on June 9, 2008, which Guttlein did not do. Guttlein
    indicated that the scheduling order was premature because the Court had not yet issued a pre­
    argument notice. It appears that Guttlein is correct. A subsequent order of the Court vacating
    the initial scheduling order indicated that it was "entered in error." Nonetheless, the Committee
    finds it somewhat troubling that Guttlein simply ignored the scheduling order instead of
    confirming with the Court that it was entered prematurely.
    VIII. Recommendation
    The Committee finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Guttlein committed
    misconduct by (1) submitting a brief in Porras that he knew to be meritless; (2) failing to
    adequately monitor the status of Blake; and (3) failing to comply with scheduling orders in
    numerous cases. This conduct is "unbecoming a member of the bar," Fed. R. App. P. 46(c), in
    violation of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and in violation ofD.R. 6­
    10 I (A)(3). This misconduct warrants sanction.
    There are two aggravating factors. First, Guttlein has engaged in a pattern of misconduct.
    See ABA Standards § 9.22(c) (pattern of misconduct can be aggravating factor). For an
    approximately three to four year period, Guttlein repeatedly failed to comply with the Court's
    scheduling orders. Second, Guttlein is an experienced practitioner who, even by his own
    account, should have recognized and addressed his problems sooner than he did. See ABA
    Standards § 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of law can be aggravating factor).8
    There are also significant mitigating factors. Guttlein's misconduct was not the result of
    a dishonest or selfish motive. See ABA Standards § 9 .33(b ) (absence of a dishonest or selfish
    motive can be a mitigating factor). In fact, the misconduct in Porras appears to be the result of
    Guttlein's misguided attempt to delay his client's deportation while he was pursuing other forms
    of relief. Additionally, Guttlein was generally forthcoming and cooperative with the
    Committee's investigation. See ABA Standards § 9.33(e) (cooperative attitude toward
    disciplinary proceedings can be a mitigating factor). Moreover, as evidenced by the impressive
    array of character letters he submitted, GuttIein appears to have a good reputation and a strong
    character. See ABA Standards § 9.33(g) (character or reputation can be a mitigating factor).
    Finally, Guttlein generally accepted responsibility for his misconduct, and the Committee found
    Guttlein's expressions of remorse to be credible. See ABA Standards § 9.33(1) (remorse can be a
    mitigating factor).
    8
    While Guttlein has a prior disciplinary offense for related conduct (missing a deadline),
    the Committee does not consider it to be an aggravating factor because that misconduct
    occurred twenty years ago. Cf ABA Standards § 9.33(m) (remoteness of prior offenses
    can be a mitigating factor)
    10
    In light of these factors, the Committee recommends that Guttlein receive a public
    reprimand from the Court. (A draft form of reprimand is attached.) In making this
    recommendation, the Committee was influenced by several factors.
    First, it appears that the majority of Guttlein' s misconduct occurred within a three to four
    year period in which Guttlein was experiencing several serious professional and personal issues.
    Nonetheless, the Committee also recognizes that some of the misconduct appears to have
    occurred after many of the clouds had passed.
    Second, it is not clear that Guttlein's misconduct prejudiced his clients. While filing a
    frivolous appeal with the BIA and then with the Court in the Porras matter was improper, it
    appears to have been part of a strategy to buy time to pursue other forms of relief - to the client's
    potential advantage, not disadvantage. In Vargas-Gonzalez, Guttlein's client was able to re-open
    his case before the BIA without any prejudice resulting from Guttlein's failure to monitor the
    Blake case. Several of the numerous petitions for review that were dismissed as result of
    Guttlein's failure to comply with the scheduling order appear to have been meritless after
    passage ofthe REAL ID Act. At the same time, without reviewing the merits of each case, the
    Committee cannot conclude that none of the clients whose petitions were dismissed as a result of
    Guttlein's failure to comply with the scheduling orders suffered any prejudice. Moreover, the
    level of prejudice to clients does not excuse Guttlein's disregard of court orders and the resulting
    burden on the Court and its staff.
    Third, Guttlein has taken several steps in order to prevent the same misconduct from
    occurring again. He has worked with Mr. Maltz to improve his case management. Guttlein
    testified that he now has a computer system that helps him keep track of his cases and upcoming
    deadlines. All of his cases and their upcoming dates are on the system. Guttlein has also hired
    staff to assist him. He now has three associates and three full-time paralegals. One ofthose
    associates focuses primarily on immigration appeals. Guttlein meets with his staff every
    morning to go over the case calendars and what has to be done. Once a week, he and his staff
    meet to discuss the new cases in which he has been retained that week and to discuss what needs
    to be done within the next month.
    Finally, Guttlein now appears to have in place a better support system to assist him
    should problems like those he previously faced arise again. Thomas E. Moseley, an experienced
    immigration practitioner, has agreed to serve as someone Guttlein can tum to for advice and
    mentoring, as has Telesforo Del Valle, Jr. Additionally, Guttlein testified that he now has
    achieved stability in his personal life.
    The Committee also notes that Guttlein has had some issues in more recent cases, such as
    in the Alejo matter discussed above. Therefore, the Committee recommends that Guttlein be
    required, in connection with his practice in any federal court in the Second Circuit or in any
    federal administrative agency whose action is subject to the Second Circuit's review, to submit
    to the Committee sworn statements identifying under oath each and every instance during each
    of the four reporting periods described below in which (1) a submission is not filed or filed out of
    time; or (2) an application is made for permission to make a late filing only after the due date has
    11
    passed. It is expected that these reports will show no such instances absent exigent
    circumstance, which circumstances should be attested to under oath in the respective report.
    In the event that a report is not timely filed or reveals deficiencies not justified by exigent
    circumstance, the Committee may recommend the imposition of additional discipline, including
    but not limited to suspension from the Second Circuit, without hearing further testimony.
    The following reporting periods and deadlines shall be observed. The report for each
    reporting period shall be mailed to the Committee Secretary within ten (10) days of the end of
    that reporting period. The first reporting period shall commence 10 days after the Committee's
    recommendation is mailed to Guttlein and shall end six months after the Second Circuit issues its
    order of disposition in this matter. Each of the three subsequent reporting period shall be for a
    reporting period commencing at the end of the prior reporting and ending six months later. A
    total of four reports will be prepared and mailed to the Committee Secretary.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-9085-am

Judges: Cabranes, Sack, Wesley

Filed Date: 5/20/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024