Ping Wu v. Holder , 436 F. App'x 41 ( 2011 )


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  •     10-5013-ag
    Wu v. Holder
    BIA
    Mulligan, IJ
    A094 939 275
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 25th day of October, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    PING WU,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                      10-5013-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Michael Brown, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Jem C. Sponzo,
    Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, U.S.
    Department of Justice, Washington,
    DC.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Ping Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic
    of China, seeks review of the November 30, 2010, order of
    the BIA affirming the August 31, 2009, decision of
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas J. Mulligan denying his
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Ping
    Wu, No. A094 939 275 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2010), aff’g     No. A094
    939 275   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 31, 2009).   We assume
    the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.     See Yan Chen
    v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).    “We review
    the agency's factual findings, including adverse credibility
    determinations, under the substantial evidence standard,
    treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable
    adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    contrary.’”   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165 (2d
    Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).    “When
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    evaluating credibility determinations for substantial
    evidence, we afford particular deference to the IJ,” and
    “[w]here the IJ's adverse credibility finding is based on
    specific examples of inconsistent statements or
    contradictory evidence, a reviewing court will generally not
    be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was
    compelled to find otherwise.”       
    Id. at 165-66
    (internal
    quotation marks and ellipsis omitted); see also
    Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    The agency’s adverse credibility determination is based
    on substantial evidence, given the inconsistencies in Wu’s
    testimony, his credible-fear interview, and the testimony of
    his witness, and in light of the IJ’s demeanor finding.         As
    the agency found, while Wu testified that he suffered two
    incidents of harm in China – an arrest and beating in 2002
    and an attempted arrest in 2006 – he failed to mention the
    2002 incident during his credible-fear interview.       See 8
    U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that an adverse
    credibility determination may be based on “the consistency
    between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
    statements . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
    such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency
    . . . goes to the hear of the applicant’s claim.”).
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    The agency was not compelled to accept Wu’s explanation
    that he had failed to mention the 2002 arrest because he had
    not been asked about harm he suffered due to his support of
    Falun Gong and because he had not considered arrest by a
    village committee to constitute an arrest.     In addition to
    being asked questions about arrest, Wu was asked whether he
    had any other reason to fear being returned to China.
    Accordingly, the agency did not need to credit his
    explanations for his inconsistent statements; they were not
    explanations that would compel a reasonable factfinder to
    accept them.   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81 (2d
    Cir. 2005).
    The IJ’s adverse credibility determination is further
    supported by an inconsistency, albeit a minor one, between
    Wu’s and his witnesses’s testimony.     See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).     The IJ’s demeanor finding also
    provides additional support for the adverse credibility
    determination, as the IJ found that on several occasions,
    supported by the record, Wu paused before responding to
    questions and appeared to be testifying from a script rather
    than actual experience.     See Dong Gao v. BIA, 
    482 F.3d 122
    ,
    126-27 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that this Court grants
    “particular deference” in applying the substantial evidence
    4
    standard to credibility findings based on demeanor).
    After concluding that the IJ “had cogent reasons for
    distrusting the veracity of [Wu’s] claim of past
    persecution,” the BIA noted that “[a]t a minimum, the [IJ]
    was justified in mandating [Wu’s] presentation of additional
    corroboration for the specific facts of his claim.”     The
    BIA’s finding was reasonable, as an asylum applicant’s
    failure to corroborate his testimony may bear on his
    credibility, “because the absence of corroboration in
    general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
    that has already been called into question.”    See Biao Yang
    v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007); Chuilu Liu v.
    Holder, 
    575 F.3d 193
    , 198 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009).   Contrary to
    Wu’s argument, the agency does not first need to identify
    the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and
    show that this evidence was reasonably available to the
    applicant, before relying on a lack of corroboration to
    support an adverse credibility finding.   See Xiao Ji Chen v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 341 (2d Cir. 2006).
    Moreover, the agency did not err in declining to give
    significant weight to the statements Wu provided from his
    family and friends.   See 
    id. at 342
    (the weight afforded to
    an applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies
    5
    largely within the discretion of the agency).
    Given Wu’s inconsistencies, demeanor, and lack of
    corroboration, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
    adverse credibility determination.   Accordingly, the agency
    did not err in denying Wu’s applications for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and CAT relief, as those claims were
    all based on the same factual predicate.   See Paul v.
    Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 155-56 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
    The agency also reasonably found that Wu did not
    demonstrate eligibility for relief based on his testimony
    and photographs of his practice of Falun Gong and
    participation in a demonstration in the United States
    because Wu did not present any evidence indicating that the
    Chinese government was aware or likely to become aware of
    those activities.   See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    ,
    129 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a fear of future
    persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid
    support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”);
    Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 143 (2d Cir. 2008)
    (holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of
    future persecution, an applicant must establish that he
    would be singled out for persecution or that there was a
    6
    pattern or practice of persecution of similarly-situated
    individuals).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    that the Court previously granted in this petition is
    VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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