Bank v. Katz , 424 F. App'x 67 ( 2011 )

09-4413-cv
Bank v. Katz
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
4 York, on the 16th day of June,two thousand eleven.
5 PRESENT:
6 ROGER J. MINER,
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 --------------------------------------
11 TODD C. BANK,
12 Plaintiff–Appellant,
13 - v - No. 09-4413-cv
14 ANNE KATZ, in her official capacity
15 as Judge of the Housing Part of the
16 Civil Court of the City of New York,
17 and JUDE ALBANO, in his official
18 capacity as Senior Court Clerk of
19 the Civil Court of the City of New
20 York,
21 Defendants–Appellees.
22 --------------------------------------
23 Appearing for Appellant: Todd C. Bank, pro se, Kew Gardens,
24 New York.
25 Appearing for Appellees: David Lawrence III, Assistant
26 Solicitor General (Barbara D.
27 Underwood, Solicitor General, and
28 Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior
29 Counsel, on the brief), New York,
1 New York, for Andrew M. Cuomo,
2 Attorney General of the State of
3 New York.
4 Appeal from a September 25, 2009, judgment of the United
5 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
6 (Garaufis, J.).
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
8 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be, and it hereby
9 is, AFFIRMED.
10 Plaintiff–appellant Todd C. Bank, an attorney proceeding pro
11 se, appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his
12 complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
13 defendants–appellees New York Civil Court Judge Anne Katz and
14 Senior Court Clerk Jude Albano. Because he is an attorney, Bank
15 is not entitled to "claim the special consideration which the
16 courts customarily grant to pro se parties." Holtz v.
17 Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001)
18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 Bank alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional
20 rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by orally
21 directing him not to wear a baseball hat when appearing in court
22 and by admonishing him for wearing inappropriately casual attire.
23 We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts,
24 procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.
25 "We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a
26 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
27 granted, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as
28 true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's
29 favor." Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp.,
30 602 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation
31 marks omitted). For a plaintiff's claim to survive a motion to
32 dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
33 accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible
34 on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
35 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
36 Bank contends, first, that the defendants violated his First
37 Amendment rights by instructing him not to wear a baseball hat
38 and casual attire when appearing in court. Assuming arguendo
39 that Bank's choice of attire constituted a form of protected
40 expression, but see Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314,
41 319-21 (2d Cir. 2003); E. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of
42 the Town of E. Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 856-58 (2d Cir. 1977) (en
43 banc), a restriction on speech in such a forum will be upheld "so
44 long as the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint-neutral,"
2
1 Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2010). Bank concedes
2 that the defendants' conduct was viewpoint neutral.
3 A restriction is "reasonable" if "it is wholly consistent
4 with the government's legitimate interest in preserving the
5 property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Make
6 the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 147 (2d Cir.
7 2004) (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted);
8 see also Byrne, 623 F.3d at 59-60. "A courthouse serves to
9 provide a locus in which civil and criminal disputes can be
10 adjudicated. Within this staid environment, the presiding judge
11 is charged with the responsibility of maintaining proper order
12 and decorum." Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 91 (2d Cir.
13 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Gentile v. State Bar
14 of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); Berner v. Delahanty, 129
15 F.3d 20, 27-29 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 102316 (1998). The restriction as alleged is therefore reasonable.
17 Bank has thus failed to allege facts sufficient to support a
18 claim of a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district
19 court did not err in dismissing this claim.
20 We also conclude that the district court did not err in
21 dismissing Bank's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is
22 premised on Bank's asserted liberty interest in his personal
23 appearance. The Supreme Court has not yet confirmed the
24 existence of such a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
25 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (assuming,
26 without deciding, the existence of such an interest). For the
27 purposes of resolving this appeal, we assume that such an
28 interest exists, as we have also done on previous occasions.
29 See, e.g., Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 321; see also Kelley, 425 U.S.
30 at 244.
31 Bank contends that the defendants' direction that he remove
32 his hat should be subjected to strict scrutiny. However, he
33 identifies no legal basis for concluding that a lawyer's interest
34 in dressing as he pleases when appearing in court rises to the
35 level of a fundamental constitutional right, see Washington v.
36 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997), nor are we able to
37 discern one. Accordingly, we apply rational-basis review to
38 Bank's Fourteenth Amendment claim. See Zalewska, 316 F.3d at39 321. We conclude that the defendants' instructions that Bank
40 remove his baseball hat when appearing in court were rationally
41 related to the legitimate governmental purpose of maintaining
42 order and decorum in the courtroom. The district court therefore
43 correctly dismissed Bank's claim for violation of his Fourteenth
44 Amendment rights.
45 Finally, in their opposing brief on appeal, the defendants
46 argue that the district court should have refrained from deciding
47 this case under the doctrine of abstention established by Younger
3
1 v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The district court did not
2 address this question. In light of our decision to affirm the
3 dismissal of Bank's claims on their merits, we need not address
4 this difficult question to resolve this appeal. See, e.g.,
5 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC,
6 467 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2006); Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of
7 N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 We have reviewed Bank's remaining contentions on appeal and
9 find them to be without merit.
10 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
11 court is hereby AFFIRMED.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
14
4