Ming Jin Chen-Sie v. Holder , 423 F. App'x 81 ( 2011 )


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  •          10-1189-ag
    Chen-Sie v. Holder
    BIA
    Laforest, IJ
    A200 125 881
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 1st day of June, two thousand eleven.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    8                RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    9                PETER W. HALL,
    10                      Circuit Judges.
    11       _______________________________________
    12
    13       Ming Jin Chen-Sie,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                            v.                                10-1189-ag
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL
    20                Respondent.
    21       ______________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:                John Z. Zhang, New York, New York.
    24
    25       FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    26                                      General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant
    27                                      Director; Kerry A. Monaco, Trial
    28                                      Attorney, Office of Immigration
    29                                      Litigation, Civil Division, United
    30                                      States Department of Justice,
    31                                      Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    5       Petitioner Ming Jin Chen-Sie, a native and citizen of
    6   China, seeks review of a March 4, 2010 decision of the BIA
    7   affirming the June 23, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge
    8   (“IJ”) Brigitte Laforest denying Chen-Sie’s application for
    9   asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    10   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   In re Ming Jin Chen-
    11   Sie, No. A200 125 881 (B.I.A. Mar. 4, 2010), aff’g No. A200
    12   125 881 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 23, 2008).    We assume the
    13   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    14   procedural history in this case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    16   decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.    See Yan Chen
    17   v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).    The
    18   applicable standards of review are well-established.    See
    19   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 20
       510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    21       As a preliminary matter, under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1),
    22   this Court “may review a final order of removal only if
    23   . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies
    2
    1   available to the alien as of right[.]”   This jurisdictional
    2   rule is absolute with respect to the requirement that on
    3   appeal to the BIA the alien must raise each category of
    4   relief subsequently raised in this Court.     See Karaj v.
    5   Gonzales, 
    462 F.3d 113
    , 119 (2d Cir. 2006).    In this case,
    6   Chen-Sie failed to challenge the IJ’s denial of CAT relief
    7   in his appeal to the BIA.   Thus, as a statutory matter, we
    8   are without jurisdiction to consider any challenge to the
    9   denial of that relief, and the petition is dismissed to this
    10   extent.   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1).
    11       As to asylum and withholding of removal, substantial
    12   evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Chen-Sie
    13   failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
    14   persecution.   As the agency reasonably noted, it is
    15   speculative whether Chen-Sie will ever become a priest or
    16   missionary as he has not undergone any religious education.
    17   Indeed, Chen-Sie testified that: he did not preach because
    18   of his educational level; he needed many more years of
    19   education and training before he could be a priest; his
    20   fellow church members did not believe he would become a
    21   priest because of his limited education; and until he
    22   becomes a priest the “[o]nly thing [he] can do is to become
    23   a sincerely [sic] follower.”   Accordingly, the agency did
    3
    1   not err in finding that he did not have a well-founded fear
    2   of persecution because his claim that he might be persecuted
    3   if he ever became a priest or missionary was too
    4   speculative.   See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129
    5   (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that an asylum applicant could not
    6   base a well-founded fear that he might be subjected to
    7   persecution on his desire to have more children in violation
    8   of China’s family planning policy because the fear was
    9   “speculative”); Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 117
    10   (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that a “speculative” anxiety does
    11   not make a fear of future persecution objectively
    12   reasonable).
    13       Chen-Sie also argues that the agency erred by failing
    14   to consider his evidence of country conditions,
    15   demonstrating that some Christians who preached outside of
    16   the state-sanctioned churches were detained, criminally
    17   charged, and tortured.   However, a reasonable fact-finder
    18   would not be compelled to conclude that the agency ignored
    19   any material evidence.   See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
    
    20 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the Court has
    21   rejected the notion that the agency must “expressly parse or
    22   refute on the record each individual argument or piece of
    23   evidence offered by the petitioner”); see also Xiao Ji Chen
    4
    1   v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006)
    2   (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of
    3   the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly
    4   suggests otherwise”).    To the contrary, as discussed above,
    5   the agency based its decision on its finding that it was too
    6   speculative that Chen-Sie would become a missionary or
    7   preacher in China, not on a finding that such individuals
    8   were never subjected to persecution.     Moreover, the agency
    9   reasonably noted that Chen-Sie testified that members of his
    10   family practiced Christianity without any problems in China.
    11       The agency also did not err in finding that Chen-Sie
    12   did not meet his burden of proof because he did not provide
    13   evidence corroborating his testimony that he was involved in
    14   a church in the United States.     “[T]he REAL ID Act
    15   emphasizes the importance of corroborating evidence” in
    16   determining whether an applicant has met his burden of
    17   proof, and an IJ may properly deny an applicant’s claim for
    18   failure to provide corroborating evidence where such
    19   evidence can reasonably be obtained.     Chuilu Liu v. Holder,
    20   
    575 F.3d 193
    , 197, 198 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 8 U.S.C.
    21   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).    Before the agency, Chen-Sie contended
    22   that he could not reasonably provide corroborating evidence
    23   from his church in the United States or people who attended
    5
    1   it with him because: he had not yet been baptized; the
    2   people in his church did not believe he would become a
    3   priest; and many asylum applications were fabricated.
    4   However,   those reasons do not compel the conclusion that
    5   corroborating evidence was unavailable.   See 8 U.S.C.
    6   § 1252(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a determination made
    7   by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of
    8   corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . .
    9   that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude
    10   that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”); cf.
    11   Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005)
    12   (providing that the agency need not credit an applicant’s
    13   explanations unless a reasonable fact-finder would be
    14   compelled to do so).   Because the agency required only
    15   confirmation that Chen-Sie attended church, the agency did
    16   not err in finding that Chen-Sie failed to meet his burden
    17   of proof given his testimony that he attended church
    18   regularly, participated in religious education classes, and
    19   handed out fliers for the church.   See 8 U.S.C.
    20   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
    21       Accordingly, because Chen-Sie’s fear of future
    22   persecution on account of his desire to become a priest was
    23   speculative, see Jian Xing Huang, 
    421 F.3d at 129
    , and
    6
    1   because the agency did not err in finding that he failed to
    2   corroborate his testimony, see Chuilu Liu, 
    575 F.3d at
    197-
    3   98, the agency did not err in denying his application for
    4   asylum.   See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 169
    , 178
    5   (2d Cir. 2004) (providing that an applicant for asylum must
    6   establish that his fear is objectively reasonable).    As
    7   Chen-Sie was unable to meet his burden for asylum he
    8   necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required to
    9   succeed on a claim for withholding of removal.   See Paul v.
    10   Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez v. INS,
    11   
    947 F.2d 660
    , 665 (2d Cir. 1991).
    12       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    14
    15                               FOR THE COURT:
    16                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    17
    18
    7