Bonilla v. Jaronczyk ( 2009 )

08-1470-pr
Bonilla v. Jaronczyk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUM M ARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUM M ARY
ORDERS FILED A FTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER
PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUM M ARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A
CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION M UST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
BE ACCOM PANIED BY THE NOTATION: “(SUM M ARY ORDER).” A PARTY CITING A SUM M ARY
O RDER M UST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUM M ARY ORDER TOGETHER W ITH THE PAPER IN
W HICH THE SUM M ARY O RDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
UNLESS THE SUM M ARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRO NIC DATABASE W HICH IS
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE W ITHOUT PAYM ENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT
HTTP://W W W .CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY
OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, TH E CITATION M UST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT
DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUM BER OF THE CASE IN W HICH THE ORDER W AS ENTERED.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 2 nd day of December, two thousand nine.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
BRIAN M. COGAN,*
District Judge.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
OFIDIO BONILLA, a/k/a Juan Calderon,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-1470-pr
JOHN JARONCZYK, Corrections Officer, Shield #341;
FRANK CAMIDGE, Corrections Officer, Shield #2394;
JOSEPH RAZZANO, Corrections Officer, Shield #2298;
and BRIAN SULLIVAN, Corrections Officer, Shield
#2103,
Defendants-Appellees.**
---------------------------------------------------------------------
*
District Judge Brian M. Cogan of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
**
The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption to read as shown above.
APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: MARK C. KUJAWSKI, Kujawski & Dellicarpini,
Deer Park, New York.
FOR APPELLEES: Lorna B. Goodman, County Attorney of Nassau
County, Gerald R. Podlesak, Deputy County
Attorney of Nassau County, Mineola, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Sandra J. Feuerstein, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the March 3, 2008 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Ofidio Bonilla, a New York State prisoner, appeals from a final judgment
entered after a jury verdict in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983of excessive force. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior
proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1. The Proper Constitutional Standard
Bonilla submits that the district court erred in refusing to submit his excessive force
claim to the jury under the Fourth, as well as the Eighth, Amendment. We review claims of
legal error de novo, see Grace v. Corbis-Sygma, 487 F.3d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2007), and
we identify none here.
While claims of excessive force “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment,” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), post-conviction excessive force claims, such as Bonilla’s,
are properly considered under the Eighth Amendment, see id. n.10 (“After conviction, the
Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary source of substantive protection . . . in cases . . .
2
where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.’” (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986))); accord Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1242 n.1
(2d Cir. 1993). We need not here decide whether there is some narrow class of post-
conviction excessive force claims that may be subject to constitutional provisions other than
the Eighth Amendment, as this case manifestly falls outside any such exception.1 Bonilla’s
challenge to the district court’s application of the Eighth Amendment is therefore without
merit.
2. Bifurcation of the Monell Claim
Bonilla also submits that the district court erred in precluding him from pursuing a
claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658(1978). By ruling that it would assess Bonilla’s right to proceed with a Monell claim if he
succeeded on any of his claims against the individual defendants, the district court effectively
bifurcated trial. Such bifurcation falls well within the court’s discretion, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(b), because “litigation of the first issue might eliminate the need to litigate the second
issue,” Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
A jury’s conclusion that a plaintiff has suffered no constitutional violation at the hands
of an individual defendant generally forecloses a Monell claim. See Matican v. City of New
1
Bonilla relies on language in Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2008),
observing that where “it is uncertain whether the [forceful] act complained of is punishment,”
determining whether the Fourth or Eighth Amendment provides the applicable rule of
decision depends on the ultimate resolution of the facts, id. at 883. There, it was unclear
whether the defendant officers removed the decedent from a courtroom because of his refusal
to leave or as punishment for his contempt of court. See id. The instant case, however,
involves no such ambiguity.
3
York, 524 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2008); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d
Cir. 2001); see also City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).
While there are limited exceptions to this rule where “the injuries complained of are not
solely attributable to the actions of named individual defendants,” Barrett v. Orange County
Human Rights Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999), or where a jury concludes that
the individual defendants violated plaintiff’s rights but nonetheless enjoy qualified immunity,
see Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d at 71, neither of these exceptions applies here.
Bonilla’s complaint alleged violations attributable only to the conduct of named individual
defendants, and thus individual liability was a prerequisite for municipal liability to arise
from those allegations. Because a jury determined that none of the defendants had violated
Bonilla’s constitutional rights, there was no basis for it to consider municipal liability. Thus,
the district court’s treatment of the Monell claim manifests no error.
3. The Challenged Evidentiary Rulings
Bonilla challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, arguing that he
is entitled to a new trial before a different judge. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion, see Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2001), and we will
not grant a new trial unless error affects a substantial right, see Arlio v. Lively, 474 F.3d 46,
51 (2d Cir. 2007). We identify no evidentiary error in this case.
a. The Department of Justice Letter
Bonilla contends that the district court erred in excluding a September 11, 2000
United States Department of Justice letter concluding that certain conditions and practices
4
at the Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”) were unconstitutional. While “factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law” are not
excluded by the hearsay rule “unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness,” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(c), the admissibility of such evidence
still depends on its relevance, see Fed. R. Evid. 401-403; see also Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d
187, 191 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Before reaching the issue whether the report qualified under the
public report exception to the hearsay rule, the district court properly considered its
relevance.” (citations omitted)).
The district court concluded that the letter was irrelevant because its general
discussion of constitutional violations did not implicate the facts of this case or name any of
the individual defendants. The court further concluded that the letter could not be used to
impeach the testimony of the official responsible for teaching the appropriate use of force
at the Nassau County Corrections Academy, as the practices and procedures taught were not
discontinued or disallowed on account of any subsequent investigation. Because it was only
after this witness was released that Bonilla suggested the relevancy of the letter’s discussion
of deficiencies in NCCC’s use of force training, we identify no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s rejection of the argument as untimely. In any event, because the excluded
evidence pertained only to the issues of qualified immunity and municipal liability, which
the jury either did not reach or was not asked to consider, the exclusion of this evidence, even
if error, was necessarily harmless.
5
b. Ennis Hightower
Bonilla asserts that the district court erred in precluding “any evidence of the subject
November 30, 1998 fight, to the extent that it involved [another prisoner named] Ennis
Hightower.” Appellant Br. at 34 (emphasis omitted). Contrary to Bonilla’s contention, the
district court did admit some evidence relating to Hightower’s involvement in the November
30 incident. See Trial Tr. at 278-81, 312-22, 338-40, 386-419. Insofar as the court excluded
evidence regarding Hightower’s own litigation against defendants as irrelevant, we discern
no abuse of discretion.
c. Bonilla’s Immigration Status
Lastly, Bonilla challenges the district court’s admission of evidence relating to his
immigration status. This challenge also fails. On cross-examination of Bonilla, defendants
were permitted to inquire into specific instances of conduct bearing on Bonilla’s “character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)(1). Questions regarding Bonilla’s
alleged use of false papers to reenter the United States illegally clearly satisfied this standard.
Any other references to Bonilla’s immigration status occurred in the context of defendants’
inquiry into his prior convictions, evidence of which was admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 609. On these facts, we perceive no abuse of discretion.
4. Conclusion
We have considered Bonilla’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
6
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
By:
7