Prince v. Astrue , 514 F. App'x 18 ( 2013 )

12-2198
Prince v. Astrue
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of
2 Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood
3 Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
4 City of New York, on the 14th day of March, two thousand
5 thirteen.
6
7 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
8 Chief Judge,
9 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
10 Circuit Judge.
11 ERIC N. VITALIANO,
12 District Judge.*
13
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
15 STEPHANIE PRINCE,
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 12-2198
19
20 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF
21 SOCIAL SECURITY,
22 Defendant-Appellee,
23 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
*
The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, District Judge of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
1
1
2 FOR APPELLANT: MARK SCHNEIDER, Plattsburgh, New
3 York.
4
5 FOR APPELLEES: MICHELLE L. CHRIST, Special
6 Assistant United States Attorney
7 (Stephen P. Conte, Regional
8 Chief Counsel, on the brief),
9 for Richard S. Hartunian, United
10 States Attorney for the Northern
11 District of New York, Syracuse,
12 New York.
13
14 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
15 Court for the Northern District of New York (Homer, M.J.)
16
17 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
18 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
19 AFFIRMED.
20
21 Stephanie Prince appeals from the judgment of the
22 United States District Court for the Northern District of
23 New York (Homer, M.J.) granting the motion for judgment on
24 the pleadings of defendant-appellee Michael J. Astrue,
25 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,
26 affirming the denial of Prince’s claim for disability
27 benefits, and denying Prince’s request for consideration of
28 new evidence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
29 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
30 presented for review.
31
32 Prince applied for disability benefits on January 27,
33 2005, alleging an inability to work due to anxiety,
34 fibromyalgia, migraines, bipolar disorder, and chronic pain.
35 Following hearings in March 2007 and February 2010,
36 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Carl E. Stephen denied
37 Prince’s application because, while several of her
38 conditions constituted severe impairments, she still
39 retained the residual functional capacity to perform
40 unskilled light work. On May 24, 2012, the district court
41 held that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
42 evidence.
43
44 On appeal, Prince argues that the district court erred
45 in upholding the ALJ’s determination that she was neither
46 physically nor mentally disabled.
47
2
1 “When deciding an appeal from a denial of disability
2 benefits, we focus on the administrative ruling rather than
3 the district court’s opinion.” Green-Yougner v. Barnhart,
4 335 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
5 omitted). “In reviewing the district court’s decision, we
6 undertake our own plenary review of the administrative
7 record.” Schall v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir.
8 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A
9 court may set aside the Commissioner’s decision only if it
10 is based upon legal error or if his factual findings are not
11 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128
13 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
14 scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
15 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
16 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal
17 quotation marks omitted).
18
19 The district court properly rejected Prince’s
20 contention that the ALJ erred in not finding that her
21 fibromyalgia constituted a per se disability under Appendix
22 1 of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
23 Appendix 1. “[M]ere diagnosis of fibromyalgia without a
24 finding as to the severity of symptoms and limitations does
25 not mandate a finding of disability[.]” Rivers v. Astrue,
26 280 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Selian v.
27 Astrue, No. 12-871, 2013 WL 627702, --- F.3d --- (2d Cir.
28 Feb. 21, 2013). Furthermore, the ALJ’s residual functional
29 capacity determination, which took into account Prince’s
30 fibromyalgia, was supported by substantial evidence. Drs.
31 Todd D. Daugherty and Edward S. Leib, rheumatologists who
32 first diagnosed Prince with fibromyalgia, noted that
33 Prince’s “joints and muscles are essentially healthy” and
34 encouraged her to pursue employment, recreational activity,
35 and exercise. JA 197. Dr. Nader Wassef observed normal
36 reflexes, a full range of motion, and full strength in
37 Prince’s extremities, and advised her only to avoid any form
38 of “extreme body contact.” JA 237. Similarly, Dr. David G.
39 Welch observed “relatively little physical pathology . . .
40 other than a clear-cut diagnosis of fibromyalgia” and found
41 that Prince had excellent strength, sensation, and range of
42 motion in her core and in all four extremities. JA 307-09.
43
44 Prince argues that the ALJ erred by refusing to give
45 controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Kokernot, a
46 treating physician, who concluded that Prince had extreme
47 limitations in her ability to carry out detailed
3
1 instructions and respond appropriately to workplace
2 pressures, as well as marked limitations in a number of
3 areas. If the ALJ had accepted Dr. Kokernot’s opinion,
4 Prince’s mental impairments would have necessitated a
5 finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
6 Appendix 1, Sections 12.04, 12.06; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a.
7 However, because Dr. Kokernot’s opinion was inconsistent
8 with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ
9 committed no error in rejecting his opinion. See 20 C.F.R.
10 § 404.1527(c)(2). Four other physicians--Dr. Welch, Dr.
11 Abdul Hameed, Dr. Brett Hartman, and Dr. Aaron Satloff–-
12 determined that Prince’s mental limitations did not preclude
13 her from performing all work. An ALJ is not required to
14 accept the opinion of a treating physician over other
15 contrary opinions, if the latter are more consistent with
16 the weight of the evidence. See Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d
17 307, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he opinions of nonexamining
18 sources [can] override treating sources’ opinions provided
19 they are supported by evidence in the record.”); see also
20 Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
21
22 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
23 Prince’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
24 the district court.
25
26 FOR THE COURT:
27 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
28
4