Yi Da Lin v. Holder , 454 F. App'x 16 ( 2012 )


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  • 10-5207-ag
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    Weisel, IJ
    A070 896 924
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
    York, on the 4th day of January, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________
    YI DA LIN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                               10-5207-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _________________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Wendy Tso, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Asistant Attorney General;
    Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director;
    Lisa Morinelli, Trial Attorney, Office
    of Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner       Yi     Da   Lin,   a     native    and    citizen   of   the
    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 30,
    2010, decision of the BIA, affirming the June 8, 2010, order
    of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel denying his
    motion to reopen.         In re Yi Da Lin, No. A070 896 924 (B.I.A.
    Nov. 30, 2010), aff’g No. A070 896 924 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
    June 8, 2010).       We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
    As an initial matter, we note that the agency erred in
    referring      to   Lin’s    motion,     which    sought       to   present   new
    evidence in support of rescinding an in absentia removal
    order, as a motion to reconsider as opposed to a motion to
    reopen.    See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (providing that a motion to reconsider
    must specify error in a prior agency decision, whereas a
    motion    to   reopen     must    present      new     facts   and   evidence).
    However, remand to correct this error would be futile because,
    as discussed below, the agency reasonably considered the new
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    evidence and arguments made in Lin’s motion as if it were a
    motion to reopen and we can confidently predict that its
    analysis would be the same on remand.                 See Shunfu Li v.
    Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 141
    , 150 (2d Cir. 2008).
    We have reviewed the denial of Lin’s motion to reopen for
    abuse of discretion.         See Alrefae v. Chertoff, 
    471 F.3d 353
    ,
    357 (2d Cir. 2006).         An order of removal entered in absentia
    may be rescinded only: (1) upon a motion filed within 180 days
    after   the    date    of   the   order    of    removal    if    the     alien
    demonstrates     that    the   failure    to     appear    was    because      of
    exceptional circumstances; or (2) upon a motion to reopen
    filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that he did not
    receive notice as required or demonstrates that he was in
    federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through
    no fault of his own.           8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(4)(ii).         Although    Lin    claimed    not     to      have
    received his Notice to Appear because it was provided to him
    in English, we have rejected the argument that a Notice to
    Appear is defective because it is not read to an alien in his
    native language.        See Lopes v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 81
    , 84-85
    (2d   Cir.    2006).     Therefore,      Lin’s    motion    rested      on    his
    argument      that     exceptional       circumstances,          namely       the
    -3-
    ineffective assistance of his immigration services agency,
    caused his failure to appear at his hearing, and his motion
    was subject to a 180-day time limitation.   See id.; see also
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(4)(ii). That
    motion, filed in 2010, was undisputably untimely as it was
    filed more that eleven years after the IJ’s 1998 in absentia
    order of removal.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(4)(ii).
    The agency did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    equitably toll the time period for filing Lin’s motion because
    he failed to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in
    pursuing reopening based on the ineffective assistance of an
    immigration services agency.    In order to warrant equitable
    tolling, even assuming that a movant demonstrated that prior
    counsel was ineffective, an alien is required to demonstrate
    “due diligence” in pursuing his claim during “both the period
    of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or
    should have been discovered and the period from that point
    until the motion to reopen is filed.”   Rashid v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    , 131-32 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Cekic v. INS, 
    435 F.3d 167
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2006).        We have noted that, in
    considering whether a petitioner exercised due diligence,
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    “there is no period of time which we can say is per se
    unreasonable, and, therefore, disqualifies a petitioner from
    equitable tolling–or, for that matter, any period of time that
    is per se reasonable.”         Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 
    508 F.3d 710
    ,
    715 (2d Cir. 2007).          Here, the agency reasonably found that
    Lin failed to demonstrate that he acted with due diligence
    because, aside from asking unidentified friends and agencies
    for advice regarding how to proceed immediately after learning
    that his agency had closed in 1998, he failed to take any
    action in his proceedings for more than eleven years, until he
    was detained in 2010.         See Cekic, 
    435 F.3d at 171
    ; see also
    Jian    Hua    Wang,   
    508 F.3d at 715
    .   Thus,    as   the   agency
    reasonably      concluded    that   Lin    failed   to   demonstrate    due
    diligence in pursuing his claim, it did not err in declining
    to toll the time period for filing his motion to reopen.                See
    Jian Hua Wang, 
    508 F.3d at 715-16
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.       As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in
    this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    -5-
    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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