Reynolds v. DeBuono ( 2007 )

06-0283-cv
Reynolds v. DeBuono
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3
4 _______________
5
6 August Term, 2006
7
8 (Argued March 5, 2007 Decided October 31, 2007)
9
10 Docket Nos. 06-0283-cv(L), 06-0284-cv(CON)
11
12 _______________
13
14 Lakisha Reynolds, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others
15 similarly situated, Georgina Bonilla, on her own behalf and on
16 behalf of all others similarly situated, April Smiley, on her own
17 behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Lue
18 Garlick, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
19 situated, Adriana Calabrese, on her own behalf and on behalf of
20 all others similarly situated, Jenny Cuevas, on her own behalf
21 and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Elston Richards,
22 on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
23
24 Plaintiffs-Appellees,
25
26 v.
27
28 Rudolph Giuliani, as Mayor of the City of New York, Jason Turner,
29 as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social
30 Services, Brian J. Wing, as Commissioner of the New York State
31 Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Barbara DeBuono,
32 as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
33
34 Defendants-Appellants.
35
36 _______________
37
38 Before:
39 CARDAMONE, STRAUB, and WALLACE*,
40 Circuit Judges.
41
42 _______________
43
44 Brian J. Wing, former Commissioner of the New York State
45 Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Barbara
46 DeBuono, former Commissioner of the New York State Department of
47 Health (collectively state defendants) appeal from the December
48 14, 2005 final judgment of the United States District Court for
49 the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) enjoining state
1 defendants to, inter alia, supervise New York City officials'
2 compliance with specified obligations under the Food Stamp Act, 7
3 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., and the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13964 et seq.
5
6 Reversed and complaint dismissed.
7
8 Judge Straub concurs in part and dissents in part, in a
9 separate opinion.
10
11 Judge Wallace concurs in a separate opinion.
12
13 _______________
14
15 RICHARD DEARING, Assistant Solicitor General, New York, New York
16 (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Michael S. Belohlavek,
17 Senior Counsel, Division of Appeals and Opinions, James M.
18 Hershler, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New
19 York, New York, New York, of counsel), for State Defendants-
20 Appellants.
21
22 MARC COHAN, Henry A. Freedman Welfare Law Center, Inc., New York,
23 New York (Petra T. Tasheff, Henry A. Freedman Welfare Law
24 Center, Inc., New York, New York; Yisroel Schulman,
25 Constance P. Carden, Randal S. Jeffrey, New York Legal
26 Assistance Group, New York, New York; Scott A. Rosenberg,
27 Christopher D. Lamb, Hwan-Hui Helen Lee, The Legal Aid
28 Society, Civil Division, New York, New York; Kenneth
29 Rosenfeld, Mary Ellen Burns, Northern Manhattan Improvement
30 Corp., New York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-
31 Appellees.
32
33 _______________
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50 _______________
51
52 * Hon. J. Clifford Wallace, United States Court of Appeals for
53 the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:
2 Ordinarily the state and federal governments, under whose
3 parallel jurisdiction we all live, rub along together pretty
4 well. When they conflict, it is unlike when "ignorant armies
5 clash by night" as Matthew Arnold famously phrased it. Instead
6 there is forethought, policy considerations and, as here, legal
7 argumentation. This appeal presents an occasion when the powers
8 confided to the federal courts and those matters reserved to the
9 states conflict. In the shift made ten years ago by Congress
10 from an emphasis on welfare and food stamps to a focus on
11 employment as a solution to long term poverty, the State of New
12 York delegated the transition to the City of New York, but
13 retained the power to supervise the City's administrator of its
14 changing assistance programs. New York City responded to the new
15 mandate by revamping its infrastructure and policies to encourage
16 welfare applicants to find jobs. Undoubtedly, the reforms posed
17 an enormous administrative challenge to the City.
18 In December 1998 seven welfare applicants (together with
19 other class members where appropriate, plaintiffs or appellees)
20 brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf
21 of all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking or
22 will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid or cash assistance
23 at the City's job centers. The complaint was lodged against
24 defendants Rudolph Giuliani, former Mayor of New York City and
25 Jason Turner, former Commissioner of the New York City Department
26 of Social Services (collectively City or city defendants), as
2
1 well as Brian J. Wing, former Commissioner of the New York State
2 Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Barbara
3 DeBuono, former Commissioner of the New York State Department of
4 Health (collectively state, state defendants or appellants), each
5 in his or her official capacity. Plaintiffs alleged that the
6 City engaged in unlawful conduct aimed to discourage and deter
7 plaintiffs from obtaining benefits to which they were entitled
8 and that the state failed to properly oversee and supervise the
9 City's administration of assistance programs.
10 Almost seven years later, the United States District Court
11 for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) awarded
12 plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief, directing city defendants
13 to comply with specified provisions of federal and state law and
14 directing state defendants to supervise the City's adherence to
15 the injunction. Initially all the defendants appealed the
16 judgment, but the City withdrew its appeal prior to oral argument
17 before this Court. We are left then with the state defendants'
18 challenge to the district court's judgment. We agree with
19 appellants' contention that the record before us does not support
20 the imposition of liability on the state or warrant the issuance
21 of a permanent injunction against it.
22 BACKGROUND
23 The Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., and the
24 Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., created cooperative
25 federal-state programs aiming, respectively, to raise nutritional
26 levels and furnish medical care to needy individuals. See 7
3
1 U.S.C. § 2011 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2003). The programs are
2 implemented by state and local agencies under the aegis of the
3 United States Department of Agriculture (food stamps) and the
4 United States Department of Health and Human Services (Medicaid).
5 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (d) (1999); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396c (2003).
6 In 1996 Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
7 Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2003)
8 (Welfare Reform Act), and set in motion dramatic changes in the
9 delivery of welfare benefits nationwide. Notably, the Welfare
10 Reform Act introduced the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
11 program with the express purpose of minimizing dependence on
12 governmental benefits by promoting employment. See 42 U.S.C.
13 §§ 601(a)(2), 602(a) (2003). The new program contained mandatory
14 work requirements and time limits on eligibility for benefits.
15 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii).
16 A. District Court Findings as to City Defendants' Non-Compliance
17 The New York City agency in charge of local implementation
18 of food stamp, Medicaid and cash assistance programs is the Human
19 Resources Administration (city agency). The city agency
20 processed welfare applications at 31 income support centers until
21 1998, at which time it began to convert the income support
22 centers into job centers in response to the new federal policy
23 reflected in the Welfare Reform Act. The aptly named job centers
24 encouraged applicants to find work and required them to undergo a
25 rigorous application process, including interviews with financial
26 and employment planners. Early evidence suggested a "culture of
4
1 improper deterrence" prevailed at the newly converted job
2 centers, which was reflected in a decline in the number of
3 applicants who received benefits from a City facility after its
4 conversion to a job center.
5 In the course of this litigation, the City audited 29 income
6 support and job centers to assess their compliance with federal
7 and state law (September 2000 audit). On the basis of the
8 September 2000 audit and other performance measures, the district
9 court determined city defendants violated various rights secured
10 to plaintiffs by federal law in four ways.
11 First, the City failed to provide a significant portion of
12 eligible applicants with expedited food stamps within the
13 mandated period of seven days. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) (1999);
14 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(3)(i) (2007). Second, although the City was
15 required to make separate determinations with regard to
16 applicants' eligibility for food stamps and Medicaid after their
17 applications for cash assistance were denied, see 7 U.S.C.
18 §§ 2014(b), 2020(i)(2) (1999); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(b)(3) (2007); 42
19 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.906, 435.913
20 (2006), such determinations were made infrequently. Third, half
21 of the withdrawn applicants audited were found to have been
22 improperly withdrawn as a result of the City's mishandling of
23 notices and records. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.913 (2006), 7 C.F.R.
24 § 273.2(c)(6) (2007). Fourth, the City frequently failed to give
25 adequate and complete notices to applicants regarding eligibility
26 decisions, in violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights
5
1 under the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of the
2 regulations. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; 7 C.F.R.
3 § 273.10(g)(1) (2007); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911, 435.912 (2006).
4 B. The State Defendants
5 The Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts authorize the states to
6 vest local agencies with responsibility for day-to-day
7 administration of these benefits programs. See 7 U.S.C.
8 § 2012(n) (1999) (defining State agency to include counterpart
9 local agencies "in those States where such assistance programs
10 are operated on a decentralized basis"); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5)
11 (2003) (requiring each state to designate a "single State agency"
12 to "administer or to supervise the administration of [the
13 State's] plan"). The acts and their implementing regulations
14 make participating states responsible for supervisory tasks,
15 including the development of plans for statewide implementation
16 of the programs, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5),
17 monitoring and evaluation of local agencies' performance, 7
18 C.F.R. § 275.5 (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 435.903(a) (2006), and
19 corrective action to reduce deficiencies in local administration,
20 7 C.F.R. §§ 275.16-.19 (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 435.903(b) (2006).
21 New York State conducts its food stamp and Medicaid programs
22 on a decentralized basis through 58 local services districts --
23 one of which is New York City -- under the supervision of the
24 Office of Temporary Disability Assistance and the Department of
25 Health. It is undisputed that both of these state agencies took
6
1 numerous steps toward improving the City's administration of its
2 benefits programs.
3 C. District Court Proceedings
4 On December 16, 1998 the named plaintiffs brought a putative
5 class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city
6 defendants deterred families and individuals from applying for
7 food stamps, including expedited food stamps, and Medicaid
8 benefits; failed to make separate and timely determinations as to
9 applicants' eligibility for Medicaid, food stamps and cash
10 assistance; and failed to inform beneficiaries regarding the
11 status of their applications. The complaint further asserted
12 that state defendants' failure to properly oversee the City's
13 administration of the food stamp and Medicaid programs violated
14 plaintiffs' rights under the respective acts and under the Due
15 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
16 issued a preliminary injunction in January 1999 requiring the
17 city defendants to comply with the federal and state laws relied
18 on by plaintiffs and enjoining the City from converting income
19 support centers into job centers, pending the district court's
20 approval of a corrective plan relating to the job centers.
21 Reynolds v. Giuliani(Reynolds I), 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 347-48
22 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
23 In May 1999 the district court approved the City's
24 corrective plan and modified the injunction to allow the city
25 defendants to convert three income support centers into job
26 centers. Reynolds v. Giuliani(Reynolds II), 43 F. Supp. 2d 492,
7
1 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). To obtain further relief from the
2 injunction, the district court required city defendants to
3 prepare statistical evidence showing that the improvements set
4 forth in the corrective plan had materialized. Id.5 In July 2000 the district court determined the City's most
6 recent evidence was incomplete and unreliable and denied its
7 motion to vacate the injunction. Reynolds v. Giuliani(Reynolds
8 III), 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In the same
9 decision, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to
10 certify as a class all New York City residents who have sought,
11 are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, or
12 cash assistance at a job center. Id. at 392.
13 At this point in the litigation, plaintiffs' action against
14 state defendants was not being vigorously prosecuted. Before the
15 district court issued the preliminary injunction, plaintiffs
16 conceded that injunctive relief against the state defendants at
17 that time would be premature. Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 340
18 n.7. Indeed, even later, in the preparation of their pre-trial
19 memo, plaintiffs did not assert any claims against the state
20 defendants.
21 As a result, the state defendants moved to dismiss the
22 complaint against them, asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs
23 failed to allege facts on which relief could be granted. In
24 Reynolds III, the district court rejected the state defendants'
25 arguments and denied their motion. 118 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
26 Importantly, the district court held that the state defendants
8
1 were liable on a theory of non-delegable duty, under which theory
2 the City's violations gave rise, by operation of law, to
3 corresponding claims against the state defendants. Id. at 386.
4 In February 2001 plaintiffs consented to vacatur of that
5 portion of the preliminary injunction that stayed the conversion
6 of income support centers into job centers. In April 2001 the
7 district court held a bench trial at which it assessed new
8 evidence, including the September 2000 audit. Following its
9 memorandum opinion in February 2005, Reynolds v. Giuliani
10 (Reynolds IV), No. 98 Civ. 8877, 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
11 14, 2005), the trial court issued its final judgment on December
12 14, 2005 enjoining the City to comply with specified provisions
13 of New York State law, the Food Stamp Act and the Medicaid Act
14 and their implementing regulations. Reynolds v. Giuliani
15 (Reynolds V), No. 98 Civ. 8877, 2005 WL 3428213 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
16 14, 2005). The state defendants were directed in the judgment to
17 supervise the City's compliance with the injunction and were
18 assigned specific monitoring duties, such as semi-annual reviews
19 of the City's performance and regular reporting to plaintiffs.
20 The state defendants appeal the district court's December
21 14, 2005 judgment.
22 DISCUSSION
23 Following a bench trial, we review the district court's
24 conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear
25 error. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 267 (2d Cir. 2006). The
26 trial court's grant of a permanent injunction is reviewed for
9
1 abuse of discretion. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d
2 Cir. 2005).
3 I Plaintiffs' Theories of State Liability
4 Following the withdrawal of the City's appeal, state
5 defendants declined to challenge the district court's conclusion
6 that the city defendants violated the Food Stamp and Medicaid
7 Acts or to dispute its holding that certain provisions of these
8 acts give rise to federal rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C.
9 § 1983. In short, state defendants maintain that whatever injury
10 plaintiffs have suffered as a result of a violation of their
11 rights under these Acts is a subject for redress from the City of
12 New York. Hence, the single question remaining before us is
13 whether state defendants are liable to plaintiffs for the city
14 defendants' violations of the Food Stamp Act, Medicaid Act, their
15 implementing regulations or the Due Process Clause of the
16 Fourteenth Amendment.
17 As numerous theories of liability against the state have
18 appeared in the course of this litigation, we pause to clarify
19 those sufficiently presented to warrant review. First, we note
20 plaintiffs' cause of action was asserted and defended on appeal
21 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court's description of the
22 complaint as asserting private rights of action in a different
23 legal context does not accord with our reading of plaintiffs'
24 complaint. In both its preliminary and jurisdictional
25 statements, the complaint makes clear that plaintiffs intended to
26 bring this action under § 1983. In their appeal brief,
10
1 plaintiffs proffer no argument as to a separate vehicle for their
2 claims, except one stray assertion that the state's duty to
3 supervise is enforceable outside § 1983. Accordingly, we proceed
4 to assess the state defendants' liability under § 1983.
5 The first theory proposed by plaintiffs, but never explored
6 by the district court, was not preserved on appeal. We have
7 already observed that the Food Stamp Act, Medicaid Act and their
8 implementing regulations outline a state's supervisory duties.
9 Plaintiffs suggested in district court that these statutory
10 provisions gave them rights to supervision enforceable against
11 the state defendants. On appeal, however, plaintiffs made no
12 effort to anchor liability on these supervision-specific
13 provisions and labeled "irrelevant" appellants' argument that 42
14 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) does not create privately enforceable rights
15 of action. Accordingly, we think a theory of plaintiffs having
16 private rights of action against the state under the Food Stamp
17 Act and the Medicaid Act has been abandoned.
18 A second theory plaintiffs assert to hold state defendants
19 liable received passing attention from the district court. Under
20 Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
21 658 (1978), state defendants may be liable when a state policy or
22 custom results in the violation of plaintiffs' federal rights.
23 Plaintiffs maintain the state's failure adequately to supervise
24 city defendants is persuasive evidence of such a policy or
25 custom.
11
1 A third theory, one which was adopted by the district court,
2 grounds the state defendants' liability in their non-delegable
3 duty to ensure the welfare programs are administered in
4 compliance with federal law. By this logic, a state may delegate
5 day-to-day administration to local entities, but it remains
6 legally liable to plaintiffs for any non-compliance by its
7 delegatee. We turn now to assess the second and third theories
8 of liability in the context of § 1983 jurisprudence.
9 II Liability Under Monell
10 In Monell, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that
11 municipalities were liable under § 1983 to be sued as "persons"
12 within the meaning of that statute, when the alleged unlawful
13 action implemented or was executed pursuant to a governmental
14 policy or custom. 436 U.S. at 691, 694; see also City of Canton
15 v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Section 1983 provides in
16 relevant part
17 Every person who, under color of any statute,
18 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . .
19 subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
20 citizen of the United States . . . to the
21 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
22 immunities secured by the Constitution and
23 laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
24 an action at law, suit in equity, or other
25 proper proceeding for redress.
26
27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of the statute's legislative history
28 and language, Monell reasoned that § 1983 rejects the imposition
29 of vicarious liability on a municipality for the torts of its
30 employees as incompatible with § 1983's causation requirement.
31 436 U.S. at 691-94; see also City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385
12
1 ("Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach
2 under § 1983."); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
3 122 (1987); Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,
4 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
5 An official capacity suit against a public servant is
6 treated as one against the governmental entity itself. Monell,
7 436 U.S. at 690 n.55; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
8 (1985). Thus, a state official may be sued in his or her
9 official capacity for injunctive or other prospective relief, but
10 only when the state itself is the moving force behind the
11 deprivation. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 169; Huminski v. Corsones,
12 396 F.3d 53, 70 (2d Cir. 2005).
13 A. Applicability of Monell
14 Plaintiffs contend Monell's policy or custom requirement and
15 its concomitant bar on respondeat superior liability are not
16 applicable to them because they seek prospective relief only.
17 They cite Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1989), which
18 held that Monell did not govern an action for prospective relief
19 against a county that enforced unconstitutional laws. Id. at
20 250. Chaloux is distinguishable from our case insofar as it
21 dealt with a municipality's liability for state policy -- what
22 one scholar coined "respondeat inferior liability," David J.
23 Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the
24 Constitution, 115 Yale L. J. 2218, 2236 (2006) -- rather than a
25 supervisor's responsibility for the actions of subordinates.
26 Monell did not address directly this application of vicarious
13
1 liability and it is not relevant to the case at bar. See id.;
2 see also Chaloux, 886 F.2d at 251.
3 To the extent Chaloux proposes to exempt all claims for
4 prospective relief from Monell's policy or custom requirement, we
5 are not persuaded by its logic. Monell draws no distinction
6 between injunctive and other forms of relief and, by its own
7 terms, requires attribution of misconduct to a municipal policy
8 or custom in suits seeking monetary, declaratory or injunctive
9 relief. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see Dirrane v. Brookline Police
10 Dep't, 315 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2002); L.A. Police Protective
11 League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher,
12 J., concurring) ("Monell . . . simply holds that a municipality
13 may not be sued at all unless the challenged conduct represents
14 the official policy or custom of the municipality.").
15 We join several of our sister circuits in adopting the view
16 that Monell's bar on respondeat superior liability under § 1983
17 applies regardless of the category of relief sought. See
18 Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 468
19 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating predominant but not unanimous view that
20 Monell's holding applies to claims seeking injunctive relief);
21 accord Dirrane, 315 F.3d at 71 & n.4 (collecting cases).
22 B. Failure to Supervise Claim
23 Municipal liability in Monell was based on the city's
24 affirmative conduct, that is, its official policy requiring
25 pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such
26 leaves were medically necessary. 436 U.S. at 660-61.
14
1 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has left a narrow opening for
2 § 1983 claims like the one we address here seeking liability
3 based not on affirmative conduct but on a government official's
4 failure to act. See, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387-92;
5 id. at 394-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
6 part) ("Where . . . a claim of municipal liability is predicated
7 upon a failure to act, the requisite degree of fault must be
8 shown by proof of background events and circumstances which
9 establish that the 'policy of inaction' is the functional
10 equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the
11 Constitution.").
12 Specifically, Monell's policy or custom requirement is
13 satisfied where a local government is faced with a pattern of
14 misconduct and does nothing, compelling the conclusion that the
15 local government has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its
16 subordinates' unlawful actions. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
17 Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (noting municipal liability may
18 attach where policy maker acquiesces in longstanding practice
19 that constitutes "standard operating procedure" of local
20 government); Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir.
21 2006). Such a pattern, if sufficiently persistent or widespread
22 as to acquire the force of law, may constitute a policy or custom
23 within the meaning of Monell. 436 U.S. at 690-91; Jeffes v.
24 Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000); Turpin v. Mailet, 619
25 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1990).
15
1 It follows therefore that a government supervisor who fails
2 to take obvious steps to prevent manifest misconduct is subject
3 to suit under § 1983 in certain, limited circumstances. See City
4 of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. In City of Canton, the Supreme Court
5 held a city's failure to train its subordinates satisfies the
6 policy or custom requirement only where the need to act is so
7 obvious, and the inadequacy of current practices so likely to
8 result in a deprivation of federal rights, that the municipality
9 or official can be found deliberately indifferent to the need.
10 Id. at 390.
11 Although City of Canton addressed a claim of a failure to
12 train, the stringent causation and culpability requirements set
13 out in that case have been applied to a broad range of
14 supervisory liability claims. See, e.g., Amnesty, 361 F.3d at15 127 (failure to supervise); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d
16 1342, 1354 (6th Cir. 1994) (failure to discipline). In Walker v.
17 City of N.Y., 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992), we outlined
18 the requirements that must be met before a local government or
19 official's failure to act amounts to deliberate indifference.
20 Plaintiffs are required to submit evidence that defendants knew
21 to a moral certainty that the City would confront a given
22 situation; the situation presented the City with a difficult
23 choice or there was a history of its mishandling the situation;
24 and the wrong choice by the City would frequently cause the
25 deprivation of plaintiffs' rights. Id.16
1 Walker, which decided an appeal from a dismissal on the
2 pleadings, is best understood as establishing the circumstances
3 that give rise to a defendant supervisor's duty to act or, more
4 precisely, the circumstances under which a supervisor's failure
5 to act triggers liability under § 1983. See id. at 294-95, 297-
6 98. At later stages of litigation, a plaintiff must establish
7 also that defendant breached its duty to act by failing to make
8 meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs.
9 See Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 129-30 & n.10 (requiring plaintiffs to
10 furnish evidence that training program was actually inadequate);
11 Vann v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing
12 inference of deliberate indifference where repeated complaints
13 are followed by no meaningful attempt to investigate or forestall
14 incidents).
15 Here, the state did respond to the City's non-compliance,
16 and so plaintiffs faced a heavy burden of proof in showing that
17 the state's response was so patently inadequate to the task as to
18 amount to deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Sarus v. Rotundo,
19 831 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring proof that failure to
20 supervise was severe); Young v. City of Providence ex rel.
21 Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[A] training program
22 must be quite deficient in order for the deliberate indifference
23 standard to be met: the fact that training is imperfect or not
24 in the precise form a plaintiff would prefer is insufficient to
25 make such a showing."). Such inadequacy must reflect a
26 deliberate choice among various alternatives, rather than
17
1 negligence or bureaucratic inaction. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475
2 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). Further, as plaintiffs in the case at
3 hand challenge a many-layered supervisory program spanning
4 several years -- rather than an isolated incident of non-
5 supervision -- they are required to identify with specificity the
6 inadequacies giving rise to their claim. Cf. Amnesty, 361 F.3d
7 at 127 n.8, 128 (not requiring plaintiff to specify obvious
8 supervisory deficiency based on allegation that chief passively
9 witnessed police brutality).
10 Plaintiffs must prove in the end that the state defendants'
11 inadequate supervision actually caused or was the moving force
12 behind the alleged violations. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
13 312, 326 (1981); see also City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
14 808, 823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (requiring at minimum an
15 "affirmative link" between policy and alleged violations); City
16 of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he identified deficiency . . .
17 must be closely related to the ultimate injury."); Zahrey v.
18 Coffee, 221 F.3d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing causation as
19 an element that must be proved to hold a municipality liable
20 under § 1983).
21 In sum, plaintiffs' claims against state defendants are
22 governed by Monell's policy or custom requirement, which
23 obligates plaintiffs to (1) establish state defendants' duty to
24 act by proving they should have known their inadequate
25 supervision was so likely to result in the alleged deprivations
26 so as constitute deliberate indifference under Walker; (2)
18
1 identify obvious and severe deficiencies in the state defendants'
2 supervision that reflect a purposeful rather than negligent
3 course of action; and (3) show a causal relationship between the
4 failure to supervise and the alleged deprivations to plaintiffs.
5 As we explain in a moment, we do not think plaintiffs
6 successfully discharged that obligation.
7 III Liability Under a Non-Delegable Duty Theory
8 Plaintiffs maintained, and the district court agreed, the
9 Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts imposed on participating states a
10 non-delegable duty to administer the programs in such a manner
11 that any state electing to operate its programs on a
12 decentralized basis may only fulfill its statutory obligations by
13 ensuring compliance by its local agencies. Following this logic,
14 the district court concluded that any violations detected in the
15 City's administration of the programs gave rise, by operation of
16 law, to corresponding claims against the state defendants.
17 Reynolds III, 118 F.3d at 386.
18 This novel theory did not require the district court to base
19 a finding of liability on any identified deficiencies in the
20 state's supervision, to find the state defendants deliberately
21 indifferent to the citizens of New York or constructively
22 acquiescent to the City's misconduct, or to locate a causal link
23 between the state's alleged sins of omission and the alleged
24 violations. In sidestepping Monell's rigorous culpability and
25 causation standards, the district court's holding tumbled
26 headlong into the error warned against by the Supreme Court and
19
1 imposed de facto respondeat superior liability -- a result
2 rejected by Monell -- on the state defendants. See City of
3 Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
4 Plaintiffs' attempt to justify the evasion of Monell's
5 rejection of vicarious liability is wholly unpersuasive.
6 Plaintiffs neither dispute that the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts
7 authorize participating states to delegate the day-to-day
8 administration of the programs, nor challenge New York State's
9 decision to operate on a decentralized basis. Instead, they
10 suggest the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts allow states to delegate
11 only at their peril. Although plaintiffs decline to state the
12 argument so bluntly, and speak instead in terms of "ultimate
13 responsibility," we understand their position to be that the
14 statutes themselves render the states vicariously liable to
15 plaintiffs. We see no support in the language of the Acts or our
16 case law for the proposition that § 1983 claims arising under the
17 Food Stamp or Medicaid Acts are exempt from the standards
18 governing all other § 1983 claims.
19 As a threshold matter, plaintiffs have not provided us with
20 any limiting principle to prevent their non-delegable duty theory
21 from swallowing Monell whole. Neither the assertion that the
22 state was the direct assignee of the task of administering the
23 food stamp and Medicaid programs, nor the amorphous concept of
24 ultimate responsibility, suffices to distinguish our case from
25 countless others in which an employer is charged with certain
26 duties, delegates those duties to his subordinates and remains
20
1 ultimately responsible to his superiors for the performance of
2 the delegated tasks.
3 Plaintiffs seek support for their position in Henrietta D.
4 v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003), where we located a
5 duty to supervise on the part of the state implicit in the
6 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id. at 287.
7 Although the rationale set out in that case might lend support to
8 plaintiffs' non-delegable duty theory in a different context, see
9 id. at 286-87, Henrietta D. is inapposite because it does not
10 address § 1983 liability. Further, that case merely held that
11 supervisory liability was a permissible basis for suit against a
12 state and did not purport to establish a standard to govern its
13 imposition on that basis. See id. at 287.
14 Both the district court and plaintiffs rely on Robertson v.
15 Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992), in which the Fourth
16 Circuit affirmed an injunction ordering the state commissioner
17 responsible for supervision of Virginia's food stamp program to
18 ensure compliance by local agencies. Id. at 532-34.
19 Undoubtedly, Robertson provides a strong endorsement of
20 plaintiffs' non-delegable duty theory but, as appellants'
21 suggest, Robertson's persuasiveness is greatly dampened by its
22 complete silence on § 1983 limitations on municipal liability.
23 Robertson, in turn, draws significantly from cases and
24 legislative history addressing a state's liability, not to
25 welfare recipients, but to the federal agency responsible for
26 national implementation of the food stamp program. See id. at
21
1 533-34; Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir.
2 1984) (holding state liable to United States Department of
3 Agriculture for local violations of Food Stamp Act); California
4 v. Block, 663 F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1981); H.R. Rep. No. 95-
5 464, at 299 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1704, 2235
6 ("The state, however, remains ultimately responsible and is the
7 unit with which the [United States Department of Agriculture]
8 deals."). These sources merely imply that, by private or public
9 arrangement, a supervisor may be held responsible to his
10 supervisor for the shortcomings of his subordinates.
11 The district court's final judgment, insofar as it requires
12 the state defendants to supervise the City without finding how
13 the state defendants have previously failed in this duty,
14 supplies further evidence of the earlier wrong turn in the
15 court's reasoning. The injunction it issued operates as a
16 general caution to do more or do better, thereby imposing
17 prophylactic duties on the state that may or may not be related
18 to the deprivations at bar. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 395
19 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
20 our view neither the district court's reasoning nor its judgment
21 can be squared with controlling § 1983 case law.
22 IV State Defendants Not Liable Under Proper Legal Standard
23 A. Inadequate Supervision
24 Plaintiffs contend state defendants were deliberately
25 indifferent under the test set out in Walker because they had
26 knowledge of an obvious need for supervision and the risk of harm
22
1 to plaintiffs. We do not decide whether plaintiffs succeed under
2 Walker in proving state defendants had a duty to act, nor whether
3 any hypothetical inadequacies in the state's response can be
4 linked to plaintiffs' injury, because plaintiffs cannot prove the
5 state's supervision was patently inadequate.
6 The district court acknowledged the state's various measures
7 to foster compliance by the City including reviews at each of the
8 job centers, issuance of policy directives, and instructions to
9 the city agency to step up its monitoring and reporting on
10 identified areas of non-compliance. Reynolds IV, 2005 WL 342106,
11 at *21. For example, in 2000 and 2001, the Office of Temporary
12 Disability Assistance conducted reviews at all job centers and
13 five income support centers in New York City. The state office
14 reported the results of these reviews to the city agency and
15 required it to submit quarterly reports until all outstanding
16 issues were resolved. On the issue of separate determinations
17 regarding an applicant's eligibility for food stamps, the Office
18 of Temporary Disability Assistance issued a policy directive
19 mandating such determinations be made. When the city agency
20 failed to comply, the office required it to investigate and
21 address the failure, as well as submit a plan for citywide
22 implementation of the state's policy.
23 Similarly, the Department of Health, New York's designated
24 single state agency under the Medicaid Act, responded to
25 plaintiffs' allegations by issuing instructions to local
26 districts to bring them into compliance and worked with city
23
1 defendants to review and approve corrective changes. The
2 Department of Health clarified that applicants were entitled to
3 separate eligibility determinations for Medicaid and required the
4 city agency to monitor referrals for such determinations.
5 Against this evidence of the state's efforts, the plaintiffs
6 note that the United States Department of Agriculture faulted New
7 York State in November 1999 for its lack of effective oversight
8 of the local agencies. We concur with the district court in
9 characterizing the 1999 report as a benchmark against which the
10 defendants' later efforts should be measured. Id. at *10
11 ("[P]laintiffs' reliance on prior reviews captures the world's
12 largest welfare system in a still portrait and overlooks the City
13 defendants' efforts toward compliance."). Later reports from the
14 Department of Agriculture noted efforts and improvements made by
15 New York's Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, while
16 also identifying areas requiring further corrective action.
17 Any inadequacy that may be found in the state's response
18 stands in sharp contrast to the allegations of inaction and even
19 encouragement of misconduct that provide grounds for supervisory
20 liability in the typical case. State defendants did not sit on
21 their hands in the face of an obvious need to act. See Bd. of
22 County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 418 (1997)
23 (Souter, J., dissenting). They did not, as did the municipal
24 defendant in Amnesty, stand idly by, let alone encourage, the
25 City's non-compliance. 361 F.3d at 128; see also Jeffes, 208
26 F.3d at 63 (allowing inference of deliberate indifference from
24
1 evidence that supervisor observed abusive incident with a smile);
2 Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1989); Gutierrez-
3 Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989). In short,
4 there is little evidence showing the state to be deliberately
5 indifferent.
6 Nonetheless, we do not hold that any action taken by a local
7 government insulates it from supervisory liability. If a
8 supervisor's steps are proven so meaningless or blatantly
9 inadequate to the task that he may be said to be deliberately
10 indifferent notwithstanding his nominal supervisory efforts,
11 liability will lie. See, e.g., Vann, 72 F.3d at 1050 (reversing
12 summary judgment against plaintiff in light of evidence that
13 police "paid virtually no attention" to complaints relating to
14 officers with history of abusive conduct); Ricciuti v. N.Y. City
15 Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating
16 dismissal on pleadings where plaintiffs alleged current training
17 was obviously inadequate); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d
18 319, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding deliberate indifference where
19 chief of police conducted superficial investigations of citizen
20 complaints and failed to discipline officers, record complaints
21 or engage in any further review).
22 Here, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the
23 state's phased efforts were meaningless or obviously inadequate,
24 except the fact of the City's continued failure to comply with
25 certain provisions of law. Contrary to the district court's and
26 plaintiffs' suggestion, the extent of state defendants' ultimate
25
1 success in averting injury cannot be the legal measure of its
2 efforts to do so, as such a standard is tantamount to vicarious
3 liability. See Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 130 ("City of Canton
4 unequivocally requires, however, that the fact-finder's
5 inferences of inadequate training and causation be based on more
6 than the mere fact that the misconduct occurred in the first
7 place.").
8 Our view that state defendants' efforts to foster compliance
9 preclude a finding of deliberate indifference finds support in
10 our cases and those of our sister circuits addressing claims
11 against supervisors who tried, but failed, to prevent injury to
12 plaintiffs. See, e.g., Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674,
13 685 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting § 1983 claim where defendant town
14 had investigated complaint, notwithstanding plaintiff's
15 unsubstantiated assertion that town's efforts were disingenuous);
16 Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 125
17 (3d Cir. 2003) (dismissing failure to train claim where some
18 police training was provided absent evidence that such training
19 was so inadequate as to amount to deliberate indifference); Liebe
20 v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
21 county's deliberate efforts to prevent inmate suicides
22 contradicted claim it was deliberately indifferent to them);
23 Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1345 (7th Cir. 1997) ("It is
24 against these 'better or more' training scenarios that the Court
25 warned in City of Canton."); Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869
26 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no deliberate
26
1 indifference where chief of police failed to remove problem
2 police officers from active duty, but sent them to psychologist
3 and monitored their progress).
4 The rationale underlying these cases is clear. A local
5 government's liability under § 1983 must be based on its policy
6 or custom under Monell. Where, as here, that policy incorporates
7 the defendants' deliberate efforts to protect plaintiffs' rights,
8 it cannot, at the same time, be deemed deliberately indifferent
9 to those rights. See Liebe, 157 F.3d at 578. A natural
10 presumption arises in such cases that any supervisory
11 inadequacies are the result of negligence rather than deliberate
12 choice.
13 B. Policy Based on Acquiescence
14 Plaintiffs argue briefly that the state's alleged
15 acquiescence to the City's pattern of misconduct represents an
16 unofficial custom and thus renders the state defendants liable
17 for suit under Monell. To the extent plaintiffs intend their
18 unofficial custom allegation to provide a ground for liability
19 independent of their failure to supervise claim, the former fails
20 for the same reason we rejected the latter. State defendants
21 took affirmative steps to investigate and correct the City's
22 misconduct, including specific directions to the city agency to
23 correct incidents of non-compliance. We cannot conclude the
24 state defendants have tacitly authorized or constructively
25 acquiesced to violations that it has vocally and actively
26 opposed.
27
1 C. Remand Serves No Useful Purpose
2 The district court did not discuss state defendants'
3 liability under Monell. On review of a district court decision
4 that rests on an improper legal standard and omits necessary
5 factual and legal analysis, it is often appropriate to remand the
6 case to the trial court for its reconsideration. See, e.g.,
7 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 472, 475 n.6 (1970). But if the
8 evidence before us admits only a single resolution of the
9 controlling issue, remanding the case serves no useful purpose.
10 See Stetson v. Howard D. Wolf Assocs., 955 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir.
11 1992) (deciding case despite trial court's application of
12 erroneous legal standard where facts adequately supported
13 result); cf. Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 n.3 (2d Cir.
14 1983) (noting that upon discovery of legal error with respect to
15 temporary injunctions, "the appellate court . . . generally will
16 not simply remand to the district court but will act on its
17 own"); accord Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening
18 News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 54, 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1979) (assuming
19 "full power to review" factual record to determine whether legal
20 test not considered by district court was satisfied). Here, "the
21 record permits only one resolution of the factual issue."
22 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982). As
23 plaintiffs cannot prevail on the record before us, we bring this
24 case, now in its ninth year, to a close by dismissing the
25 complaint against state defendants.
28
1 V Injunction Against State Defendants Was Abuse of Discretion
2 Having disposed of the substantive arguments for § 1983
3 liability against state defendants we turn finally to the
4 injunctive remedy the district court imposed.
5 While we recognize that a district court has broad
6 discretion in fashioning equitable relief, such discretion is not
7 boundless and must instead be exercised in light of governing
8 legal principles and is subject to thorough appellate review.
9 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975); Hodge v.
10 Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). Consequently, a
11 grant of injunctive relief may be overturned if it is predicated,
12 as here, on legal error. See Abrams, 719 F.2d at 28.
13 The authority to issue an injunction is an extraordinary and
14 powerful one that is to be used sparingly and cautiously and only
15 in a "clear and plain" case. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378
16 (1976); Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 33 (1850). Even
17 greater caution is appropriate where a federal court is asked to
18 interfere by means of injunctive relief with a state's executive
19 functions, a sphere in which states typically are afforded
20 latitude. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-80; see also Huffman v. Pursue,
21 Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603 (1975) (requiring federal courts to
22 "abide by standards of restraint that go well beyond those of
23 private equity jurisprudence" when asked to enjoin state
24 officials). As Justice Holmes said "no injunction ought to issue
25 against officers of a State . . ., unless in a case reasonably
26 free from doubt . . ." Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S.
291 525, 527 (1926). In such cases, we must keep in mind the
2 "integrity and function" of state institutions, see Knox v.
3 Salinas, 193 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), as
4 well as the delicate balance that must be maintained between a
5 federal court's exercise of its equitable power and a state's
6 administration of its own affairs, see Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-80.
7 Writing for the Supreme Court in Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 528 (1932), Justice Cardozo explained
9 Caution and reluctance there must be in
10 special measure where relief, if granted, is
11 an interference by the process of injunction
12 with the activities of state officers
13 discharging in good faith their supposed
14 official duties. In such circumstances this
15 court has said that an injunction ought not
16 to issue "unless in a case reasonably free
17 from doubt.". . . A prudent self-restraint is
18 called for at such times if state and
19 national functions are to be maintained in
20 stable equilibrium. . . . Our process does
21 not issue unless the path is clear.
22
23 Id. at 60-61.
24 Such federalism concerns underlie the instant litigation.
25 Indeed, they are exacerbated by evidence of the state defendants'
26 efforts to improve the City's compliance with federal law. It is
27 often more difficult to discern a defendant's culpability if he
28 has acted to prevent harm than where he has failed to act at all.
29 Plaintiffs' claim that the state should have supervised more or
30 differently put pressure on the district court to second guess
31 the state's managerial decisions and priorities, a task for which
32 courts are ill-suited. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
30
1 In our view, the district court's decision made light of
2 these considerations, and the permanent injunction it issued
3 against the state reveals a deficit of the caution called for by
4 the authorities just cited. In view of state defendants'
5 affirmative supervisory steps, plaintiffs' inability to show
6 defendants were deliberately indifferent to their needs, and the
7 district court's reliance on a novel and untenable theory of
8 liability, we are compelled to conclude that this case was
9 neither clear nor plain, and certainly not reasonably free from
10 doubt. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in
11 issuing the injunction against state defendants and that portion
12 of the injunction must be vacated.
13 CONCLUSION
14 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
15 district court's grant of an injunction against the state
16 defendants, dismiss the complaint against state defendants, and
17 strike paragraphs 2, 4, 8 and 11 from the district court's
18 December 14, 2005 judgment.
31
1 STRAUB, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
2 When the State of New York accepted federal funding under the Food Stamp Act, 7
3 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036, and the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v, it made a promise to
4 provide residents who cannot afford to pay for food or healthcare with the means to secure these
5 basic necessities of life. Although that promise was technically made to the federal government,
6 it can be enforced to some extent by qualified beneficiaries, upon whom the Acts
7 “unambiguously confer[] [the] right” to receive food stamps and Medicaid assistance in a timely
8 manner. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (requiring such a right to support
9 a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiffs were deprived of that right and thus brought
10 this class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several governmental agencies that design and
11 implement these programs in New York. In doing so, plaintiffs allege that the policies and
12 practices of the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”), the New York State
13 Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”), and the New York State Department
14 of Health (“DOH”) have the effect of preventing needy New York City families and individuals
15 from applying for, and timely receiving, the benefits to which they are entitled. Following a
16 bench trial in April 2001, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
17 (William H. Pauley, III, Judge) granted the plaintiff class declaratory and injunctive relief as
18 against all defendants. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877 (WHP), 2005 WL 342821319 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2005). Only the commissioners of the two state agencies (“State
20 defendants”) have maintained their appeal.
21 Because New York has delegated the day-to-day administration of the food stamp and
22 Medicaid programs to local agencies such as the HRA, see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law, art. 3, the
23 OTDA and DOH did not directly participate in the mishandling of plaintiffs’ applications.
24 Furthermore, plaintiffs have not shown that the State defendants promulgated policies or took
25 other affirmative actions that compelled the HRA to wrongfully withhold benefits. Plaintiffs’ §
1
1 1983 complaint against the State defendants is best construed as a claim, not of malfeasance, but
2 of nonfeasance – or, more precisely, a failure to adequately train and supervise.
3 I concur with my colleagues that a governmental entity’s failure to properly train or
4 supervise may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where that failure reflects a deliberate
5 indifference to the rights of citizens and is closely related to the ultimate injury suffered. See
6 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 391 (1989). To permit claims based upon a failure
7 to act “to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto
8 respondeat superior liability,” id. at 392 – a result that the Supreme Court has specifically
9 rejected, see Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
10 Moreover, such a result would abrogate the language of § 1983, which makes clear that only a
11 person who, under color of law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the
12 deprivation of any rights . . . shall be liable to the party injured,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis
13 added); see Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The doctrine of
14 respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983; there must be
15 some showing of personal responsibility.”). The District Court thus erred when it held the State
16 defendants liable under § 1983 without first determining that their failure to adequately train and
17 supervise amounted to deliberate indifference, and that such failure caused plaintiffs’ injury.
18 While I agree that the District Court’s judgment against the State defendants was
19 premised on legal error, I believe that this error warrants vacatur and remand instead of reversal.
20 As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[w]hen an appellate court discerns that a district court has
21 failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there
22 should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing
23 findings.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982). The only exception to this rule
24 is when “the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.” Id. at 292. This exception
25 should be construed narrowly, since “factfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts,
26 rather than appellate courts.” DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.1 (1974).
2
1 Deliberate indifference and causation are fact-sensitive issues. Furthermore, the facts in
2 this case are extensive and complex, filling thousands of pages of dense reports, declarations, and
3 deposition testimony. My colleagues, perhaps swayed by a sense that this litigation has gone on
4 long enough, have concluded that this case need not drag on longer because the record permits
5 only one conclusion – that whatever their shortcomings, the State defendants were not
6 deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights and did not cause plaintiffs’ injury. Because I do not
7 view the record as so clear-cut and one-sided, I would follow the usual rule and remand for
8 further proceedings. I therefore dissent in the result.
9
10 I.
11 I shall begin with the fault element of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. In Canton, the Supreme
12 Court explained that a governmental entity’s “failure to provide proper training may fairly be said
13 to represent a policy for which [it] is responsible,” where “in light of the duties assigned to
14 specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
15 inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of . . . [citizens’] rights, that the policymakers . . .
16 can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” 489 U.S. at 390.
17 We have previously distilled Canton’s explanation of deliberate indifference into three
18 concrete requirements, which apply to inadequate training and inadequate supervision claims
19 alike. See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
20 961, 972 (1993). “First, the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows ‘to a moral certainty’
21 that her employees will confront a given situation.’” Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10).
22 “Second, the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult
23 choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of
24 employees mishandling the situation.” Id. “Finally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong
25 choice by the . . . employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s . . . rights.” Id. at
26 298.
3
1 Citing this Court’s decision in Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 1342 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983), the State defendants argue that the Walker
3 requirements should be applied more strictly in this case because their power over the local
4 agencies “is far less than the degree of control typically found in supervisor-subordinate
5 relationships within a single agency or institution.” In particular, the State defendants point out
6 that under the scheme established by the New York Social Services Law, they lack the authority
7 to dictate the size or composition of any local agency’s staff.
8 In Doe, the plaintiff claimed to have suffered continuous abuse at the hands of her foster
9 father and brought a § 1983 action against the agency charged with supervising her foster care.
10 649 F.2d at 136-37. The plaintiff asserted that “the agency’s failure to supervise her placement
11 adequately and to report her situation to the New York City Department of Social Services as a
12 suspected case of child abuse led to the continuation of her mistreatment in the home.” 649 F.2d
13 at 137. In analyzing deliberate indifference in that context, we observed that the foster care
14 agency’s relationship to the families it licensed differed in two key respects from the normal
15 supervisor-subordinate relationship within a single institution. Id. at 142. First, unlike
16 institutional administrators, who “can readily call in subordinates for consultation” and “give
17 strict orders with reasonable assurance that their mandates will be followed,” the foster care
18 agency “had to rely upon occasional visits for its information gathering, and its relationship to the
19 foster family was less unequivocally hierarchical.” Id. Second, “given its goal of approximating
20 a normal family environment for foster children,” the foster care agency understandably “felt
21 constrained to respect the foster family’s autonomy and integrity and pressured to minimize
22 intrusiveness.” Id. As the State defendants here emphasize, we noted that these differences
23 tended to “suggest that deliberate indifference ought not to be inferred from a failure to act as
24 readily as might be done in the [normal institutional] context, since in the foster care situation,
25 there are obvious alternative explanations for a family being given the benefit of the doubt and
26 the agency refusing to intervene.” Id.4
1 Our analysis did not end there, however. We went on to recognize that “[i]n other cases,
2 defendants have been ‘charged with knowledge’ of unconstitutional conditions when they
3 persistently violated a statutory duty to inquire about such conditions and to be responsible for
4 them.” Id. at 145 (citing United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975);
5 Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972)). We
6 explained that “[t]hese cases are best understood not as imposing strict liability under section
7 1983 for failure to perform statutory duties, but as inferring deliberate unconcern for plaintiffs’
8 welfare from a pattern of omissions revealing deliberate inattention to specific duties imposed for
9 the purpose of safeguarding plaintiffs from abuse.” Id.; see also Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 832 n.31.
10 The foster care agency had “a strict duty,” imposed on it by state law, “to report all suspected
11 cases of child abuse to the Department of Social Services.” Doe, 649 F.2d at 145. We
12 determined that if the agency persistently failed to carry out that statutory duty, it could be held
13 liable under § 1983, notwithstanding its imperfect knowledge of the situation and limited control
14 over the foster family. See id. at 146.
15 A state is free not to participate in the “scheme of cooperative federalism” established
16 under the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts, but if it decides to join, “it must comply with federal
17 requirements if it is to assure the continued availability to it of federal funds to defray a part of
18 the total expense of assisting its needy citizens.” Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.
19 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Acts impose a
20 number of specific, binding obligations on participating states for the benefit of applicants. For
21 instance, the Food Stamp Act provides that each state, inter alia:
22 (1) “shall provide timely, accurate, and fair service to applicants for, and
23 participants in, the food stamp program,” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(i);
24 (2) “shall permit an applicant household to apply to participate in the program
25 on the same day that the household first contacts a food stamp office in
26 person during office hours,” id. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii);
27 (3) “shall consider an application that contains the name, address, and
28 signature of the applicant to be filed on the date the applicant submits the
29 application,” id. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iv);
5
1 (4) “shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant
2 household by way of verification of income . . . so as to complete
3 certification of and provide an allotment retroactive to the period of
4 application to any eligible household not later than thirty days following
5 its filing of an application,” id. § 2020(e)(3); and
6 (5) “shall . . . provide coupons no later than 7 days after the date of application
7 to any household which [qualifies for expedited food stamp service],” id. §
8 2020(e)(9)(A).
9 The Medicaid Act similarly mandates that a state’s plan for medical assistance “provide that all
10 individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have
11 opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to
12 all eligible individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8).
13 Both Acts permit a participating state to delegate the administration of the assistance
14 programs to local agencies. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n)(1) (Food Stamp Act); 42 U.S.C. §
15 1396a(a)(1) (Medicaid Act). However, “[a] state that chooses to operate its program[s] through
16 local, semi-autonomous social service agencies cannot thereby diminish the obligation to which
17 the state, as a state, has committed itself, namely, compliance with federal requirements
18 governing the provision of the . . . benefits that are funded by the federal government.”
19 Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 1992), cited in Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331
20 F.3d 261, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004).1 In other words, although
1
In Henrietta D., we considered the scope of a state agency’s liability under another
Spending Clause legislation – the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. Observing
that “Spending Clause legislation is ‘much in the nature of a contract,’” we looked to general
principles of contract law to determine the proper remedy. 331 F.3d at 285 (quoting Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)). Applying these principles, we determined that the State of
New York – like any obligor that promises performance in exchange for consideration – was
“liable to guarantee that those it [had] delegate[d] to carry out its programs satisf[ied] the terms
of its promised performance, including compliance with the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 286. We
also noted that “[a] number of non-Second Circuit cases . . . seem to take the view that the state’s
assumption of liability under [other Spending Clause legislation such as] the Food Stamp and
Medicaid Acts renders it liable for violations of those acts by local agencies.” Id. (citing, inter
alia, Robertson, 972 F.2d at 534). Consistent with those cases, we held that the Commissioner
of the New York State Department of Social Services was subject to supervisory liability for
localities’ non-compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 287. We declined to decide “what
factual showing would adequately establish an actionable failure to supervise,” however, as the
issue was not squarely presented. Id.
Here, plaintiffs chose 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the statutory vehicle to enforce their rights to
6
1 administrative duties may be passed down, “ultimate responsibility for compliance with federal
2 requirements nevertheless remains at the state level.” Robertson, 972 F.2d at 533 (internal
3 quotation marks omitted).
4 To discharge this ultimate responsibility, a state that chooses to delegate administrative
5 duties to local agencies must, at the very least, provide those agencies with adequate guidance on
6 the proper procedures for determining eligibility so that qualified applicants receive the
7 assistance they need in a timely manner. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(A) (“[T]he State agency shall
8 establish procedures governing the operation of food stamp offices that the State agency
9 determines best serve households in the State . . . .”); 7 C.F.R. § 272.3(a) (“State agencies shall
10 prepare and provide to staff responsible for administering the Program written operating
11 procedures.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4)(B) (specifying that the state plan for medical
12 assistance must provide “for the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff . . . in the
13 administration of the plan”).2
14 In addition, the state must conduct regular reviews of the local agencies to ensure that the
15 correct procedures are being followed and that the rights of eligible beneficiaries are not being
16 violated. See 7 C.F.R. § 275.5 (requiring the state agency in charge of the food stamp program to
17 conduct Management Evaluation reviews “to measure compliance with the provisions” of Food
18 and Nutrition Service regulations); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.903(a) (mandating that the state
19 agency charged with overseeing the Medicaid program “[h]ave methods to keep itself currently
20 informed of the adherence of local agencies to the State plan provisions and the agency’s
food stamps and Medicaid assistance. Therefore, we need not decide whether a cause of action
exists against the State defendants directly under the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts, or what
standard of fault, if any, would apply to such a hypothetical claim. Section 1983, which sounds
in tort rather than contract, see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 709-10 (1999), demands some showing of fault, and where the claim alleges a failure to
train or supervise, the requisite standard is deliberate indifference. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.
2
HRA submits its proposed local procedures, relating to policy matters as well as
operational issues such as computer support, to the DOH for review and sign-off. The OTDA
likewise has the authority to disapprove of local rules and procedures.
7
1 procedures for determining eligibility”). If deficiencies are discovered, the state must promptly
2 formulate a corrective action plan to address them, and then undertake follow-up measures to
3 ensure that the plan is fully implemented and the identified deficiencies cured. See 7 C.F.R. §
4 275.16(c) (providing that the state agency in charge of the food stamp program “shall ensure that
5 appropriate corrective action is taken on all deficiencies including each case found to be in error
6 by quality control reviews and those deficiencies requiring corrective action only at the project
7 area level”); id. § 275.18(b) (stating that “[p]roject area/management unit corrective action plans
8 shall contain all the information necessary to enable the State agency to monitor and evaluate the
9 corrective action properly”); id. § 275.19(b) (directing the state agency to “ensure that corrective
10 action on all deficiencies identified in the State Corrective Action Plan and Project
11 Area/Management Unit Corrective Action Plan is implemented and achieves the anticipated
12 results within the specified time frames”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.903(b) (requiring that the
13 state agency responsible for the Medicaid program “[t]ake corrective action to ensure [the local
14 agencies’] adherence [to the state plan provisions and the agency’s procedures for determining
15 eligibility]”).
16 As detailed in the following sections, there is evidence in this record indicating that,
17 despite a long history and alarmingly high rate of HRA staff mishandling food stamp and
18 Medicaid applications following the implementation of the Personal Responsibility and Work
19 Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), the State
20 defendants continually failed to provide the training and supervision needed to remedy systemic
21 problems. To point to two examples in particular, the record contains evidence that the State
22 defendants: (A) failed to provide adequate guidance regarding the proper method of processing
23 applications, so as to ensure that applicants’ eligibility for food stamps and Medicaid benefits
24 was determined separately from their eligibility for cash assistance; and (B) failed to adequately
25 review the local agencies and monitor the success of corrective action plans. Although the State
26 defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely for not living up to its statutory
8
1 obligations, Doe teaches that evidence of a pattern of inattention to statutory duties can support
2 an inference of deliberate indifference. 649 F.3d at 145-46. I would therefore remand to allow
3 the fact finder to decide whether that inference should be drawn here.
4 A.
5 As the District Court aptly described it, PRWORA “represent[ed] a legislative sea change
6 in thinking about welfare.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
7 Among other things, PRWORA eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
8 program and replaced it with a new cash assistance program called Temporary Assistance to
9 Needy Families (“TANF”). A central purpose of TANF, as articulated in the statute itself, is to
10 “end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
11 work, and marriage.” 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2). Consistent with that purpose, PRWORA provides
12 that a participating state must “[r]equire a parent or caretaker receiving assistance under the
13 program to engage in work (as defined by the State) once the State determines the parent or
14 caretaker is ready to engage in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assistance under
15 the program for 24 months (whether or not consecutive), whichever is earlier . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
16 602(a)(1)(A)(ii); see also id. § 607 (describing mandatory work requirements).
17 In response to the PRWORA, HRA began converting its “Income Support Centers” into
18 new “Job Centers” in March of 1998. The conversion encompassed much more than switching
19 the sign above the buildings; it entailed a complete overhaul of the application and eligibility
20 determination procedures. Prior to PRWORA, any individual seeking public assistance was
21 provided with a state-approved joint application form for food stamps, Medicaid, and cash
22 assistance. Once the individual completed the application, the application specialist registered
23 the applicant and scheduled an appointment for a full application interview for five to seven days
24 later, or in emergency need cases, for that same day. See Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 335. After
25 PRWORA, the state must first determine that the individual seeking cash assistance is exempt
26 from work activities or ready to engage in work. If the individual is ready to work, then he or she
9
1 must immediately be assigned job search activities and placed on the path towards gainful
2 employment. See id. at 335-36. These new requirements apply only to cash assistance and do
3 not affect the eligibility standards or statutorily-prescribed time frames for providing food stamps
4 or Medicaid. Hence, as a result of PRWORA, cash assistance had to be delinked from food
5 stamps and Medicaid.
6 The Welfare Management System (“WMS”) is a code-driven computer system used to
7 process and track applications at the local centers. Before PRWORA, when an individual
8 applied for cash assistance, WMS automatically enrolled the applicant for a food stamp and/or
9 Medicaid eligibility determination. In an effort to implement PRWORA, the system was
10 changed to require a cash assistance worker to affirmatively input a code into WMS to indicate
11 when an individual is also applying for food stamps or Medicaid, thereby signaling the need for a
12 separate determination. If the cash assistance worker uses the incorrect code and cash assistance
13 is later denied, the application is never reviewed for food stamp and Medicaid eligibility, and it is
14 impossible to detect this error through WMS. Furthermore, even if the cash assistance worker
15 uses the correct code, the denial of cash assistance requires that the entire application be closed in
16 WMS. For a separate determination on food stamp and Medicaid eligibility to be made, the cash
17 assistance worker must make a copy of the application and forward it to the food stamp or
18 Medicaid specialist, who is most likely located in a different office. The specialist must then
19 reenter the information and re-register the application using the original filing date.
20 In January 1999, the District Court found that the staff at the new Job Centers were
21 denying applicants food stamps and Medicaid benefits for failing to comply with PRWORA’s
22 work rules. See id. at 346. The District Court preliminarily enjoined the HRA from converting
23 any more Income Support Centers into Job Centers pending approval of an adequate corrective
24 plan, which was to include, inter alia, “[p]rocedures for processing applications for food stamps
25 and/or Medicaid where applicants fail to comply with work requirements.” Id. at 348.
10
1 Although a corrective action plan was approved in May 1999, see Reynolds v. Giuliani,
2 43 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a November 1999 review by the United States Department
3 of Agriculture (“USDA”) confirmed that there was still a “serious program deficiency” relating
4 to separate determinations. The HRA’s program evaluation of Job Centers and Income Support
5 Centers for the period November 1999 to June 2000 revealed that 96% of cases requiring a
6 separate determination for food stamps were not prepared for transfer to the food stamp office,
7 and that 86% of cases requiring a separate determination for Medicaid did not have a copy of the
8 correct referral form. An audit performed in September 2000 showed that the Job Centers were
9 making separate food stamp and Medicaid determinations “only about 14 percent of the time.”
10 Reynolds, 2005 WL 342106, at *20.
11 Against this backdrop, a fact finder could conclude that the State defendants knew to a
12 “moral certainty” that HRA employees were often entering the wrong code and not referring
13 applications for separate determinations – choices that frequently resulted in the deprivation of
14 beneficiaries’ rights. See Walker, 974 F.2d at 297-98. Despite the urgency of this problem, it
15 appears that as of 2001, when the trial in this case was held, no effort had been made to remedy
16 these problematic aspects of WMS. The February 2001 deposition testimony of Betty Rice, a
17 director within DOH’s Office of Medicaid Management, is revealing. When asked whether it
18 was the case that WMS “closes the application [when cash assistance is denied] and that the
19 Medicaid application has to be re-registered with the original filing date,” Rice replied: “I am not
20 denying that.” When asked whether DOH had a plan to change that feature of WMS, Rice
21 answered: “No, it does not.” Later in the deposition, Rice was questioned about how an
22 applicant who has been denied cash assistance for a reason that requires a separate Medicaid
23 determination can tell whether the necessary referral has been made. Rice responded: “[I]f a
24 person is supposed to have a separate determination, they would be notified on their notice that
25 they are to have a separate determination, and a prudent person I think could determine if in a
26 reasonable amount of time they didn’t get a determination about the separate determination that
11
1 maybe something was wrong and they should look into that.” When pressed about what would
2 happen if an applicant were to inquire and discover that the referral had not been made, Rice
3 stated that “one would expect that [the Medicaid application] would go back to the date that the
4 case should have been referred for the separate determination.” However, Rice also admitted that
5 DOH’s instructions “may be silent on the issue.”
6 As Judge Cardamone points out, the State defendants did take some measures after the
7 initiation of this lawsuit to foster compliance by the HRA. See Reynolds, 2005 WL 342106, at
8 *21. As I read Canton, however, the operative question is not whether the State defendants
9 provided any training at all, but whether the State defendants ignored an obvious “need for more
10 or different training” in light of the duties assigned to the HRA. 489 U.S. at 390 (emphasis
11 added). In my view, a reasonable fact finder could conclude, based upon the above evidence,
12 that the State defendants failed to respond to such a need for more training and corrective action
13 relating to separate determinations, despite their knowledge that the inadequacy would continue
14 to result in violations of beneficiaries’ rights. This evidence counsels remand.
15 B.
16 The record also contains evidence indicating that the State defendants “persistently
17 violated [their] statutory duty to inquire about . . . conditions” at the new Job Centers “and to be
18 responsible for them.” Doe, 649 F.2d at 145. Given the significance of PRWORA’s reforms,
19 one might have expected the State defendants to step up their supervision efforts to ensure that
20 the implementation of those reforms did not affect eligible beneficiaries’ access to food stamps
21 and Medicaid. In its November 1998 review, the USDA discovered exactly the opposite
22 situation – a “lack of effective state agency oversight over the local district offices.” Reynolds,
23 2005 WL 342106, at *12. The USDA found that due to the OTDA’s inadequate supervision,
24 “[s]ubstantial non-compliance with the [Food Stamp Act] and regulations had gone undetected
25 and unaddressed at the local level.” Id. As for the DOH, it acknowledged before the District
26 Court that it did not even know about the HRA’s intention to convert the Income Support
12
1 Centers into Job Centers until early 1998, and did not learn of the complaints regarding the
2 inappropriate denials, withdrawals, and deterrence of Medicaid applications until plaintiffs filed
3 this lawsuit in December 1998. See id. at *14. As Betty Rice put it: “[T]he first we understood
4 that there was a problem were [sic] when things came to light in the newspaper articles.”
5 As noted, in January 1999 the District Court preliminarily enjoined the HRA from further
6 converting its Income Support Centers into Job Centers, finding that the HRA’s administration of
7 the food stamp and Medicaid programs at the Job Centers did not comport with legal standards.
8 Two years later, however, the DOH still had not conducted any on-site reviews of the Job
9 Centers in New York City. The preliminary injunction did prompt the OTDA to conduct reviews
10 of the Job Centers in 2000 and 2001. But as the District Court pointed out in its post-trial order,
11 “reviews were not conducted at regular intervals, and OTDA has no policy regarding how much
12 time may elapse between those reviews.” Id. at *12. Rosella Bryson, a senior OTDA official,
13 was questioned about the agency’s schedule for future reviews during her February 2001
14 deposition. She speculated that “with the current schedule we have,” it would take about three
15 years to complete a round of Management Evaluation reviews – i.e., that each site would receive
16 a review about once every three years.
17 Perhaps more important than conducting regular reviews is following up on reviews to
18 make sure that problems are corrected. There is evidence to suggest that even when the reviews
19 uncovered serious deficiencies, the OTDA made little effort to ensure that corrective action plans
20 were properly implemented. For example, Bryson recounted that during a review of the Waverly
21 Job Center, the OTDA found that personnel were not having discussions with applicants about
22 food stamp eligibility after cash assistance applications were withdrawn. Despite the severity of
23 the problem, the OTDA did not investigate or evaluate the center’s implementation of a
24 corrective action plan for more than a year afterwards. Bryson also acknowledged that the
25 OTDA does not provide written instructions to its staff on how to conduct a corrective action
26 plan review, nor do supervisors discuss any particular center with staff prior to the review. Only
13
1 one OTDA staff member is assigned to a center, and each visit lasts one and a half days. In that
2 short time, the OTDA staff member reviews just five cases and speaks only to the center director.
3 And although the OTDA makes findings based on the corrective action plan review, the HRA is
4 not required to take any action in response to those findings.
5 I believe that the above evidence could “constitute[] incremental documentation of a
6 pervasive pattern of indifference” on the part of the State defendants. Doe, 649 F.2d at 146. I
7 would remand to allow the District Court to decide whether it does.
8
9 II.
10 Demonstrating that a governmental entity was deliberately indifferent to citizens’ rights is
11 not enough to hold it liable under § 1983; the plaintiffs “must still prove that the deficiency in
12 training [or supervision] actually caused” their injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. In other words,
13 the plaintiffs must “prove that the deprivation occurred as a result of a [governmental] policy
14 rather than as a result of isolated misconduct by a single actor.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of West
15 Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2004).
16 The District Court found that the Job Centers were, inter alia: (A) improperly denying
17 applicants expedited food stamps about 57.33 to 67 percent of the time, Reynolds, 2005 WL
18 342106, at *7; (B) making separate food stamp determinations when denying cash assistance
19 applications only sporadically, and making separate Medicaid determinations less than 11 percent
20 of the time, id. at *8; and (C) causing applicants to withdraw applications based on misleading
21 information, which accounted for 45 percent of food stamp application withdrawals and 56
22 percent of Medicaid withdrawals, id. These statistics suggest that the programs’ deficiencies
23 resulted from more than the actions of a few rogue employees. Instead such problems arguably
24 implicate the very policies and practices of the HRA, which the State defendants are responsible
25 for overseeing and correcting.
14
1 As Canton instructs, the proper inquiry in addressing the causation issue is as follows:
2 Would plaintiffs’ injury have been avoided if the HRA had been trained or supervised under a
3 program that was not deficient in the respects identified above? 489 U.S. at 391. “Predicting
4 how a hypothetically well-trained [and well-supervised] officer would have acted under the
5 circumstances may not be an easy task,” but it is one that the “judge and jury, doing their
6 respective jobs, will be adequate to” address. Id. In my view, there is sufficient evidence to
7 present a triable issue on causation. I would therefore let the question go to the District Court,
8 which is intimately familiar with the facts in this case and is more than adequate to the task.
9
10 III.
11 In closing, I reiterate that my aim has not been to show that the State defendants must, or
12 should, be held liable under § 1983, but merely to demonstrate that the record does not foreclose
13 a possible finding of liability by the District Court under the correct legal standards. Granted, six
14 years have passed since the trial, so the existing record may be too stale to support the reentry of
15 a permanent injunction. But whether new evidence should be received is a matter for the District
16 Court to decide, as are the factual issues of deliberate indifference and causation. Because I
17 believe that the record permits more than one resolution of these issues, I would remand.
15
1 Reynolds v. Giulani, No. 06-0283-cv
2 WALLACE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
3 As Judge Cardamone correctly points out in his opinion, Monell v.
4 Department of Social Services bars indirect liability section 1983 claims against
5 state officials. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123,
6 140 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A supervisor may not be held liable under section 1983
7 merely because his subordinate committed a constitutional tort”). I agree with
8 Judge Cardamone that the district court erred by awarding a judgment in the
9 appellees’ favor on these claims, and reversal is required.
10 I recognize along with Judge Cardamone and Judge Straub that, apart from
11 the bar on respondeat superior liability under section 1983, this court has held that
12 “a supervisor may be found liable for his deliberate indifference to the rights of
13 others.” Poe, 282 F.3d at 140. The analysis of Judge Cardamone persuades me,
14 but that issue is not properly before us and we need not pursue it. First, the
15 appellees failed to allege either in their complaint or in the pretrial order that the
16 State appellants acted with deliberate indifference or gross negligence. Second,
17 the district court never made findings to this end. Third, until prompted to do so,
18 the appellees did not address these issues and even tried to distinguish City of
19 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1998), the case on which the deliberate
20 indifference analysis depends. Finally, the deliberate indifference approach fails
21 to provide a coherent account of the district court’s disposition of the various
22 claims in the complaint. It strikes me that we cannot review a case on appeal that
1
1 was not tried in the district court, and I would not now permit appellees to correct
2 on appeal strategic mistakes that they made in the trial court; the issue is forfeited
3 and Monell ends the game. Under these circumstances, I conclude there is no
4 reason to remand and allow appellees to start over with a new game plan.
2