United States v. Pedro Lora ( 2013 )


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  • 12-3685-cr
    United States of America v. Pedro Lora
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND
    THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th
    day of July, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:     JON O. NEWMAN,
    RALPH K. WINTER,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    United States of America,
    Appellee,
    v.
    12-3685-cr
    Ricardo Leonardo, Yenny Guzman,
    Defendants,
    Pedro Lora, aka Smokey,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    FOR APPELLANT:                           Frank J. Riccio, II, Law Offices of
    Frank J. Riccio LLC, Bridgeport, CT.
    FOR APPELLEE:                       Jonathan Francis, Assistant United
    States Attorney (Sandra S. Glover
    and Robert M. Spector, Assistant
    United States Attorneys, on the
    brief), United States Attorney’s
    Office   for    the   District  of
    Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
    Appeal   from    the   United       States    District   Court    for   the
    District of Connecticut (Covello, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
    Defendant–Appellant Pedro Lora appeals from an August 30,
    2012, order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). On September 19, 2005, pursuant to a Federal
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Lora pled
    guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to
    distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 846.                On October 24,
    2011, Lora moved for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction based on
    Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which re-promulgated
    prior temporary reductions to the base offense levels for crack
    cocaine offenses.     See U.S.S.G. App. C., Amend. 750 (2011).
    A court may reduce a defendant’s sentence if he has been
    “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
    that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,”
    and if such a reduction is “consistent with applicable policy
    statements   issued    by   the   Sentencing        Commission.”    18    U.S.C.
    2
    § 3582(c)(2); see Dillon v. United States, 
    130 S. Ct. 2683
    , 2691
    (2010).      The    District   Court   held    that   because   Lora’s   Rule
    11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement did not refer to a guidelines range, his
    15-year sentence was not based on an amended guidelines range, and
    Lora   was   thus     ineligible   for     §   3582(c)(2)   relief.      The
    determination of whether an original sentence was “based on” a
    sentencing range that has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission
    is a matter of statutory interpretation, and our review is de novo.
    United States v. Martinez, 
    572 F.3d 82
    , 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
    § 3582(c)(2)).       In conducting that review here, we assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior
    proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our
    decision to affirm.
    Lora urges that the Supreme Court’s holding in Freeman v.
    United States, 
    131 S. Ct. 2685
     (2011), authorizes a sentence
    reduction because his plea agreement expressly refers to, or is at
    least “loosely based upon,” the Guidelines.            Appellant Br. at 6;
    see Freeman, 
    131 S. Ct. at 2695-97
     (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
    (where a defendant is sentenced pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
    agreement, a district court has jurisdiction to consider a sentence
    reduction only if the agreement makes clear that the basis for a
    term of imprisonment is the guidelines range).          The District Court
    rejected this argument, but we need not consider it, as we affirm
    on a different ground.         Lora’s calculated guidelines range was
    based on the finding that he was a career offender, and Amendment
    3
    750   to    the   Guidelines      did     not       affect    his     career      offender
    enhancement.          Because    the     amendment      does        not   lower    Lora’s
    applicable     guideline      range,     he    is    ineligible       for   a   sentence
    reduction.1
    Section 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that
    “[a] reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not
    consistent     with    this     policy    statement          and    therefore      is   not
    authorized under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) if . . . [an amendment]
    does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
    guideline range.”        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).                  Amendment 759 to
    the Guidelines, effective November 1, 2011, amended the advisory
    notes to § 1B1.10 to define the “applicable guideline range” as
    “the guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and
    criminal history category determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which
    is determined before consideration of any departure provision in
    the Guidelines Manual or any variance.”                       See U.S.S.G. App. C,
    Amend. 759 (2011); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).
    At Lora’s sentencing on January 17, 2006, the Court adopted
    the offense level and criminal history category from the Probation
    Department’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”).                          The PSR included a
    career offender enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, resulting
    in a total offense level of 35.                Based on this offense level and
    1
    “[I]t is long-settled law that we may affirm the judgment of
    the District Court on any ground that the record supports.”
    Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 
    610 F.3d 776
    , 781 n.6 (2d Cir.
    2010).
    4
    a criminal history category of VI, Lora’s sentencing range was 292
    to   365    months’     imprisonment.       The   Court    departed    from   the
    Guidelines and the plea agreement and sentenced Lora to a term of
    11 years’ imprisonment.         Following an initial appeal not relevant
    here, on remand, the District Court sentenced Lora to 15 years’
    imprisonment in conformity with the plea agreement.
    The   fact   that   the   District     Court   originally   departed
    downward from both the Guidelines and the minimum sentence in the
    plea agreement has no effect on Lora’s ineligibility for a sentence
    reduction.       Prior to Amendment 759's definition of “applicable
    guideline range,” this Court had held that where a sentencing judge
    departs from a range computed under the career offender guideline
    to a lower range, the post-departure range was the “guideline range
    applicable” to a defendant for the purposes of § 1B1.10.                      See
    United States v. Rivera, 
    662 F.3d 166
    , 177 (2d Cir. 2011).               But our
    decision in Rivera acknowledged that the then-proposed Amendment
    759, once effective, would “prescribe the precise construction of
    ‘applicable guideline range’ that we refuse to give the existing
    guideline, i.e., it is the pre-departure range from the initial
    sentencing.”       
    Id. at 183
    ; see also United States v. Steele, 
    714 F.3d 751
    , 756 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the limitations of
    Rivera’s holding after the effective date of Amendment 759).2
    2
    Lora filed a pro se § 3582(c)(2) motion on October 24, 2011
    — a week before the effective date of Amendment 759. In addition
    to defining the “applicable guideline range,” Amendment 759
    clarified that a sentencing court shall use the version of § 1B1.10
    5
    Although Amendment 750 reduced the base offense levels for
    crack cocaine offenses, it made no such reduction to the career
    offender enhancements set forth in § 4B1.1.             As a career offender,
    Lora   is    ineligible    for    §   3582(c)(2)      relief.      See   U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); see also U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 750 (2011)
    (explaining that offenders sentenced pursuant to § 4B1.1 receive
    guideline ranges that are “unaffected by a reduction in the Drug
    Quantity Table”); United States v. Mock, 
    612 F.3d 133
    , 138 (2d Cir.
    2010) (a defendant sentenced as career offender under § 4B1.1 is
    ineligible for a sentence reduction under crack cocaine amendments
    to   the    Guidelines).     Lora     also   argues    that     recent   case   law
    developments render his career offender status uncertain, but this
    argument is not properly raised on a § 3582(c)(2) motion.                       See
    Dillon, 
    130 S. Ct. at 2694
    . Accordingly, the order of the District
    Court is AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT,
    CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk
    that is in effect on the date on which the court reduces the term
    of imprisonment.   U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 759 (2011); U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10 cmt. n.6.    The District Court’s order denying Lora’s
    motion was entered on August 30, 2012 — well after the effective
    date of Amendment 759 — and the amendment’s definition of
    “applicable guideline range” governs this appeal.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-3685-cr

Judges: Newman, Winter, Droney

Filed Date: 7/16/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024