Yong Lin v. Holder ( 2012 )


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  •          10-2386-ag
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    Vomacka, IJ
    A098 997 995
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
    DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
    COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 8th day of May, two thousand twelve.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                RALPH K. WINTER,
    8                JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    9                ROBERT D. SACK,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _______________________________________
    12
    13       YONG LIN,
    14                       Petitioner,
    15
    16                       v.                                       10-2386-ag
    17                                                                NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL; UNITED STATES
    20       DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    21                Respondents.
    22       _______________________________________
    23
    24       FOR PETITIONER:                 WaiSim M. Cheung, New York, New
    25                                       York.
    26
    27       FOR RESPONDENTS:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    28                                       General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant
    29                                       Director; Shahrzad Baghai, Trial
    30                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration
    31                                       Litigation, Civil Division, United
    32                                       States Department of Justice,
    33                                       Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    3   hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for
    4   review is DENIED.
    5       Petitioner Yong Lin, a native and citizen of the
    6   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 21, 2010,
    7   order of the BIA affirming the July 22, 2008, decision of
    8   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Alan A. Vomacka, denying his
    9   applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    10   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).    In re Yong
    11   Lin No. A098 997 995 (B.I.A. May 21, 2010), aff’g No. A098
    12   997 995 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 22, 2008).    We assume the
    13   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    14   procedural history of the case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    16   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision.     See Xue
    17   Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d
    18   Cir. 2005).    The applicable standards of review are well-
    19   established.    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    20   Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    21       The agency reasonably concluded that Lin failed to meet
    22   his burden of demonstrating a well-founded fear of future
    23   persecution based on his violation of China’s family
    24   planning policy.    The BIA reasonably found that Lin’s
    2
    1   testimony alone, even if credible, was insufficient to
    2   support his claim because he omitted from his asylum
    3   application his assertion that officials in China were
    4   searching for him and had questioned his wife about his
    5   whereabouts.    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(ii); Biao Yang v.
    6   Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[t]he absence
    7   of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
    8   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
    9   question.”); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 
    575 F.3d 193
    , 198 n.5 (2d
    10   Cir. 2009).    Moreover, as the BIA found, none of Lin’s
    11   evidence, including letters from his ex-wife and his
    12   parents, mentioned that government officials had learned
    13   that he had divorced for the purpose of avoiding the family
    14   planning rules or that the officials were looking for him.
    15   See Chuilu, 
    575 F.3d at 196-97
     (providing that corroboration
    16   should be provided where “it would reasonably be expected”
    17   even where testimony is credible).
    18       To the extent Lin argues that the BIA erred by failing
    19   to specify additional evidence he should have provided, the
    20   burden rested with him to provide all available
    21   corroborating evidence, and he provided no explanation as to
    22   why the letters from his wife and parents did not show that
    3
    1   officials were aware of the divorce.     See Chuilu Liu, 575
    2   F.3d at 198 n.6 (stating that the alien bears the ultimate
    3   burden of introducing such evidence without prompting from
    4   the IJ).   We have held that the agency’s designation of
    5   missing corroboration need not be done prior to the
    6   disposition of an alien’s claim.     See Chuilu, 
    575 F.3d at
    7   198-99; see also     
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(ii)(REAL ID Act
    8   provision codifying the rule that an IJ, weighing the
    9   evidence to determine if the alien has met his burden, may
    10   rely on the absence of corroborating evidence adduced by an
    11   otherwise credible applicant unless such evidence cannot be
    12   reasonably obtained).     Accordingly, as the BIA concluded,
    13   Lin failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution
    14   because he did not sufficiently corroborate his claim that
    15   Chinese officials were aware of his “sham” divorce or were
    16   searching for him.     See Chuilu, 
    575 F.3d at 196-97
    ; Jian
    17   Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005)
    18   (providing that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it
    19   lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely
    20   “speculative at best”).
    21       The agency also reasonably determined that Lin did not
    22   establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on his
    4
    1   baptism and practice of Christianity in the United States
    2   because Lin testified that he was a relatively new
    3   practitioner and evidence in the record indicated that
    4   officials primarily targeted spiritual leaders.     See
    5   Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 143 (2d Cir. 2008)
    6   (“Put simply, to establish a well-founded fear of
    7   persecution in the absence of any evidence of past
    8   persecution, an alien must make some showing that
    9   authorities in his country of nationality are either aware
    10   of his activities or likely to become aware of his
    11   activities.); see also Jian Xing Huang, 
    421 F.3d 125
     at 128-
    12   29.   The agency also reasonably determined that Lin had not
    13   established a pattern or practice of persecution against
    14   Christians in China because the country conditions evidence
    15   in the record indicated that enforcement against underground
    16   churches varied throughout China and the Chinese
    17   government’s treatment of members of underground churches
    18   constituted harassment rather than persecution.     See Siewe
    19   v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[w]here
    20   there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact
    21   finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”);
    22   Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 341 (2d
    23   Cir. 2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe
    5
    1   and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12
    
    2 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[P]ersecution does not
    3   encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair,
    4   unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”).
    5              Because Lin failed to establish his eligibility
    6   for asylum, he necessarily was unable to meet the higher
    7   standard to establish his eligibility for withholding of
    8   removal.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir.
    9   2006). Lin has not challenged the agency’s denial of CAT
    10   relief.    See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 541
    11   n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that issues not
    12   sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and
    13   normally will not be addressed on appeal).
    14       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    15   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of
    16   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    17   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    18   this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    19   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    20   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    21   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    22                                 FOR THE COURT:
    23                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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