Lin v. Garland ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •      19-3630
    Lin v. Garland
    BIA
    Vomacka, IJ
    A206 529 429
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 12th day of November, two thousand twenty-
    5   one.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    9            GERARD E. LYNCH,
    10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   HAIYAN LIN,
    15        Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                         19-3630
    18                                                               NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Joan Xie, Esq., New York, NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
    27                                    Attorney General; Mary Jane
    1                                  Candaux, Assistant Director; Remi
    2                                  Da Rocha-Afodu, Trial Attorney,
    3                                  Office of Immigration Litigation,
    4                                  United States Department of
    5                                  Justice, Washington, DC.
    6
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    10   is DENIED.
    11       Petitioner     Haiyan   Lin,   a   native      and   citizen   of    the
    12   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 25,
    13   2019, decision of the BIA affirming a March 22, 2018, decision
    14   of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for
    15   asylum,   withholding    of   removal,      and     relief     under    the
    16   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re Haiyan Lin, No.
    17   A206 529 429 (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2019), aff’g No. A206 529 429
    18   (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 22, 2018).          We assume the parties’
    19   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    20       Under    the   circumstances,      we   have    reviewed    the     IJ’s
    21   decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the IJ’s demeanor
    22   finding that the BIA declined to affirm.             See Xue Hong Yang
    23   v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
    24   The applicable standards of review are well established.                See
    25   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 2
    1   67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
    2       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    3   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    4   determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
    5   or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , [and] the
    6   internal consistency of each such statement . . . without
    7   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
    8   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
    9   relevant factor.”   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   “We defer
    10   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    11   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    12   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    13   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
    14   accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.     Substantial evidence
    15   supports the agency’s determination that Lin was not credible
    16   as to his claim that police in China detained and beat him
    17   for practicing Falun Gong and that he fears future persecution
    18   on that ground.
    19       The IJ reasonably relied on Lin’s inconsistent evidence
    20   regarding when he last travelled to China, how long he was
    21   detained, why he did not submit evidence of the medical
    22   treatment he received after his release, and whether he
    3
    1    organized    a    Falun       Gong   promotional       event     or   was     merely
    2    photographed at it.            See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see
    3    also Likai Gao v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 137
    , 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)
    4    (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from
    5    showing    that    an    IJ    was   compelled      to    find   him    credible.
    6    Multiple    inconsistencies           would       so     preclude      even     more
    7    forcefully.”).          The agency also reasonably relied on Lin’s
    8    inability to describe the five movements of Falun Gong despite
    9    his claim to have practiced for more than six years.                               See
    10   Rizal v. Gonzales, 
    442 F.3d 84
    , 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing
    11   that there may be “instances in which the nature of an
    12   individual applicant’s account would render his lack of a
    13   certain    degree       of    doctrinal       knowledge    suspect     and     could
    14   therefore    provide         substantial       evidence    in    support      of    an
    15   adverse credibility finding”).
    16       Having        questioned         Lin’s      credibility,          the     agency
    17   reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his
    18   testimony with reliable corroborating evidence.                             See Biao
    19   Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
    20   applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
    21   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
    22   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
    4
    1   that has already been called into question.”).              We find no
    2   error in the agency’s decision declining to credit unsworn
    3   letters from Lin’s father and friend in China.             See Y.C. v.
    4    Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer
    5    to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an
    6    applicant’s documentary evidence.”); see also Mei Chai Ye v.
    7    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    489 F.3d 517
    , 524 (2d Cir. 2007)
    8    (“[T]his court has . . . firmly embraced the commonsensical
    9    notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an
    10   indication that the statements are ‘canned.’”).            The IJ also
    11   reasonably noted that Lin failed to submit evidence from his
    12   uncle who purportedly paid the fine to secure his release
    13   from detention, the hospital where he sought treatment, or
    14   his fellow Falun Gong practitioners in the United States.
    15       Given the inconsistencies, Lin’s lack of knowledge of
    16   Falun   Gong,   and   absence   of       reliable   corroboration,   the
    17   agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by
    18   substantial evidence.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
    19   That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of
    20   removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
    21   on the same factual predicate.             See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
    
    22 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    5
    1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    3   stays VACATED.
    4                               FOR THE COURT:
    5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    6                               Clerk of Court
    6