United States v. Miri ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • 12-1822-cr
    United States v. Miri
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO
    A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS
    GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLAT E PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT' S
    LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.   WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
    WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER" ).      A PARTY
    CITING TO A SUMMARY O RDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
    the 27th day of June, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:   CHESTER J. STRAUB,
    PETER W. HALL,
    DENNY CHIN,
    Circuit Judges.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v-                           12-1822-cr
    VICTOR MIRI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
    FOR APPELLEE:                     Jason Cowley, Assistant United
    States Attorney, for Preet
    Bharara, United States Attorney
    for the Southern District of New
    York, New York, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:        Robert J. Boyle, Law Office of
    Robert J. Boyle, New York, New
    York.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED or, alternatively, the
    judgment is AFFIRMED.
    Defendant-appellant Victor Miri pled guilty, pursuant
    to a plea agreement, to possession of a firearm after having
    been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1).    The plea agreement included a waiver of his right
    to appeal or otherwise challenge "any sentence within or below
    . . . 87 to 108 months' imprisonment."      The district court
    (McMahon, J.) principally sentenced Miri to 108 months'
    imprisonment.    Miri appeals, challenging the substantive
    reasonableness of his sentence.
    As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Miri's
    appellate waiver is enforceable.       Miri asserts that we should
    not enforce the appellate waiver in the plea agreement because
    the magistrate court (Gorenstein, M.J.) wrongly informed him
    during the plea allocution that "if you get a sentence of 87
    months or less you are giving up your right to challenge that
    sentence."     Plea Tr. 9:25-10:2 (Sept. 6, 2011) (emphasis added).
    -2-
    Hence, although Miri received a sentence covered by the
    appellate waiver in the plea agreement, he asserts that the
    magistrate court's misinformation rendered that waiver unknowing
    and involuntary.
    It is apparent that the magistrate judge misspoke when
    he informed Miri of the terms of his appellate waiver.1             See Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring court to inform defendant of
    "the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to
    appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence").            Nevertheless,
    "it is well-settled that a defendant's knowing and voluntary
    waiver of his right to appeal a sentence within an agreed upon
    guideline range is enforceable."           United States v. Lee, 
    523 F.3d 104
    , 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (omission and quotation marks omitted).
    Furthermore, "a judge's remark at sentencing . . . does not
    affect a waiver that is clear and fully enforceable when
    entered."    United States v. Roitman, 
    245 F.3d 124
    , 126 (2d Cir.
    2001).
    We have before us several indicia of the knowing and
    voluntary nature of Miri's waiver:          (1) his signature on the
    written plea agreement; (2) his statements at the plea
    allocution; (3) a letter to the district court from the
    1
    The district court, moreover, may have compounded the confusion
    by initially indicating during a hearing that it would adhere to the
    appellate waiver as stated on the record by the magistrate court.
    -3-
    government after the error was made, which confirmed that Miri
    and his lawyer "understand and agree to the appellate waiver as
    described in the plea agreement" and would so clarify on the
    record; and (4) Miri's statements at sentencing.   Moreover, when
    the error was discussed before the district court, Miri never
    sought to withdraw his plea or otherwise challenged the extent
    of the appellate waiver as described in the plea agreement.
    Based on the foregoing, notwithstanding the magistrate
    court's erroneous description of the appellate waiver, Miri
    understood that the plea agreement waived his right to appeal a
    sentence of 108 months' imprisonment or less.   See 
    id. (Rule 11 error
    did not undermine clear waiver where error did not affect
    defendant's understanding of waiver).   Thus, reviewing the
    record as a whole, we conclude that Miri's knowing and voluntary
    waiver is enforceable and that we lack jurisdiction to hear this
    appeal.   See United States v. Arevalo, 
    628 F.3d 93
    , 98 (2d Cir.
    2010); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    ,
    80 (2004) (courts "must look to the entire record" to assess
    effect of Rule 11 error).
    Even if, however, we were to reach the merits of
    Miri's appeal, his arguments challenging the substantive
    reasonableness of his sentence would fail.   We review the length
    of a sentence for reasonableness, United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d
    -4-
    742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam), "tak[ing] into account the
    totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the
    sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind
    the institutional advantages of district courts," United States
    v. Cavera, 
    550 F.3d 180
    , 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).   Miri was
    sentenced on a single count of felony possession but, as the
    district court described, the offense involved possession of "1,
    2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 firearms and more than 5,000
    rounds of ammunition of various makes and calibers."   Sentencing
    Tr. 8:5-6 (Mar. 29, 2012).   Moreover, the district court was
    openly -- and understandably -- skeptical of Miri's claim that
    he was merely a collector of guns, particularly as guns were
    found hidden underneath the mattress of his bed, in a bedroom
    closet, and in a kitchen drawer; five of the guns were found
    loaded; and the police also recovered fake silencers and night
    vision goggles from his home.
    While acknowledging certain mitigating circumstances,
    the district court then found the 108-month sentence would
    appropriately "punish this case, this conduct, your conduct."
    Upon reviewing the record, even assuming Miri did not waive his
    right to appeal, we conclude that the sentence imposed was not
    "shockingly high . . . or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of
    law."   United States v. Rigas, 
    583 F.3d 108
    , 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
    -5-
    We have considered Miri's remaining arguments and
    conclude they are without merit.    For the foregoing reasons, we
    DISMISS the appeal or, alternatively, we AFFIRM the judgment of
    the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1822-cr

Judges: Straub, Hall, Chin

Filed Date: 6/27/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024