United States v. Marin Moreno , 701 F.3d 64 ( 2012 )

10-3567-cr
United States v. Marin Moreno
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2011
(Argued: October 20, 2011 Decided: November 20, 2012)
No. 10-3567-cr
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
-v.-
NORBY MARIN MORENO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
Before: CABRANES, LIVINGSTON, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Norby Marin Moreno (“Marin”) appeals from a
August 20, 2010, judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Gleeson, J.) convicting her, following a jury trial, of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession with
intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Marin contends that the district court erred in denying
her motion to suppress evidence seized from her motel room. Marin argues,
inter alia, that the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
because (1) no exigent circumstances justified the DEA agents’ warrantless entry
of her motel room; (2) her consent to search was a fruit of the illegal entry; and
(3) even assuming that the agents’ warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, Marin’s consent was invalid. We AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
Judge Carney concurs in a separate opinion.
DAVID A. LEWIS, Appeals Bureau, Federal
Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, New
York, for Defendant-Appellant.
ALI KAZEMI, Assistant United States Attorney
(David C. James, Assistant United States
Attorney, on the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch,
United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee.
LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Norby Marin Moreno (“Marin”)1 appeals from an
August 20, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Gleeson, J.), convicting her, following a jury trial, of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession
with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Marin to
120 months’ incarceration, three years of supervised release, and a $200
special assessment. On appeal, Marin contends that the district court
erred in denying her pretrial motion to suppress the approximately l.2
kilograms of heroin found hidden in four perfume canisters in her luggage
1
We refer to the Defendant-Appellant as “Marin” because in Spanish
language usage “Marin” is the patronymic and “Moreno” is the matronymic, and
accepted custom is to refer to an individual by the former. See United States v.
Cuevas Pimentel, 815 F. Supp. 81, 82 n.2 (D. Conn. 1993) (Cabranes, J.).
2
after she consented to a search of her motel room and bags on the day of her
arrest. Marin first contends that the district court erred in concluding that
exigent circumstances supported the warrantless entry of Drug Enforcement
Agency (“DEA”) agents into her room and that her consent to search was a
fruit of this illegal entry and was therefore invalid. She next argues that
even assuming the agents’ warrantless entry was justified by an exigency, her
consent to search was not voluntary.
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the district court did not
err (much less clearly err) in determining that exigent circumstances justified
the agents’ warrantless entry into Marin’s room. Further, we find no error in
the district court’s finding that Marin’s consent was voluntary. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.2
BACKGROUND
1. Evidence at the Suppression Hearing
The following background is taken from the district court’s
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Marin’s motion to suppress and
from the testimony of DEA Special Agents Salvatore Aceves (“Aceves”) and
2
In light of this disposition, we need not address Marin’s argument that
the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable in the circumstances here.
3
Elizabeth O’Connor (“O’Connor”) at a two-day pretrial suppression hearing
before Judge Charles P. Sifton.3 We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. See United States v. Worjloh, 546 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118,
129 (2d Cir. 2004).
On the morning of July 31, 2008, Aceves, from the DEA’s New York
Field Division, received information from DEA Special Agent Richard Walsh
(“Walsh”), who was stationed in Bogota, Colombia, that over a kilogram of
heroin was to be delivered by courier at the Metro Hotel in Queens that very
day.4 Walsh was working with the Colombian National Police (the “CNP”) on
an investigation into a drug trafficking organization that was ferrying large
amounts of cocaine and heroin to the United States and into New York City
through Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. Pursuant to Colombian law, the
CNP, working with Walsh, had placed taps on the telephones of members of
the drug organization. These taps had resulted in previous substantial
narcotics seizures.
3
Judge Sifton presided over the suppression hearing and subsequent jury
trial in this case. Judge Gleeson took over the matter after Judge Sifton’s death.
4
The Metro is actually a motel, located at 7300 Queens Boulevard,
Flushing, New York.
4
On this occasion, Walsh, who had worked with Aceves in the New York
office prior to his posting to Colombia, contacted Aceves from a Bogota “wire
room” in which he was listening to calls to and from a phone associated with a
high-level member of the drug organization. Walsh called to alert Aceves to
the impending heroin delivery in New York City. Walsh relayed information
to Aceves -- including that the drug courier would be at the Metro Hotel and
that the courier’s name was “Norby” -- as Walsh obtained it from the
interceptions. By approximately 10:00 a.m. on July 31, Aceves had learned
from Walsh over the course of several conversations
that a heavyset Hispanic woman named Norby would be
at the Metro Hotel in Room 166 with approximately
1,200 grams of heroin and that she’d be waiting for a
male known only as Pintora to arrive and that either he
or someone would arrive to receive the heroin; that he
would be giving her $10,000. [Aceves was] also told [by
Walsh] that beforehand, [Pintora] would contact [Norby]
and he would tell her that he was calling on behalf of El
Tio, which means the uncle. . . . [T]hat was their code to
her for her to proceed as scheduled.
Walsh informed Aceves that Norby was “already there” and that the
transaction would take place “at any moment,” according to the intercepted
conversations.
After receiving this information from Walsh, Aceves drove to the Metro
Motel, arriving at approximately 12:00 noon. He established surveillance of
the motel by parking his van in the parking lot outside Room 166 so that the
5
van faced the exterior door of Room 166, which opened onto the parking lot,
from about 25 feet away. Aceves was soon joined by six other DEA agents,
including O’Connor, who was in charge. By about 12:45 p.m., the agents had
formed a perimeter around the motel. Agents were stationed in Aceves’s van
facing Room 166; in a second van also parked in the gravel parking lot; inside
the motel, in a common area; and on Queens Boulevard near the motel’s main
entrance.
At approximately 12:30 p.m., as this perimeter was still being
established, Aceves observed a heavyset Hispanic woman matching Walsh’s
description in the parking lot of the Metro Motel; he saw her approach the
exterior door of Room 166. The woman, who was later revealed to be Marin,
was carrying one or two small plastic bags and she held a cell phone to her
ear. She stepped inside Room 166, leaving the door open, and then after a few
seconds stepped outside again and looked around the surrounding area; she
repeated this movement twice before finally entering the room and closing the
door.
Marin had been inside Room 166 for approximately half an hour when
the agents discovered that in addition to the exterior door that opened onto
the parking lot where Aceves’s van was stationed, Room 166 also had an
interior door that opened into an interior corridor of the motel. The agents
6
were immediately concerned that because they had been unaware of the
interior door when they first established their perimeter, Marin might have
left Room 166 via the interior door, or Pintora or another person might have
arrived without their knowledge.5 As Agent Aceves testified, “[t]he drug
transaction could have already taken place while we were merely surveilling
the exterior door.” An agent was promptly posted in the interior corridor.
Shortly before 1:30 p.m., Agents O’Connor, Aceves, and Special Agent David
Samilo (“Samilo”) decided that Agent O’Connor would ask a female member of
the motel’s cleaning staff to knock on the exterior door of Room 166, with
Agent O’Connor standing beside her, in the hope that O’Connor by this
measure might ascertain who was inside.
Shortly thereafter, the motel’s housekeeper, accompanied by O’Connor,
knocked on the exterior door of Room 166 and announced “room service or
maid service” or “[s]omething to that effect.” The housekeeper wore a solid
color uniform dress. O’Connor was dressed in plain clothes -- a short sleeved
white golf shirt and khaki green capri slacks -- but also wore a two-and-one-
half inch gold badge on her hip that identified her as a DEA agent. As the
housekeeper knocked on the door to Room 166, Samilo, followed by Aceves,
5
There was a window in Room 166, overlooking the parking lot, but the
shade to that window was drawn.
7
approached the door from Aceves’s van. Both agents were wearing badges and
bullet-proof vests over their short-sleeve shirts.
Marin opened the door in response to the housekeeper’s knock. She
“made eye contact with the maid, [and] smiled,” but when she saw O’Connor,
“the smile dropped from her face, and she went to slam the door in
[O’Connor’s] face.” O’Connor, who did not have her weapon drawn and was
unaware whether Marin was armed or had another person in the room, first
put up her hand to block the door, announcing “calm,” “tran[q]uila” and “we
are the police,” and then, as Marin resisted, grabbed her wrist, pushing the
door open and calling for Agent Samilo’s help. With Samilo’s assistance, the
altercation was over within seconds, as O’Connor successfully handcuffed
Marin inside the motel room. During that same brief interval, Aceves entered
the room with his gun drawn and conducted a brief security sweep; after
ascertaining that no one else was in Room 166, he holstered his weapon. The
agents, aware from Agent Walsh’s information that Pintora or his associate
could be arriving to meet the courier at any moment, secured the room by
closing the doors.
After Marin was seated on a chair, Aceves, who is fluent in Spanish,
spoke with her, eliciting her name, “where she was coming from, [and] when
she arrived.” He also translated for O’Connor, who in addition to speaking
8
with Marin was responding to phone calls from other agents on the
surveillance operation. Marin was calm. O’Connor told her, in substance,
that it was in her interest to cooperate and that “if there’s something here that
shouldn’t be here it’s in your best interest to tell us now while you can before
we find it on our own.” After a brief interval during which the agents
continued to wait for the arrival of Pintora or his associate, Aceves asked for
Marin’s consent to search the room and her bags. Marin immediately agreed
to the search, adding that her bags had already been searched by Customs
officials upon her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport (“JFK”)
that morning.
After Marin orally consented to search, Aceves provided her with a
written consent to search form, in English, which he then translated into
Spanish for her, in writing, line by line. The form noted that Marin had been
asked to permit the search of her room and bags, and stated that “[she had]
not been threatened, nor forced in any way” to consent. The form provided, in
closing, that “I freely consent to this search.” In addition to writing out the
form’s contents in Spanish for Marin to read, Aceves, who previously worked
as a DEA translator, also read the form aloud to Marin in her native tongue.
He confirmed with her that she understood the form’s contents. The form was
9
then signed by Marin, O’Connor, and Aceves.6
After obtaining Marin’s consent, the agents proceeded to search a black
suitcase, a camouflage suitcase, a red handbag, a brown purse, a lime green
purse, and various other items scattered about the room. During the search,
Samilo discovered a metal perfume canister concealed deep within one of the
suitcases. The canister was wrapped in clothing. Samilo removed the lid and
sprayed perfume. He then continued to search the suitcase and discovered
three similar perfume canisters. The canisters “appeared to be normal
perfume canisters; however, they weren’t weighted the way a liquid should be
weighted. They didn’t slosh around a bit, but they were heavy as if they were
full.” As Aceves and Samilo were examining the canisters, Marin volunteered
that the canisters did not belong to her. Aceves pried the interior lid off one of
the canisters and discovered a brown substance hidden inside the canister
which field tested positive for heroin.
Marin and her belongings, including the canisters with the heroin, were
then transported to the New York Field Office for processing. A lab report
prepared after Marin’s arrest indicated that the confiscated heroin had a net
6
Marin was handcuffed consistent with DEA protocol and, as O’Connor
testified, because “quite frankly . . . she resisted once, and I didn’t want her to
do it again.” Marin’s handcuffs were removed so that she could sign the consent
form. She was handcuffed again during the search of the motel room and her
bags.
10
weight of 1209 grams (almost precisely the amount that the courier was to be
carrying, according to the information relayed by Walsh from the intercepted
phone conversations in Colombia) and a purity of 93.5 percent. According to
Agent Aceves, “[a]nything above [a purity of] 80 [percent] would be considered
extremely good quality heroin. This is almost -- I’ve never seen anything
above 80.” The canisters each contained “a very, very small amount of
perfume . . . [t]he rest of it was all heroin.”
2. The District Court’s Decision
Marin was indicted on two counts, for conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession with intent to distribute one
kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A). Prior to trial, Marin moved to suppress the physical evidence
seized from her room.7 After a hearing held on November 25 and 26, 2008, the
district court denied the motion to suppress the physical evidence. On
7
Marin also moved to suppress certain statements she made in response
to questioning about whether she was the only occupant in the room, whether
the suitcases belonged to her, whether the cell phone was hers, and when and
where she purchased it. The government conceded that these statements were
inadmissible pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and did not
offer testimony at trial regarding them.
11
February 24, 2009, following trial, the court issued an order memorializing its
reasons for denying the suppression motion and setting forth its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. See United States v. Marin Moreno, No. 08-cr-605
(CPS), 2009 WL 454548 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009). As relevant here, the
district court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the agents’ entry
into Marin’s motel room without a warrant. Id. at *8. The district court cited
our decision in United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769-70 (2d Cir.
1990) (en banc), which sets forth illustrative factors to be considered in
evaluating whether, given the totality of the circumstances, “law enforcement
agents were confronted by an ‘urgent need’ to . . . take action,” id. at 769.
Drawing on the analysis in MacDonald, the court reasoned that exigent
circumstances justified entry because
[t]he agents were faced with a situation (1) involving the
serious offense of narcotics trafficking; (2) where it was
unknown whether the defendant was armed, or whether
she was alone, as the agents reasonably believed an
accomplice might have been present in the room; (3)
where the defendant’s description and location precisely
matched the information obtained by Agent Aceves from
Agent Walsh, which, having been determined to be
sufficiently reliable, and together with defendant’s
observed demeanor, established probable cause that
defendant was or soon would be committing the crime; (4)
where, based on their surveillance, the agents believed
the defendant was in the room at the time; and (5) the
agents’ entry into the room, while unwelcome and met
with resistance, did not result in any injury to the
12
defendant or any damage to the hotel property. Finally,
the offense involved powdered heroin, which could be
disposed of in a toilet at the first indication that DEA
agents sought to speak with the defendant or gain access
to the room.
Marin Moreno, 2009 WL 454548, at *8 (citation omitted).
The district court also found that Marin’s consent to search was
voluntary. It noted that the following factors weighed against this finding:
that at least Aceves entered Room 166 with his weapon drawn; that O’Connor
and Samilo briefly struggled with Marin and handcuffed her prior to her
giving of consent; and that the agents “failed to advise defendant of her right
to refuse consent, and that Agent O’Connor advised defendant that it was in
her best interests to cooperate.” Id. at *7. But the district court found that
[a]side from these circumstances . . . [Marin] has
submitted no . . . evidence that her consent was not
voluntary, and indeed fails to allege that she was coerced
into giving consent. The atmosphere of the encounter
between the DEA agents and the defendant, while clearly
not friendly, does not appear to have been unduly hostile.
There is no allegation that the agents used intimidating
or coercive language or gestures in an attempt to secure
defendant’s consent.
Id. The district court emphasized that Marin “provided oral consent [to
search] immediately upon request” and she “stat[ed] that her bags had already
been searched at the JFK airport.” Id. Based on all the facts and
13
circumstances, the court concluded that Marin’s consent was voluntary.8 Id.
3. The Trial
Trial began on December 8, 2008. During its case-in-chief, in addition to
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and already discussed, the
government introduced proof regarding certain telephone calls received on the
cellular phone in Marin’s possession while the DEA agents were searching her
room. The caller in these calls stated that he was calling for “Norby,” “on
behalf of El Tio,” further corroborating the information obtained from Agent
Walsh to the effect that Pintora would contact Norby and tell her he was
calling on behalf of El Tio before arriving to take possession of the drugs.
Marin was also shown to have three SIM cards at the time of her arrest.9
DEA Special Agent Robert Garcia testified that drug traffickers commonly
possess multiple SIM cards, as a cellular phone user can effectively change her
8
The district court also concluded that, in any event, the heroin in
Moreno’s luggage would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory
search of her bags, and was thus admissible, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
447 (1984) (holding that unlawfully seized evidence should not be excluded “if
the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained
inevitably” without the constitutional violation), an issue this Court does not
reach.
“A SIM, or ‘security identity module,’ card is the device within a phone
9
that contains the unique information identifying a particular subscriber.”
United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 125 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008).
14
number at will by using a new card. Finally, proof was offered that upon
arriving at JFK, Marin listed a false destination address of “5921 Callow, New
York,” on her Customs declaration. The government called Patricia
Carrasquilla, the individual residing at that address, who testified that she
met Marin two or three years ago, but had not spoken to her since, and that
Carrasquilla was unaware Marin had traveled to New York in July 2008.
Marin testified in her own defense. She described a history of hostility
against her family in Colombia by local paramilitary groups and claimed that
she came to the United States to find out what happened to her two children,
who had disappeared. Marin denied bringing heroin into the United States
and alleged the drugs had been placed in her suitcase after her arrival at the
motel as part of an effort by members of these paramilitary groups to frame
her. She claimed that she left Room 166 to go shopping and, upon returning,
found both doors to the room open.10 Marin admitted, however, that she did
not report this incident to the front desk, but instead took a nap. The DEA
agents arrived shortly thereafter. Marin claimed that the agents turned her
around while searching her belongings so that she could not fully see what
was happening. She denied ever before seeing the canisters found in her
10
She also testified that while showering in Room 166, she heard her motel
door being opened.
15
luggage. Marin also denied bringing drugs into the country in April 2007, a
previous occasion on which she traveled to New York. She admitted, however,
that she had listed a cousin’s address as her destination address on a Customs
declaration form for that trip when, in fact, she did not see her cousin and she
stayed, not with her cousin, but at the Metro Motel.
The government in rebuttal introduced evidence from the manager of
the Metro Motel to the effect that both doors to Room 166 have an automatic
close-and-lock mechanism so that they cannot be left ajar, much less open,
unless the doors are physically blocked from closing. In addition, Agent
Aceves testified (contradicting Marin) that the defendant watched the agents
as they searched her bags, and that he personally field tested the substance
removed from one of the perfume canisters in front of her, and then informed
her that the substance was heroin.
The jury began deliberating on December 15, 2008, and returned a
verdict of guilty on both counts that same day.
DISCUSSION
When evaluating a district court’s decision denying a motion to
suppress, “we review the [district] court’s factual findings for clear error,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Worjloh,
16
546 F.3d at 108. We review de novo the legal issues presented by a motion to
suppress. See United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 490-91 (2d Cir. 2007).
“The reasonableness of police action is a ‘mixed question of law and fact’
that is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir.
2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Therefore,
the ultimate determination of whether a search was objectively reasonable in
light of exigent circumstances is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.; see
also, e.g., United States v. Goree, 365 F.3d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Given
the heavily fact dependent nature of the exigency inquiry, however, the lower
court decision will almost invariably rest on factual determinations about the
extent of the exigency, and therefore our review is usually, in practice, for
clear error. See United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2008).
Under clear-error review, we must be “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed” in order to reverse a district
court’s exigent circumstances finding. United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d 179,
185 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We similarly review a district court’s finding that consent to search was
voluntary for clear error. See United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d
Cir. 2004); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)
(“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
17
circumstances . . . .”). “So long as the police do not coerce consent, a search
conducted on the basis of consent is not an unreasonable search.” Garcia v.
United States, 56 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1995).
1. Exigent Circumstances
It is well-settled, as we have repeatedly said, “that the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment must yield in those situations in which
exigent circumstances require law enforcement officers to act without delay.”
United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1992). Thus, “[p]olice officers
may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a
fleeing suspect.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). And “the
need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized
as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The exigent circumstances rule is not rendered inapplicable, moreover,
simply because “law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant
knock on a door . . . [as] any private citizen might do.” Id. at 1862. Officers
may not gain entry by actually violating or threatening to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, however, for
officers to knock on a door as any private citizen might. If those on the other
18
side of the door react in ways that result in exigencies to which police must
respond, occupants “have only themselves to blame for the warrantless
exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.” Id.We employ an objective test in deciding whether an exigency justified a
warrantless intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests, one “that turns on [an]
examination of the totality of circumstances confronting law enforcement
agents in the particular case.” MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 769. We have often
referred to six factors as guideposts for determining the existence of exigent
circumstances:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which
the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of
probable cause . . . to believe that the suspect committed
the crime; (4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is
in the premises being entered; (5) a likelihood that the
suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6)
the peaceful circumstances of the entry.
Id. at 769-70 (omission in original and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that in
addition to the MacDonald factors, “federal courts, including our own, have
considered [an additional factor, namely whether] quick action is necessary to
prevent the destruction of evidence”). These factors are not germane in every
19
exigent circumstances situation, however,11 and we have thus emphasized that
they “are merely illustrative, not exhaustive, and [that] the presence or
absence of any one factor is not conclusive.” Gordils, 982 F.2d at 69 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The core question is whether the facts, as they
appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer
to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.” Klump,
536 F.3d at 117-18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on these principles, we conclude that the district court’s
determination that exigent circumstances justified the agents’ entry into
Marin’s motel room was not erroneous, much less clearly so.
Given the detailed information from Walsh, which the district court
found to be reliable, as well as the ample corroboration of this information by
the agents’ observations at the scene, the agents clearly had probable cause to
believe that Marin was a drug courier and in possession of over a kilogram of
heroin.12 Based on his covert monitoring of a phone belonging to a member of
11
Consider, for instance, those cases in which officers enter private
premises not in pursuit of a suspect, but to render aid. See, e.g., Klump, 536
F.3d at 118 (concluding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry
into warehouse to investigate the cause of an odor indicative of a possible fire).
Before the district court, Marin moved to suppress the evidence found
12
in her motel room on the additional ground that the agents lacked probable
20
the drug smuggling organization, Walsh provided not only a description of the
courier, but specific information as to where she would be found, and when the
drug transaction was to occur. Marin not only fit the description but was
observed entering the very motel room in which the heroin delivery was to
take place on the very day of delivery. Moreover, the agents observed Marin
repeatedly enter and exit Room 166 and survey the parking lot -- behavior
that added to their probable cause to believe that Marin was about to engage
in a drug transaction, as Marin appeared to be awaiting the arrival of another
individual, engaging in precisely the conduct one might expect of a drug
courier seeking to consummate a delivery. See United States v. Montana, 958
F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that observations of defendant “pac[ing]
back and forth . . . and attempt[ing] to peer through [a car’s] darkened
windows” supported “probable cause to believe that [he] was a knowing
participant in [a planned] drug pickup”).
The agents’ probable cause was yet again strengthened, as the district
court found, when Marin “suddenly and forcefully attempted to slam her door
cause to arrest her. The district court rejected this argument, see Marin Moreno,
2009 WL 454548, at *6, and Marin does not contest the court’s probable cause
ruling on appeal. Probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a serious
crime, as already indicated, weighs in favor of a finding of exigency in the
circumstances here. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 769.
21
closed upon seeing Agent O’Connor standing outside her room.” Marin
Moreno, 2009 WL 454548, at *6. As we have recognized, a hasty retreat into
one’s home on sight of police manifests guilt and may, in appropriate
circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause. See United States v.
Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding probable cause
where suspect “looked frightened and ran back into the apartment” in
response to agents’ identifying themselves as police). “[D]eliberatively furtive
actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers,” as the Supreme
Court has said, “are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of
crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an
arrest.” Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968); see also
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting that “nervous, evasive
behavior” and “[h]eadlong flight -- wherever it occurs” are “not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but [are] certainly suggestive of such”).
Marin’s reaction to seeing O’Connor at her door, moreover, also created
an urgent need to enter Room 166 to ensure that evidence was not destroyed.
Marin’s unusual behavior -- “suddenly and forcefully” attempting to slam shut
a door she had just opened -- raised a legitimate concern that she would
22
attempt to destroy or discard the drugs that the agents had probable cause to
believe were inside. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857 (noting that evidence
destruction is frequent in drug cases “because drugs may be easily destroyed
by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain”); see also United
States v. Atherton, 936 F.2d 728, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “we have
repeatedly upheld warrantless entries where law enforcement officers
reasonably believed that immediate access to the premises was necessary to
prevent loss of evidence” and collecting cases). This rendered Agent
O’Connor’s entry reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Marin argues that the district court erred in finding an exigency here
because she believed that Agent O’Connor was a robber, not a DEA agent, and
thus Marin had no incentive to destroy her drugs. Marin further contends
that even if she realized the true identity of the officers, the Supreme Court’s
decision in King makes clear that an “occupant[’s] mere knowledge of the
presence of agents or police outside, without more, is insufficient to create
exigent circumstances warranting the officers’ entry into the home.” Marin
Reply Br. at 12. These arguments are unavailing.
First, Marin did not testify at the suppression hearing and did not
claim, either on the day of her arrest or before the district court, that she
23
believed Agent O’Connor -- attired as she was, in a white golf shirt and green
capri slacks -- was at Marin’s door to effect a daytime robbery. Moreover, we
find no clear error in the district court’s determination that Marin continued
to resist O’Connor’s efforts to calm her, even after O’Connor identified herself
as “police” -- a finding in some tension with Marin’s claim. In any event, even
assuming, arguendo, that Marin believed Agent O’Connor was a robber when
Marin attempted to slam the door, this fact makes no difference to the
propriety of the agents’ entry. The Supreme Court has made clear that “[a]n
action [by law enforcement agents] is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment . . . as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the]
action.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (last alteration in
original and internal quotation marks omitted).13 In light of Marin’s behavior
and the surrounding circumstances -- which would not have led a reasonable
officer to conclude that Marin believed robbers were at her door -- we find no
clear error in the district court’s conclusion that a reasonable, experienced
13
For this reason, Agent O’Connor’s stray remark at the suppression
hearing that Marin, after being subdued, “calmed down and she realized, I think,
that we were the police and not there to rob her” also makes no difference to the
inquiry. O’Connor’s subjective belief as to Marin’s state of mind (whatever it
might have been) is not germane to the question whether an exigency existed.
See id.; see also Klump, 536 F.3d at 119 (“[A]gents’ subjective motives [for
effecting a warrantless search] simply do not matter.”).
24
officer would have recognized an urgent need to take action, regardless of
Marin’s undisclosed reasons for her conduct.
Similarly (and contrary to Marin’s claim), the district court’s exigency
finding is not inconsistent with the recognition in King that when police
without a warrant knock on an individual’s door, that person “need not allow
the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at
any time.” King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862. To be clear, police may not knock on a
door and then “cry exigent circumstances whenever probable cause exists that
readily disposable drugs are in the home -- no matter what the response of the
resident happens to be.” United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 576 (6th
Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., dissenting). But as Judge Sutton recognized in
Chambers -- and as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in King -- where the
resident’s reaction to the appearance of officers is “the verbal, visual or aural
equivalent of ‘The police are here, destroy the drugs,’” the traditional rules
governing the exigent circumstances exception render entry reasonable. Id. at
577. Here, Marin did not simply refuse entry by the agents. Rather, as the
district court found, she attempted “suddenly and forcefully” to slam the door
in Agent O’Connor’s face and thereafter continued to struggle against her as
Agent O’Connor announced she was from the police. Marin Moreno, 2009 WL
25454548, at *6. Thus, contrary to Marin’s claim, this is not a case involving an
individual’s “knowledge of the presence of agents . . . without more.” Marin
Reply Br. at 12.
Attempting to avoid this conclusion, Marin cites the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2012), which
reversed a district court’s finding that exigent circumstances justified officers’
warrantless entry into a hotel room. The officers in Ramirez, however, first
attempted, without any evidence of exigency whatsoever, to enter the
defendant’s room with a key card, and then forced entry when the defendant
“attempt[ed] to shut the door” on their announcement they were police. Id. at
762. “[W]ithout more,” the Eighth Circuit concluded, merely shutting the door
“[did] not bolster the claim that it was reasonable to conclude that the
destruction of evidence was imminent.” Id. But Ramirez is simply inapposite
here. When the agents knocked on Marin’s door, they had probable cause to
believe she was at that moment or would imminently be delivering a kilogram
of heroin within the room. Marin responded to police, not by declining to
speak, but by “suddenly and forcefully attempt[ing] to slam her door closed
upon seeing Agent O’Connor standing outside her room,” Marin Moreno, 2009
WL 454548, at *6 -- thus creating a circumstance in which any reasonable,
26
experienced officer would see “an urgent need to . . . take action.” Klump, 536
F.3d at 117-18.
In sum, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court erred in determining that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry into Marin’s motel room. Indeed, we see no error, much less
clear error, in the district court’s conclusion as to exigency. Accordingly, we
reject Marin’s claim that the evidence seized from Room 166 should have been
suppressed as the tainted fruit of an unlawful entry.
2. Consent
Marin next contends that even assuming the warrantless entry into
Room 166 was justified by exigent circumstances, the heroin concealed in her
bags should still have been suppressed because her consent to search was not
voluntary. “The test of voluntariness is whether the consent was the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,” United States v.
Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1988), as opposed to “mere
acquiescence in a show of authority.” United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346,
351 (2d Cir. 1993). Voluntariness “is a question of fact to be determined from
all of the surrounding circumstances.” Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d at 57. In
27
considering Marin’s challenge, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and “will not reverse a finding of voluntary
consent except for clear error.” United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 131 (2d
Cir. 2006). We find no such error here.
Marin argues that, in light of the forcible entry into her motel room by
armed agents who both subdued and handcuffed her, failing thereafter to
inform her that she was not required to consent, her oral and written consent
to search could not reasonably be deemed voluntary. To be sure, these factors
are germane to the voluntariness inquiry. In the totality of all the
circumstances, however, we see no basis for concluding that the district court
clearly erred in its consideration of them.
We have repeatedly observed that neither the fact that a person is in
custody nor that she has been subjected to a display of force rules out a finding
of voluntariness. See id.; accord Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 129 (holding that
handcuffing and display of guns by five or six officers to effectuate arrest did
not render consent to search involuntary); United States v. Kon Yu-Leung, 910
F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] finding of coercion [does not] follow from the
fact that [the defendant] was handcuffed.”); Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d at 57-58(noting that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] was in custody for five hours did
28
not compel a finding that his consent was involuntary”). Here, sufficient time
elapsed between the agents’ initial entry into Marin’s room and her consent to
search for Marin to calm down after her initial, brief struggle with O’Connor
and Samilo. Indeed, it is undisputed from the record that Marin was calm
when agents asked her consent to search. Moreover, Marin did not allege
before the district court “that the agents used intimidating or coercive
language or gestures” in seeking her consent. Granted, agents did not
explicitly advise her that she could decline. “While knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account,” however, “the
government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 129-30(finding valid consent where defendant had been subjected to use of force, was
handcuffed, and was asked by agents “‘Do you mind if we search?’” and
defendant responded “‘Sure, go ahead’”). Knowledge of the right to refuse, as
we have said, “is not a requirement to a finding of voluntariness.” Garcia, 56
F.3d at 422.
Here, Marin did not hesitate when the agents requested her consent but
immediately gave them permission to search her bags, volunteering that the
29
bags had already been searched at the airport. Marin may have hoped to
dissuade the officers from searching with this information, or she may have
been confident that the heroin, secreted in carefully constructed perfume
canisters, would be overlooked, given that it had not been found before. At
any rate, the district court did not clearly err in considering that Marin’s
ready acquiescence to the agents’ first request and her volunteered
information that her bags had already been searched weighed against the
claim that “her free will was overcome.” Marin Moreno, 2009 WL 454548, at
*7.
Marin points, finally, to the absence of Miranda warnings and to Agent
O’Connor’s statement to her that “if there’s something here that you want to
tell us or if there’s something here that shouldn’t be here it’s in your best
interest to tell us now while you can before we find it on our own.” She argues
that these factors strongly militate against the district court’s conclusion that
her consent was not coerced. Miranda warnings, however, are not a
prerequisite to obtaining a valid consent to search. See United States v.
Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding unpersuasive “[t]he
argument that Miranda warnings are a prerequisite to an effective consent to
search”). And although Marin argues that O’Connor’s statement effectively
30
communicated “that refusing to consent would be futile, and such statements
are . . . inherently coercive,” the district court’s factual findings are to the
contrary.
Agent Aceves carefully explained to Marin that the agents were seeking
her consent. In the district court’s words, “[a]fter providing a written Spanish
translation of the [consent] form to the defendant, and reading the form to her
in Spanish, Agent Aceves asked her if she understood the form, and she
replied that she did.” Marin Moreno, 2009 WL 454548, at *3. These actions
clearly communicated that Marin’s consent mattered -- so that the agents did
not intend then and there to conduct a search regardless of her response.14
And as Agent Aceves testified, when Marin was asked for consent to search,
“[s]he agreed,” and agreed immediately.
In sum, we find no clear error in the district court’s holding that Marin’s
consent to search her motel room was voluntarily given. Marin provided oral
consent without hesitation. She was then provided with a consent form that
expressly noted she had been asked to permit a search of her luggage and
room; that affirmed she had not been threatened or forced in any way; and
Agent Aceves testified that, pursuant to DEA procedure, if Marin had
14
refused consent, the agents would have sought a search warrant -- a warrant for
which they clearly had probable cause.
31
that concluded by stating that she freely consented. This form was not only
provided to her in writing, but was also read to her aloud. Marin affirmed
that she understood the form and she signed it without pause. As the district
court found, the atmosphere of the encounter between the agents and Marin
was not unduly hostile, and Marin has not alleged that the agents acted in an
intimidating or coercive manner in eliciting her consent. There is simply no
basis on this record to conclude that the district court clearly erred in holding
that Marin’s consent was voluntary.
CONCLUSION
We find no clear error in the district court’s ruling that the agents’
warrantless entry into Marin’s motel room was justified by exigent
circumstances. We similarly conclude that the district court did not clearly err
in determining that Marin’s consent to search her motel room and her luggage
was voluntarily given. We have considered all of Marin’s remaining
arguments and have rejected them as without merit. For the foregoing
reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
32
SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The majority has conducted a careful analysis in a difficult and highly fact-
specific case. Nonetheless, I find that I cannot join it in concluding that there was
no clear error in the district court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the
agents’ warrantless entry into Marin’s motel room. Because I do join, however, in
the majority’s determination that Marin’s consent to search was voluntary, and
because I conclude that the taint created by the unlawful entry was dissipated, I
concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the district court.
The “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), applies equally to warrantless searches of a motel
room, see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). A warrantless search that
is supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances will overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002)
(per curiam). Although exigency in “the need to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless
search,” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011), the government bears “a
heavy burden” when attempting to demonstrate that such circumstances were
present when the search took place, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50
(1984).
The majority here concludes that Marin’s attempt to slam her motel room
door upon seeing O’Connor created an urgent need for the agents to enter the room
to ensure that Marin would not dispose of the drugs that the agents had probable
cause to believe were inside. I agree the agents had probable cause to believe that
Marin was a drug courier in possession of over a kilogram of heroin.1 I also agree
that Marin’s actions upon seeing, unexpectedly, O’Connor standing with the
chambermaid informs our analysis of whether an exigency existed. I am troubled,
however, that the majority’s finding of exigency ultimately appears to turn on the
speed and force with which Marin attempted to close her door when she saw
O’Connor, an un-uniformed stranger, standing there.
As the majority notes, “[t]he core question is whether the facts, as they
appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to
believe that there was an urgent need to . . . take action.” United States v. Klump,
536 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2008). As I see it, the determinative “moment of
entry” in this case occurred when O’Connor “put [her] hand up to block” Marin from
closing the door. Tr. of Suppression Hr’g at 96:3-4; see also Maj. Op. at 8. As the
Supreme Court recently cautioned in Kentucky v. King, however, even if an
occupant has opened the door to law enforcement officers, that “occupant need not
allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at
any time.” 131 S.Ct. at 1862. When the housekeeper knocked and Marin began to
open the door, Marin had no obligation to speak to O’Connor; nor was she required
to allow O’Connor to enter her room.
1
Probable cause alone, of course, does not establish exigency. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753(recognizing that “no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a
serious crime has been committed”).
2
What, then, were the exigent circumstances that justified the agents’
warrantless entry as Marin shut the door? The majority asserts that Marin created
an exigency by “suddenly and forcefully attempting to slam shut a door she had just
opened.” Maj. Op. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). It characterizes
Marin’s actions as “the verbal, visual, or aural equivalent of ‘The Police are here,
destroy the drugs.’” Maj. Op. at 25 (quoting United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d
563, 577 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., dissenting)).
With respect, I disagree. Under Kentucky v. King, as one of our sister
circuits has held, a hotel guest like Marin was “within [her] bounds in [her] attempt
to close the door” on O’Connor and the chambermaid. United States v. Ramirez,
676 F.3d 755, 762 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing Kentucky v. King and making
alternative finding that suspect’s attempt to close hotel door on officers waiting
outside was insufficient to establish exigent circumstances justifying warrantless
entry). “That [she] did so, without more, does not bolster the claim that it was
reasonable to conclude that the destruction of evidence was imminent.” Ramirez,
676 F.3d at 762. I am concerned that the majority’s rationale here could be invoked
“whenever probable cause exists that readily disposable drugs are in the home” and
a defendant acts in an abrupt or uncivil manner in denying entry to law
enforcement officers. Chambers, 395 F.3d at 576 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
Further, I question whether the circumstances in this case, as they appeared
when O’Connor forcibly entered Marin’s room, provided an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that Marin understood the stranger at her door to be a law
3
enforcement agent. If not, it is difficult to interpret Marin’s closing the door with
force as signaling her resistance to the police and foretelling an attempt to destroy
evidence. Indeed, O’Connor was dressed in plain clothes – an untucked short-
sleeved white golf shirt and green capri slacks. When Marin attempted to slam the
door, O’Connor had not identified herself as “police.” And although O’Connor wore
a two-and-one-half inch gold badge on her hip, there was no testimony to suggest
that Marin had looked down toward the badge or that the badge was even visible
given the position of the parties and the matter of seconds between when Marin
opened the door and when she attempted to close it.2 For these reasons, I harbor
serious doubts that exigent circumstances justified the agents’ warrantless entry,
and I believe the district court clearly erred in its analysis concluding to the
contrary.
Despite my departure from its reasoning on the lawfulness of the entry, I join
in the majority’s result because I conclude that the government has shown that
Marin’s subsequent consent to search the room was both voluntary and also
“sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.”
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975).
We have observed that “[w]hen a consent to search follows an illegal entry,”
the government must “show more than the voluntariness of the consent; it must
also demonstrate that the taint of the initial entry has been dissipated in order to
2
The record does not reflect whether the housekeeper was standing next to or in front of
O’Connor or whether O’Connor’s untucked shirt obscured her badge from view.
4
admit evidence seized following the illegal entry.” United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d
119, 132 (2d Cir. 2006). For the reasons set forth by the majority, I find no clear
error in the district court’s ruling that Marin’s consent to search her motel room
was voluntarily given. The separate but overlapping taint inquiry, which (in light
of its ruling on the alleged exigency) the district court did not reach, presents a
more difficult question.
In assessing “whether the taint of [an] illegal entry was sufficiently
diminished, we consider four factors: whether a Miranda warning was given, the
‘temporal proximity’ of the illegal entry and the alleged consent, ‘the presence of
intervening circumstances,’ and ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.’” United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04). Here, the record reveals the following.
First, Marin did not receive a Miranda warning in the interim between the
entry and the search of her suitcases, and the record provides no reason for the
omission.3 The rights secured by Miranda were not fully explained through the
consent form. But second, approximately fifteen minutes had elapsed between the
very brief, tumultuous entry and Marin’s consent to search. The record reflects that
during this interlude Marin had “calmed down.” Tr. of Suppression Hrg. at 35:20.
Although handcuffed, she engaged in conversation in Spanish with Agent Aceves
during this time. Marin Moreno, 2009 WL 454548, at *3. Third, when Aceves
3
In addition, O’Connor told Marin that “if there’s something here that you want to tell us or
if there’s something here that shouldn’t be here it’s in your best interest to tell us now while you can
before we find it on our own.” Tr. of Suppression Hrg. at 104:12-15; Maj. Op. at 30.
5
requested Marin’s consent to search the room, she “agreed immediately.” Tr. of
Suppression Hr’g at 36:7. In addition, she told the agents that she had been
searched by customs officials upon her arrival at the airport that morning –
implying, it seems, that she was not concerned that the agents would find any item
of consequence, and underscoring the voluntariness of her consent. Tr. of
Suppression Hr’g at 36:9-10. And, after Aceves translated its contents into Spanish
for her, line by line, and wrote the Spanish version out for her on the forms, Marin
agreed to and did sign a printed consent to search. The form stated, inter alia, “I
have not been threatened, nor forced in any way,” and “I freely consent to this
search.” Suppression Hr’g, Gvt. Ex. 1. Finally, our panel has been directed to no
evidence suggesting that the agents’ conduct in entering or searching was
“flagrantly illegal or fraught with evil purpose.” Oguns, 921 F.2d at 448.
Although the question is close, I conclude that these circumstances,
particularly Marin’s comment about her earlier uneventful passage through
customs, sufficed to “sever the causal connection between [the] entry and [the]
subsequent consent to search.” Snype, 441 F.3d at 135; cf. id. (finding dissipation of
taint where “intervening events,” including the defendant’s written consent to
search, “effectively replaced the fearful atmosphere of the initial forcible entry with
relative calm”).
I therefore concur in the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s
judgment.
6