United States v. City of Norwalk , 447 F. App'x 269 ( 2012 )

10-5123-cr
United States v. Buchanan
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 10-5123-cr
17
18 CITY OF NORWALK, MARC LEPORE, LISA M.
19 BROWN, ARCADIA FINANCIAL LTD.,
20 Interested-Third-Parties,
21
22 JERMAINE BUCHANAN, a/k/a SKI,
23 Defendant-Appellant.
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25
26 FOR APPELLANT: Jeremiah Donovan, Law Offices of
27 Jeremiah Donovan, Old Saybrook,
28 CT.
1
1 FOR APPELLEE: Stephen B. Reynolds, Sandra S.
2 Glover, for David B. Fein,
3 United States Attorney for the
4 District of Connecticut,
5 Hartford, CT.
6
7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
8 Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.).
9
10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
11 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
12 AFFIRMED.
13
14 Jermaine Buchanan appeals the sentence imposed
15 following a jury trial in the United States District Court
16 for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.), on convictions
17 for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
18 Organizations Act, violent crimes in aid of racketeering,
19 and conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. See
20 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1959(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
21 841(b)(1)(A). Buchanan challenges his sentence for
22 substantive reasonableness. We have already affirmed
23 Buchanan’s conviction, but remanded to give the district
24 court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the
25 Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552
26 U.S. 85 (2007), it would have deviated from the Sentencing
27 Guidelines after considering the disparity between the
28 Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine. United
29 States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 231 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
30 United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)
31 (per curiam) (articulating standard for remand following
32 Kimbrough). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
33 facts and procedural history, which is fully recited in our
34 previous opinion.
35
36 Following our remand, the district court concluded that
37 it would have imposed the same sentence even if fully aware
38 of Kimbrough:
39
40 The court would determine the Sentencing Guidelines the
41 same as they were originally determined in the initial
42 sentencing, for a Guideline range of life imprisonment.
43 While considering all of the section 3553(a) factors,
44 the court is particularly informed in this case by the
45 need to protect the public and for deterrence.
46 Jermaine Buchanan is responsible for the murder of an
47 innocent man, the crippling (paraplegia) of another,
2
1 and the attempted murder of a third person. While a
2 street dealer, he played a critical part--enforcer--in
3 a large volume, long-standing drug conspiracy. He has
4 an extensive criminal history, primarily of assaultive
5 conduct with a gun, beatings, and assault on a police
6 officer.
7
8 Joint Appendix at 90-91.
9
10 We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness
11 under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,” United
12 States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en
13 banc), and “will not substitute our own judgment for the
14 district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to
15 meet the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) considerations in any
16 particular case." Id. A district court’s sentence may be
17 disturbed "only in exceptional cases where [its] decision
18 cannot be located within the range of permissible
19 decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
20 analysis is no different following a district court’s
21 decision not to resentence under Regalado, except that we
22 ensure that the district court articulated its reasons for
23 declining to do so. See Regalado, 518 F.3d at 149.
24
25 The sentence imposed was reasonable. Buchanan contends
26 that the district court failed to accord sufficient weight
27 to the need for and possibility of rehabilitation. Given
28 the volume of crack involved, and the circumstances observed
29 by the district court (above), we cannot say that the
30 sentence of life imprisonment fell outside of the range of
31 permissible sentences. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.
32
33 Similarly, there is no valid challenge to the district
34 court’s consideration of the sentencing factors contained in
35 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “[W]e presume, in the absence of
36 record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing
37 judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the
38 statutory factors.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d
39 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006). Buchanan has not identified any
40 record evidence suggesting otherwise, and our own review of
41 the sentencing proceedings has not indicated otherwise.
42
43
44
45
46
3
1 Finding no merit in Buchanan’s remaining arguments, we
2 hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
3
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
7
4