Xiang Xiang Wang v. Holder , 455 F. App'x 44 ( 2012 )


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  •     10-1426-ag (L)
    Wang v. Holder
    BIA
    Videla, IJ
    A099 025 437
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 9th day of January, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    ROGER J. MINER,
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    XIANG XIANG WANG,
    Petitioner,
    10-1426-ag (L);
    -v.-                                  10-4013-ag (Con)
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Richard Tarzia, Law Office of
    Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, N.J.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant
    Director; Micheline Hershey,
    Attorney, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, U.S. Department of
    Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of
    two Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for
    review are DENIED.
    Petitioner Xiang Xiang Wang, a native and citizen of
    the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of both the
    March 23, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the June 3,
    2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C.
    Videla, denying his application for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”), In re Xiang Xiang Wang, No. A099 025 437 (B.I.A.
    Mar. 23, 2010), aff’g No. A099 025 437 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.
    City June 3, 2008), and the September 7, 2010, decision of
    the BIA denying his motion to reopen, In re Xiang Xiang
    Wang, No. 099 025 437 (B.I.A. Sept. 7, 2010).1    We assume
    the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history.
    I.     Merits - Docket Number 10-1426-ag (L)
    With respect to the agency’s denial of Wang’s initial
    application, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
    1
    Wang does not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT
    relief.
    2
    “for the sake of completeness.”     Zaman v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 233
    , 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)(internal quotation
    marks omitted).     The applicable standards of review are
    well-established.
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)(2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
    
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    In finding that Wang failed to establish his
    eligibility for asylum, the agency properly found that
    Wang’s claim based on his wife’s forced sterilization was
    foreclosed by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    494 F.3d 296
    , 309 (2d Cir. 2007)(en banc).     Indeed, in Shi Liang
    Lin, we squarely rejected the notion that an alien is per se
    eligible for relief based on a spouse’s forced abortion.
    See 
    id. (holding that
    “an individual does not automatically
    qualify for ‘refugee’ status on account of a coercive
    procedure performed on someone else”).
    Moreover, as to Wang’s other allegation of past
    persecution--his altercation with family planning officials-
    -substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
    that Wang did not testify credibly because he omitted this
    allegation from his asylum application.
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)(2006) (stating that the
    3
    agency may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making
    an adverse credibility determination as long as the
    “totality of the circumstances” establishes that an asylum
    applicant is not credible, without regard to whether those
    inconsistencies go to the heart of the applicant’s claim);
    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,163,167 (2d Cir.
    2008)(per curiam); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260,
    265 (B.I.A. 2007).
    Here, as the agency found, while Wang testified that he
    tried to prevent family planning officials from entering his
    home by “pulling them and drag[ging] them,” his written
    application indicated only that he “disagreed” with his
    wife’s forced sterilization, and that Chinese family
    planning officials took him to a government office where he
    was detained briefly and ordered to pay a fine, and made no
    mention of any physical struggle or any other attempt to
    resist efforts to sterilize his wife.   See Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 166
    (stating that for the purposes of analyzing a
    credibility determination, “[a]n inconsistency and an
    omission are ... functionally equivalent”).   A reasonable
    fact finder would not be compelled to credit Wang’s
    explanation for this omission.   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
    4
    Moreover, as the agency reasonably found, even if Wang
    testified credibly regarding his altercation with family
    planning officials, and even if this altercation might be
    characterized as “other resistance,” see Shi Liang 
    Lin, 494 F.3d at 313
    , Wang nevertheless failed to establish that he
    suffered harm rising to the level of persecution on account
    of that resistance.   Indeed, because the only harm Wang
    claimed to have suffered was a brief detention and damage to
    some of his furniture, the agency reasonably found that the
    harm Wang alleged did not rise to the level of persecution.
    See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 341
    (2d Cir. 2006).   Given Wang’s failure to establish past
    persecution or to provide any alternative basis for his fear
    of future persecution, the agency did not err in finding
    that he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
    persecution, particularly in light of the fact that,
    following his wife’s forced sterilization, he remained in
    China for two years without any further harm.   See
    Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 169
    , 178 (2d Cir. 2004);
    Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Furthermore, despite Wang’s assertion that he
    established a well-founded fear of persecution based on his
    illegal departure from China, the agency reasonably found
    5
    that the possibility that he will be prosecuted under a
    generally applicable statute does not, by itself,
    demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution
    on account of a protected ground.   See Qun Yang v. McElroy,
    
    277 F.3d 158
    , 163 n.5 (2d Cir. 2002).
    Accordingly, the agency reasonably denied Wang’s
    application for asylum.   Because he failed to meet his
    burden of demonstrating eligibility for asylum, Wang
    necessarily failed to meet the higher burden for withholding
    of removal.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d
    Cir. 2006).
    II. Motion to Reopen - Docket Number 10-4013-ag (Con)
    We have reviewed the BIA’s denial of Wang’s motion to
    reopen for abuse of discretion, see Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    , 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and conclude that
    there has been no abuse of discretion, as the BIA provided
    rational explanations for its decision.   See Ke Zhen Zhao v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
    Specifically, as the BIA noted, Wang failed to submit a new
    asylum applicationwith his motion to reopen, as required by
    the regulations.   See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to
    reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an
    6
    application for relief must be accompanied by the
    appropriate application for relief.”).
    Additionally, the BIA reasonably determined that Wang
    failed to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief
    based on his practice of Falun Gong in the United States.
    See INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 104 (1988) (recognizing that
    a movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the
    underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground on
    which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen).   As the BIA
    found, Wang failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable
    fear that he would be persecuted due to his practice of
    Falun Gong, as he did not present any evidence that Chinese
    officials were aware or would become aware of his practice
    of Falun Gong.   See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    ,
    143 (2d Cir. 2008)(per curiam).   Furthermore, contrary to
    Wang’s argument that the BIA abused its discretion by
    failing to consider adequately the evidence in the record,
    the BIA explicitly referenced Wang’s evidence in its
    decision, and its acknowledgment was sufficient.    See Jian
    Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008)
    (noting that the BIA does not need to parse expressly or
    refute every piece of evidence submitted by the petitioner);
    Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 337
    n.17 (2d Cir. 2006)(same).
    7
    For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are
    DENIED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    8