Hilfiger v. Alger , 387 F. App'x 111 ( 2010 )

08-4984-cv
Hilfiger v. Alger
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 30 th day of July, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 LORETTA HILFIGER,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 08-4984-cv
17
18 MARK ALGER, Steuben County Executive
19 of Steuben County Department of Social
20 Services, KATHRYN BEILH, Commissioner,
21 and ROBERT PLENGE, Deputy Commissioner
22 of Administration and Finance for the
23 Department of Social Services,
24
25 Defendants-Cross-Claimants-
26 Cross-Defendants-Appellees,
27
1
1 CARLA HIBBARD, Director Steuben Child
2 Care Project--A Division of Pro
3 Action of Steuben and Yates Inc.,
4 d/b/a Steuben Child Care Project, and
5 JOAN SIMPSON, Caseworker at Steuben
6 Child Care Project,
7
8 Defendants-Cross-Defendants-
9 Cross-Claimants-Appellees.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12
13 FOR APPELLANT: CATHERINE MONTJAR IRWIN,
14 Kornstein Veisz Wexler &
15 Pollard, LLP, New York, New
16 York.
17
18 FOR APPELLEES: BRYAN J. MAGGS, Davidson &
19 O’Mara, P.C., Elmira, New York;
20 MATTHEW J. DUGGAN, Lippman
21 O’Connor, Buffalo, New York.
22
23 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
24 Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.).
25
26 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
27 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
28 AFFIRMED.
29
30 Plaintiff-appellant Loretta Hilfiger alleges, inter
31 alia, that (1) the defendants violated her rights under the
32 due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying
33 her a child care subsidy without providing constitutionally
34 sufficient pre-deprivation process, and (2) that this
35 violation was not cured by post-deprivation procedures.
36
37 “To determine whether a plaintiff was deprived of
38 property without due process of law in violation of the
39 Fourteenth Amendment, we must first identify the property
40 interest involved. Next, we must determine whether the
41 plaintiff received constitutionally adequate process in the
42 course of the deprivation.” O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d
43 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005). It is undisputed here that
44 Hilfiger had a property interest in her continued receipt of
45 the child care subsidy; the contested issue is whether she
46 received constitutionally adequate process.
2
1 “An essential principle of due process is that a
2 deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by
3 notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
4 of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
5 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Due process should include “notice [that is] reasonably
7 calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
8 interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
9 them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane
10 v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
11
12 “To determine whether [a plaintiff] received the
13 process [s]he was due, we must consider: (1) the private
14 interest at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation
15 of that interest through the procedures used and the
16 probable value (if any) of alternative procedures; [and] (3)
17 the government’s interest, including the possible burdens of
18 alternative procedures.” O’Connor, 426 F.3d at 197 (citing
19 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). In
20 undertaking this analysis, we abide by the principle that
21 “[p]re-deprivation process ‘need not be elaborate,’” and
22 that the “primary function” of such process “is to serve as
23 an ‘initial check against mistaken decisions.’” O’Connor,
24 426 F.3d at 198 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545).
25 “[T]he Constitution mandates only that such process include,
26 at a minimum, notice and the opportunity to respond.”
27 O’Connor, 426 F.3d at 198.
28
29 Applying these principles, we hold that Hilfiger
30 received constitutionally sufficient pre-deprivation
31 process. As to the July 2004 denial: Hilfiger was notified
32 on July 14 that “care is not normally covered for an older
33 sibling during maternity leave and [that Hilfiger] could be
34 responsible for the full cost of care.” J.A. 259.
35 Accordingly, she was asked that same day to submit specific
36 documentation which might support her eligibility for the
37 subsidy. By August 12, Hilfiger had not submitted the
38 documentation. Thus, in the period between July 14 and the
39 August 13 oral denial of the July subsidy, Hilfiger had
40 received both notice that the subsidy might be denied for
41 July, and an opportunity to respond to that notice by
42 providing the requested documentation or by objecting to the
43 possibility of the pending denial (as her legal advocate did
44 in the August 23 letter).
45
46 As to the September 2004 termination: On September 3,
47 Hilfiger’s case manager wrote Hilfiger a letter warning that
3
1 her eligibility for the subsidy depended on her submission
2 by September 13, 2004 of an employment verification form and
3 pay stubs for Linza Ford--the father of her two children,
4 who was scheduled to move into the home on September 14.
5 That letter gave notice that “[f]ailure to submit all of the
6 required documentation listed above before the due date will
7 result in the termination of child care services.” J.A.
8 277. Hilfiger failed to submit the requested documentation
9 until September 23-24, after the September 22 notice
10 terminating her subsidy effective September 29. Thus, at
11 this juncture as well, Hilfiger was given notice that her
12 eligibility might terminate, and an opportunity to respond.
13
14 Finally, it is irrelevant whether Hilfiger was entitled
15 to more process under New York law than that which she
16 actually received. “Unlike the existence of a property
17 interest, which finds its origins in state law, minimum
18 procedural requirements are a matter of federal law.”
19 Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 319 (2d Cir.
20 2002) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see
21 also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). “The
22 Constitution, not state law sources[,] . . . determines what
23 process is due.” Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 319. Thus,
24 where--as here--constitutionally sufficient process has been
25 afforded, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
26 regardless of whether state procedural rules were
27 contravened.
28
29 Finding no merit in Hilfiger’s remaining arguments, we
30 hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
31
32
33 FOR THE COURT:
34 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
35
4