De Souza-De Queiroz v. Barr ( 2019 )

18-2234
De Souza-De Queiroz v. Barr
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
30th day of August, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
PETER W. HALL,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ADEMIR DE SOUZA-DE QUEIROZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 18-2234
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Gerald R. Nowotny, Latin American
Law Center, Canton, CT.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Jennifer A. Singer, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation;
Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior
Litigation Counsel, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Appellant’s appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
Appellant Ademir De Souza-De Queiroz filed a complaint for
injunctive and mandamus relief to stay his removal and compel the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to adjudicate his appeal of
an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his motion to reopen his
removal proceedings prior to his removal. De Souza-De Queiroz
also moved for (1) an emergency stay of removal while he litigated
his immigration case and (2) a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
to prevent his removal while the District Court considered his
stay motion. In July 2018, the District Court denied the motion
for a TRO for lack of jurisdiction. In October 2018, the District
Court also denied the stay motion and dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction. De Souza-De Queiroz appeals the denial of the
TRO and argues that the District Court had jurisdiction over his
mandamus action and motions.
The essence of De Souza-De Queiroz’s action in district court
was to stay his removal pending the BIA’s decision on his motion
to reopen his removal proceedings and to compel the BIA to rule
before he was removed. The BIA has since denied the motion to
reopen following the filing of this appeal. The action and appeal
are therefore moot. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85,
2
91 (2013) (“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’
or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” (some internal quotation
marks omitted)); N.Y.C. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 969
F.2d 1430, 1433 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that an appeal must be
dismissed “even if the case was live at the outset but later events
rendered it moot on appeal”). “When a civil case becomes moot on
appeal from a federal district court, the appropriate disposition
is to dismiss the appeal, reverse or vacate the district court
judgment, and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the complaint.” Id. (quoting Blackwelder
v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal, vacate the judgment, and
remand for the District Court to dismiss the action as moot.1
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
1We note that De Souza-De Queiroz has filed a timely petition for
review of the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. That petition is
pending before this Court. See Dkt. No. 18-3705.
3