Dvorak v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  •      19-4130
    Dvorak v. Garland
    BIA
    Farber, IJ
    A209 029 897/898
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4   on the 30th day of November, two thousand twenty-one.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JON O. NEWMAN,
    8            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    9            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   NIKOLAJ DVORAK, NATALIE
    14   DVORAKOVA,
    15            Petitioners,
    16
    17                       v.                                      19-4130
    18                                                               NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONERS:                    Theodore N. Cox, New York,
    25                                       NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    28                                       Assistant Attorney General;
    29                                       Jessica A. Dawgert, Senior
    30                                       Litigation Counsel; Richard
    31                                       Kelley, Trial Attorney, Office of
    32                                       Immigration Litigation, United
    1                                States Department of Justice,
    2                                Washington, DC.
    3
    4       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7    is DENIED.
    8        Petitioners    Nikolaj    Dvorak   and   Natalie   Dvorakova,
    9   natives of Russia and citizens of the Czech Republic, seek
    10   review of a November 15, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming
    11   a May 16, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
    12   denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    13   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Nikolaj Dvorak,
    14   Natalie Dvorakova, Nos. A209 029 897/898 (B.I.A. Nov. 15,
    15   2019), aff’g Nos. A209 029 897/898 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May
    16   16, 2019).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    17   underlying facts and procedural history.
    18       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
    19   the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d
    20   Cir. 2005).     The applicable standards of review are well
    21   established.    See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    22   Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    23       Asylum and Withholding of Removal
    2
    1         To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of
    2   removal, an applicant must establish past persecution or a
    3   well-founded fear or likelihood of persecution on account of
    4   “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    5   social    group,          or     political         opinion.”            8 U.S.C.
    6   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.
    7   § 1208.16(b)(1)(i),            (2).      “[P]ersecution      is    an    extreme
    8   concept that does not include every sort of treatment our
    9   society regards as offensive.”                 Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633
    
    10 F.3d 64
    , 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    11   For   economic    harm     to    constitute       persecution,     “an    asylum
    12   applicant must offer some proof that he suffered a deliberate
    13   imposition of substantial economic disadvantage.”                    Guan Shan
    14   Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    293 F.3d 61
    , 70 (2d Cir. 2002)
    15   (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re T-Z-, 24
    
    16 I. & N. Dec. 163
    , 170–73 (B.I.A. 2007).
    17         The agency did not err in finding that, even assuming
    18   Petitioners’      proposed            social     groups    were    cognizable,
    19   Petitioners failed to establish that they suffered economic
    20   persecution      as   a   result.          The    record   establishes     that
    21   Petitioners      themselves       instituted       bankruptcy     proceedings,
    22   were found to be creditors, were permitted to remain in their
    23   company’s residence during the bankruptcy proceedings, and
    3
    1   were able to support themselves with alternate employment.
    2   Accordingly,       Petitioners         did     not    establish      that    they
    3   “suffered a deliberate imposition of substantial economic
    4   disadvantage” as required to establish economic persecution.
    5   Guan Shan Liao, 
    293 F.3d at 70
     (internal quotation marks
    6   omitted).
    7         The   agency      also     did    not     err    in    concluding      that
    8   Petitioners failed to establish past persecution or a well-
    9   founded     fear   of    future    persecution         based    on     Nikolaj’s
    10   conviction for theft of assets from their bankrupt company.
    11   “Punishment for violation of a generally applicable criminal
    12   law is not persecution.”          Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962
    
    13 F.2d 234
    , 239 (2d Cir. 1992).                Although “prosecution that is
    14   pretext for political persecution is not on account of law
    15   enforcement,” Jin Jin Long v. Holder, 
    620 F.3d 162
    , 166 (2d
    16   Cir. 2010), Petitioners did not show pretext.                  In determining
    17   whether prosecution is a pretext for persecution, the agency
    18   looks   to,    among     other    factors,       conformity       to   criminal
    19   procedures,    indications        that       abuse    was    directed       toward
    20   modifying an opinion rather than conduct, and treatment of
    21   other members of the population under similar circumstances.
    22   See Vumi v. Gonzales, 
    502 F.3d 150
    , 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007).
    23   The   record   reveals     that        Czech    police      followed   criminal
    4
    1   procedures in pursuing charges against Nikolaj.       Natalie, who
    2   represented the creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding, filed
    3   complaints   about   the   bankruptcy    trustee,   and   tried   to
    4   circumvent the trustee’s authority, was not prosecuted.           And
    5   the country conditions evidence reflects that the government
    6   of the Czech Republic does not arbitrarily arrest people,
    7   that the judiciary is independent, and that criminal trials
    8   are fair and public.
    9        Petitioners’ failure to demonstrate past persecution or
    10   a well-founded fear of persecution was dispositive of asylum
    11   and withholding of removal.     See Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 12
       111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).    Accordingly, we do not reach the
    13   other grounds.   See INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976)
    14   (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to
    15   make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary
    16   to the results they reach.”).
    17       CAT Relief
    18       To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must show that it is
    19   “more likely than not” that he would be tortured.          8 C.F.R.
    20   §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a).       In evaluating a CAT claim, the
    21   agency considers evidence of past torture and evidence of
    22   human rights violations in the country of removal among any
    23   other relevant information.     Id. § 1208.16(c)(3).
    5
    1       Petitioners did not present any evidence of past torture
    2   and their fear that Nikolaj would be tortured in prison is
    3   speculative given that his prison sentence was suspended and
    4   the country conditions evidence states that there were no
    5   reports of torture in the Czech Republic.              See Jian Xing
    6   Huang v. U.S. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the
    7   absence   of   solid   support   in   the   record    .   .   .   ,   [an
    8   applicant’s] fear is speculative at best”).          Accordingly, the
    9   agency did not err in concluding that Petitioners failed to
    10   satisfy their burden of proof for CAT relief.             See 8 C.F.R.
    11   §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a).
    12       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    14   stays VACATED.
    15                                    FOR THE COURT:
    16                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    17                                    Clerk of Court
    6