Weshnak v. Bank of America, N.A. , 451 F. App'x 61 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •      11-3107
    Weshnak v. Bank of America
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
    APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
    COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 26th day of January, two thousand twelve.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                              Chief Judge,
    8                RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    9                SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    10                              Circuit Judges.
    11
    12       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    13       MARILYN WESHNAK, et al.,
    14                Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    15
    16                   -v.-                                          11-3107
    17
    18       BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
    19                Defendant-Appellee,
    20
    21       NICHOLAS COSMO, et al.,
    22                Defendants.
    23       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    24
    1
    1   FOR APPELLANTS:            Susan K. Alexander (Sanford
    2                              Svetcov, Samuel H. Rudman,
    3                              Robert M. Rothman, Edward Y.
    4                              Kroub, on the brief), Robbins
    5                              Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
    6                              Melville, NY, San Francisco, CA.
    7
    8   FOR APPELLEE:              Pamela A. Miller (Michael D.
    9                              Schissel, on the brief), Arnold
    10                              & Porter LLP, New York, NY.
    11
    12        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    13   Court for the Eastern District of New York (Spatt, J.).
    14
    15        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    16   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    17   AFFIRMED.
    18
    19
    20        Plaintiffs, victims in a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by
    21   Nicholas Cosmo through Agape World, Inc., and other entities
    22   (collectively, “Agape”), appeal the dismissal of their
    23   amended consolidated class action complaint against Bank of
    24   America (“BOA”), which alleges aiding and abetting fraud,
    25   conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. We assume the
    26   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
    27   procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
    28
    29        “[W]e review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
    30   dismiss de novo, construing the complaint liberally,
    31   accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true,
    32   and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
    33   favor.” Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of
    34   Fin., 
    620 F.3d 146
    , 150 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    35   marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
    36   complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
    37   as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
    38   its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949
    39   (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    40   570 (2007)).
    41
    42        “Under New York law, the elements of aiding and
    43   abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a
    44   conversion, and aiding and abetting a fraud are
    45   substantially similar. The claims require the existence of
    46   a primary violation, actual knowledge of the violation on
    47   the part of the aider and abettor, and substantial
    2
    1   assistance.” Kirschner v. Bennett, 
    648 F. Supp. 2d 525
    , 533
    2   (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459
    
    3 F.3d 273
    , 292-95 (2d Cir. 2006). We need not determine
    4   whether Plaintiffs adequately pled that BOA had actual
    5   knowledge of Cosmo and Agape’s violation; Plaintiffs’
    6   complaint does not plausibly state a claim that BOA
    7   substantially assisted in it.
    8
    9        Plaintiffs allege that Tom Sullivan, a BOA senior
    10   manager, recommended a structure of accounts that allowed
    11   Agape to move money from sub-accounts into an operating
    12   account and a Remote Depository System that allowed Agape to
    13   deposit checks from its headquarters. Plaintiffs allege
    14   that Rebecca Campagnuolo, a BOA employee, provided banking
    15   services to Agape from within Agape’s headquarters,
    16   including issuance of a check from an Agape account to an
    17   investor. Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that these
    18   services differed from those BOA provided other large
    19   commercial customers. A bank’s provision of “its usual
    20   banking services to a customer . . . does not in and of
    21   itself rise to the level of substantial assistance.” Rosner
    22   v. Bank of China, 
    2008 WL 5416380
    , No. 06-CV-13562, at *12
    23   (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted);
    24   see also e.g., Ryan v. Hunton & Williams, 
    2000 WL 1375265
    ,
    25   No. 99-CV-5938, at *9 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 20, 2000).
    26
    27        Plaintiffs allege that when BOA customers received
    28   large deposits into their accounts, Campagnuolo tipped off
    29   Agape brokers so that they could solicit investments from
    30   these potential victims, and that Campagnuolo’s husband
    31   received three payments totaling more than $31,000 from
    32   Agape. An employer is not vicariously liable for acts
    33   committed by employees “for personal motives unrelated to
    34   the furtherance of the employer[’s] business.” Artalyan,
    35   Inc. v. Kitridge Realty Co., 
    52 A.D.3d 405
    , 407, 860
    
    36 N.Y.S.2d 100
    , 102 (1st Dep’t 2008); see also Swarna v. Al-
    37   Awadi, 
    622 F.3d 123
    , 144 (2d Cir. 2010). It is implausible
    38   that Campagnuolo acted in furtherance of BOA’s business by
    39   identifying its customers to be defrauded.
    40
    41
    42
    43
    44
    45
    46
    47
    3
    1        Finding no merit in Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments, we
    2   hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    3
    4
    5                              FOR THE COURT:
    6                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    7
    8
    4