Gomez Velez v. Holder , 456 F. App'x 48 ( 2012 )


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  •          10-1305-ag
    Gomez Velez v. Holder
    BIA
    A089 013 442
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 24th day of January, two thousand twelve.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                JON O. NEWMAN,
    8                JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    9                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       CARLOS ALBERTO GOMEZ VELEZ,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                          v.                                  10-1305-ag
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _______________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:                  Glenn T. Terk, Wethersfield,
    24                                        Connecticut.
    25
    26       FOR RESPONDENT:                  Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    27                                        General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
    28                                        Assistant Director; D. Nicholas
    29                                        Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of
    30                                        Immigration Litigation, United
    31                                        States Department of Justice,
    32                                        Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Carlos Alberto Gomez Velez seeks review of a March 10,
    6   2010, order of the BIA, denying his motion to reconsider its
    7   July 24, 2009, decision in which it affirmed the April 11,
    8   2008, removal order of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Paul M.
    9   Gagnon.   In re Gomez Velez, No. A089 013 442 (B.I.A. Mar.
    10   10, 2010).   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    11   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    12       We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider
    13   for abuse of discretion.   See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439
    
    14 F.3d 109
    , 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).    As an initial
    15   matter, because the petition for review is timely only as to
    16   the BIA’s 2010 decision, we have jurisdiction to review only
    17   the BIA’s 2010 denial of Gomez Velez’s motion to reconsider,
    18   not the BIA’s underlying dismissal of his appeal.     See
    19   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Nwogu v. Gonzales, 
    491 F.3d 80
    , 84
    20   (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of
    21   Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 90 (2d Cir. 2001).     We conclude that
    22   the BIA did not abuse its discretion in its denial of
    23   reconsideration.
    2
    1       In his motion to reconsider, Gomez Velez argued that
    2   the IJ did not allow him to present evidence in support of
    3   his motion to suppress evidence of his alienage obtained as
    4   a result of his arrest.   He has not explained, however,
    5   before the BIA or this Court, what evidence he would have
    6   presented that might have changed the outcome in his case.
    7   Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
    8   reconsideration on this ground.   See Aslam v. Mukasey, 537
    
    9 F.3d 110
    , 115 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (denying due
    10   process claim because alien “fail[ed] to persuasively argue
    11   that he was prejudiced”); Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 
    588 F.3d 90
    ,
    12   96 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying due process claim because “any
    13   injury suffered as a result has been cured because [the
    14   alien] has been afforded the requisite full and fair
    15   opportunity to litigate the merits of his . . . claim before
    16   the BIA and this Court”); Rajah v. Mukasey, 
    544 F.3d 427
    ,
    17   448 (2d Cir. 2008) (in the absence of “unresolved issues,”
    18   an IJ’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the
    19   petitioner’s removability did not require remand).
    20       Gomez Velez also argued in his motion to reconsider
    21   that the BIA improperly engaged in fact-finding by relying
    22   on a declaration he submitted on appeal.   In denying the
    3
    1   motion, the BIA responded that it had not in fact relied on
    2   the declaration, but rather on his statements during the
    3   proceedings before the IJ.     Gomez Velez does not challenge
    4   or even acknowledge the BIA’s response or the fact that the
    5   IJ found the same facts, but simply reiterates that the BIA
    6   erred in relying on his declaration.     Thus, there is no
    7   basis to find that the BIA abused its discretion in denying
    8   the motion to reconsider on this ground.     See Belortaja v.
    9   Gonzales, 
    484 F.3d 619
    , 624 (2d Cir. 2007); Xian Tuan Ye v.
    10   Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    446 F.3d 289
    , 296 (2d Cir. 2006)
    11   (per curiam) (recognizing that the BIA does not overstep its
    12   authority when it relies on facts already in the record).
    13       Finally, Gomez Velez argued in his motion to reconsider
    14   that even if his initial stop was due to a traffic
    15   violation, his subsequent seizure was an egregious violation
    16   of his rights warranting suppression because the Middletown
    17   police officer who arrested him was not authorized to
    18   enforce immigration law.     We have explained that an
    19   egregious constitutional violation will trigger the
    20   exclusionary rule in removal proceedings where, either:
    21   (1) “an individual is subjected to seizure for no reason at
    22   all . . . if the seizure is sufficiently severe”; or (2)
    4
    1   “even where the seizure is not especially severe . . . if
    2   the stop was based on race (or some other grossly improper
    3   consideration).”*   Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 
    461 F.3d 231
    ,
    4   235 (2d Cir. 2006).
    5       Before this Court, Gomez Velez suggests that race may
    6   have played a role in his arrest, pointing to evidence
    7   submitted before the IJ of a pending complaint against the
    8   officer for racial profiling.    However, because Gomez Velez
    9   did not exhaust this issue before the BIA, we decline to
    10   address this argument.    See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of
    11   Justice, 
    480 F.3d 104
    , 122 (2d Cir. 2007).
    12       Although Gomez Velez argues that his arrest was an
    13   egregious violation of his constitutional rights because the
    14   arresting officer did not have authority to enforce
    15   immigration law, he cites no binding or relevant authority
    16   for this proposition.    As the government points out, at
    17   least in some circumstances federal immigration law
    18   contemplates the cooperation of state employees with the
    19   federal government in “the identification, apprehension,
    *
    We have also recognized that exclusion is
    appropriate where the Fourth Amendment violation
    undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.
    See 
    Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235
    . Here, however,
    Gomez Velez has not raised any challenge to the veracity
    of the evidence of his alienage.
    5
    1   detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the
    2   United States.”    8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).   Because Gomez
    3   Velez refers to no relevant facts or law to support his
    4   assertion that the arresting officer was not authorized to
    5   enforce federal immigration law, we cannot find that the BIA
    6   abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider.
    7   See Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    , 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005) (per
    8   curiam).
    9       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    10   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of
    11   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    12   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    13   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for
    14   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    15   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    16   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    17                                 FOR THE COURT:
    18                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    19
    20
    6