Tanvir v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. , 480 F. App'x 620 ( 2012 )

11-143-cv
Tanvir v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 16th day of May, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11
12
13 SHAHID TANVIR,
14
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 -v.- 11-143-cv
18
19 NEW YORK CITY HEALTH & HOSPITALS CORPORATION,
20
21 Defendant-Appellee.*
22
23
24 FOR APPELLANT: SHAHID TANVIR, pro se, Elmwood Park, NJ.
25
26 FOR APPELLEE: Ronald E. Sternberg (Leonard Koerner, on
27 the brief), for Michael A. Cardozo,
28 Corporation Counsel of the City of New
29 York, New York, NY.
30
*
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to
amend the caption to conform to the above.
1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
2 Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.).
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
6 AFFIRMED.
7 Appellant Shahid Tanvir, proceeding pro se, appeals the
8 district court’s judgment in which it granted summary
9 judgment in favor of the defendant, New York City Health &
10 Hospitals Corporation ("HHC"), with respect to his
11 employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title
12 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.
13 §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in
14 Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. We
15 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
16 the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
17 appeal.
18 Administrative Exhaustion of Tanvir's ADEA Claim
19 "Exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC
20 is an essential element of the Title VII and ADEA statutory
21 schemes and, as such, a precondition to bringing such claims
22 in federal court." Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree
23 Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001) (per
24 curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a
2
1 claim that was not presented to the EEOC may still be
2 pursued where the claim is "reasonably related" to the
3 claims that were brought before the agency. See id.
4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Tanvir did not present
5 his age discrimination claims to the EEOC, and he has not
6 established that his age discrimination claims are
7 "reasonably related" to the claims before the agency. We
8 therefore affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss
9 Tanvir's ADEA claims based on a failure to exhaust
10 administrative remedies.
11 Failure-to-Promote and Retaliation Claims
12 To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment
13 with respect to a failure-to-promote claim under Title VII,
14 a plaintiff must show that: "(1) [he] is a member of a
15 protected class; (2) [he] applied and was qualified for a
16 job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) [he]
17 was rejected for the position; and (4) the position remained
18 open and the employer continued to seek applicants having
19 the plaintiff's qualifications." Estate of Hamilton v. City
20 of New York, 627 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
21 omitted). To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation
22 under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged
3
1 in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of the
2 protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment
3 action against the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection
4 exists between the protected activity and the adverse
5 action. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141 (2d Cir.
6 2003). A plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of
7 discrimination under Title VII based on "purely conclusory
8 allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete
9 particulars." See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d
10 Cir. 1985).
11 Under both types of claims, once the plaintiff has
12 presented a prima facie case, the burden of production
13 shifts to the defendant to articulate, through the
14 introduction of admissible evidence, a legitimate,
15 nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
16 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
17 (1973); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
18 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). Once the employer has met this
19 burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
20 demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason was merely a
21 pretext for discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
22
4
1 The record fully supports the district court’s finding
2 that HHC met its burden of articulating legitimate,
3 nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions
4 alleged in Tanvir's complaint, and that Tanvir had not met
5 his burden of showing that the reasons provided by HHC were
6 pretextual in nature and that discriminatory animus was the
7 real reason for the actions. Accordingly, we also affirm
8 the district court’s grant of summary judgment in HHC’s
9 favor with respect to Tanvir's Title VII failure-to-promote
10 and retaliation claims.
11 Hostile Work Environment Claim
12 Though not expressly addressed by the district court,
13 we determine that summary judgment is also proper on
14 Tanvir’s hostile work environment claim. See Chase
15 Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of
16 Chicago, 93 F.3d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996). To establish a
17 hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must
18 demonstrate, among other things, that his workplace was
19 “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
20 insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
21 the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
22 abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
5
1 Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal
2 quotation marks omitted).
3 Tanvir’s hostile work environment claim appears to be
4 based on an aggregation of all the actions alleged in his
5 failure-to-promote and retaliation claims. He has failed to
6 demonstrate that any of the actions were discriminatory in
7 nature. Additionally, he has not suggested that he was
8 exposed to race- or national origin-based comments (positive
9 or negative) in his workplace. Based on the lack of
10 evidence supporting a finding that his workplace environment
11 was one characterized by "discriminatory intimidation,
12 ridicule, and insult" of a "severe or pervasive" nature,
13 summary judgment is appropriate with respect to this claim
14 as well.
15 We have considered Tanvir’s remaining arguments and
16 find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
17 judgment of the district court.
18
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
21
22
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