Giunta v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2011 )

10-4869-cv
Giunta v. Commissioner of Social Security
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
on the 23rd day of November, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________
Joseph Jude Giunta,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 10-4869-cv
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Joseph Jude Giunta, pro se, Flushing, N.Y.
FOR APPELLEE: Varuni Nelson, Kathleen A. Mahoney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, of counsel, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Ross, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Joseph Jude Giunta, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s
judgment granting the motion of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for
judgment on the pleadings in Giunta’s action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
In reviewing a district court’s decision affirming a final decision of the Commissioner,
we do not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but rather review the
administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a
whole, to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d
Cir. 2010); Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court “may only set aside
a determination which is based upon legal error or not supported by substantial evidence.”
Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial
evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence
exists, we defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting evidence. Clark v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998). If there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Commissioner’s factual findings, they are conclusive and must be upheld. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Having conducted an independent review of the administrative record in light of the
above principles, we conclude that, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court,
the Commissioner’s decision denying Giunta’s claim for disability benefits was legally correct
and supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, Giunta emphasizes his own report of the
debilitating effects of his impairment and the opinions of his treating physicians that he was
“totally disabled.” However, the ultimate determination of whether a claimant is disabled under
the Social Security Act is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). As
noted by the ALJ and district court, a claimant’s subjective report of the effects of his
impairment is not controlling, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, and the opinion of a treating physician
is not controlling if it conflicts with other substantial evidence in the record. Snell v. Apfel, 177
F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). Here, there was substantial
evidence suggesting that Giunta retained a residual functional capacity to perform his past
relevant work as a “light duty” computer technician, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv),
416.960(b)(1) (defining “past relevant work”), including objective medical evidence, physician
testimony and reports, and Giunta’s own behavior in working as a computer technician after
sustaining his injuries. Although Giunta claims that his injuries ultimately prevented him from
performing his past relevant work as a computer technician, this claim is inconsistent with his
testimony that, after being laid off, he did not reacquire such a job because of the weak economy,
not because of a physical limitation. The ALJ was not required to accord controlling weight to
Giunta’s subjective complaints or, in light of the conflicting evidence, the opinions of Giunta’s
treating physicians. We are required to defer to the ALJ’s resolution of this conflict as the ALJ
provided adequate explanation for the weight given to the opinions. See Clark, 143 F.3d at 118.
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We have considered ’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without
merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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