Persaud v. Holder ( 2011 )


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  •          10-1963-ag
    Persaud v. Holder
    BIA
    A073 540 452
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 30th day of September, two thousand eleven.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    8                PETER W. HALL,
    9                DENNY CHIN,
    10                    Circuit Judges.
    11       ______________________________________
    12
    13       NAITRAM PERSAUD,
    14                Petitioner,
    15                                                              10-1963-ag
    16                           v.                                 NAC
    17
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
    19                Respondent.
    20       ______________________________________
    21
    22       FOR PETITIONER:               Naitram Persaud, pro se.
    23
    24       FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    25                                     General; Leslie McKay, Assistant
    26                                     Director; Kelly J. Walls, Trial
    27                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration
    28                                     Litigation, Civil Division, United
    29                                     States Department of Justice,
    30                                     Washington, D.C.
    31
    32
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Naitram Persaud, a native and citizen of Guyana, seeks
    6   review of a May 12, 2010, decision of the BIA denying his
    7   motion to reopen his deportation proceedings.     In re
    8   Persaud, No. A073 540 452 (B.I.A. May 12, 2010).      We assume
    9   the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    10   procedural history of the case.
    11       As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review
    12   Persaud’s arguments with respect to the underlying denial of
    13   asylum, because our review is limited to the BIA’s denial of
    14   his motion to reopen, as that is the only order from which a
    15   timely petition for review was filed.     See Ke Zhen Zhao v.
    16   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001).
    17   We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse
    18   of discretion.   See Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d
    19   Cir. 2006).   The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
    20   Persaud’s motion to reopen as untimely.     See 
    id.
       A motion
    21   to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days
    22   after the date on which the final administrative decision
    23   was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened.      See
    2
    1   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).   There is no dispute that
    2   Persaud’s motion to reopen, filed in February 2010, almost
    3   fourteen years after the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of his
    4   asylum application, was untimely.    See id.
    5   A.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    6        The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    7   equitably toll the time period for filing Persaud’s motion
    8   to reopen because he failed to demonstrate that he exercised
    9   due diligence in pursuing reopening based on his claim of
    10   ineffective assistance of counsel.    See Cekic v. INS, 435
    
    11 F.3d 167
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA reasonably found that
    12   other than the vague assertion that Persaud “tried to
    13   contact” his former counsel, Persaud did not recount any
    14   steps he took in pursuing his claim during the nearly
    15   fourteen-year period between the BIA’s decision and his
    16   motion to reopen, and thus failed to demonstrate that he
    17   exercised due diligence in pursuing his claim “during the
    18   entire period he . . . [sought] to toll.”      Rashid v.
    19   Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    , 132 (2d Cir. 2008).     In an affidavit
    20   Persaud submitted before this Court, he asserts that his
    21   former counsel told him that the BIA had not decided his
    22   appeal, and that in mid-2001, he was no longer able to reach
    23   his former counsel.   Persaud does not mention any steps he
    3
    1   took to ascertain the status of his appeal to the BIA during
    2   the more than eight years after he lost contact with his
    3   former counsel, until he discovered, in 2009, that his
    4   appeal had been denied.   In addition, because Persaud’s
    5   affidavit was not submitted to the BIA and is not part of
    6   the administrative record, it is of no moment here.    See 8
    
    7 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(A) (mandating that “the court of appeals
    8   shall decide the petition only on the administrative
    9   record”).
    10   B.   Discretionary Sua Sponte Reopening
    11        In Persaud’s motion to reopen, he requested that the
    12   BIA reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte to allow him
    13   to pursue cancellation of removal and adjustment of status
    14   based on his mother’s approved I-130 Petition.   The BIA, in
    15   its discretion, may grant reopening outside the time
    16   limitations for motions to reopen.   See 8 C.F.R.
    17   § 1003.2(a).   Although we lack jurisdiction to review the
    18   BIA’s discretionary decision not to grant reopening sua
    19   sponte, see Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 518 (2d Cir.
    20   2006), where the BIA declines to reopen sua sponte based on
    21   a misperception of law, we will remand to the BIA, see
    22   Mahmood v. Holder, 
    570 F.3d 466
    , 469 (2d Cir. 2009).     We
    4
    1   have also explained that the BIA has a “duty to ‘consider
    2   the facts of record relevant to the motion’ and provide a
    3   ‘rational explanation’ for its ruling.”   Sheng Gao Ni v.
    4   BIA, 
    520 F.3d 125
    , 129-30 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Melnitsenko
    5   v. Mukasey, 
    517 F.3d 42
    , 50 (2d Cir. 2008)).
    6       Here, the BIA erred in failing to address Persaud’s
    7   request for sua sponte reopening to allow him to pursue
    8   adjustment of status or cancellation of removal.    As the
    9   Government argues, however, remand would be futile because
    10   Persaud is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of
    11   removal and adjustment of status.   Adjustment of status is
    12   available only if, inter alia, “an immigrant visa is
    13   immediately available to [the alien] at the time his
    14   application is filed.”   
    8 U.S.C. § 1255
    (a).   Because
    15   Persaud’s priority date is not current, remand to the BIA
    16   for it to consider whether to reopen his deportation
    17   proceedings to allow him to apply for adjustment of status
    18   would be futile.   See Conteh v. Gonzales, 
    461 F.3d 45
    , 64
    19   (1st Cir. 2006).
    20       Remand for the BIA to consider Persuad’s motion to
    21   reopen sua sponte based on his application for cancellation
    22   of removal would likewise be futile because he is ineligible
    23   for this form of relief. Because Persaud’s proceedings
    5
    1   commenced (and even concluded) prior to the effective date
    2   of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
    3   Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), the provisions regarding
    4   cancellation of removal do not apply to him.     See 8 U.S.C.
    5   § 1229b(b) (setting forth eligibility requirements for
    6   cancellation of removal).     Instead, Persaud was required to
    7   seek suspension of deportation under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1254
    (a)(1)
    8   (repealed in 1996 with the enactment of IIRIRA), but failed
    9   to do so.    Cf. Arenas-Yepes v. Gonzales, 
    421 F.3d 111
    , 116-
    10   17 (2d Cir. 2005).     Accordingly, remand for the BIA to
    11   consider in the first instance whether sua sponte reopening
    12   is warranted in its discretion would be futile.     See Alam v.
    13   Gonzales, 
    438 F.3d 184
    , 187-188 (2d Cir. 2006) (remand is
    14   not required where “there is no realistic possibility that .
    15   . . the IJ or BIA would have reached a different
    16   conclusion”).
    17   C.   Pending Motions
    18        Persaud moves to supplement his brief with evidence
    19   that criminal charges against him were dismissed, which he
    20   contends is relevant to his eligibility for cancellation of
    21   removal.    However, because this evidence is not part of the
    22   administrative record and was not submitted to the BIA it
    6
    1   has no bearing on whether the BIA abused its discretion in
    2   denying his motion to reopen.       See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(A).
    3   Finally, because we deny Persaud’s petition for review on
    4   the merits, we do not reach the Government’s motion to
    5   dismiss based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
    6       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    7   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    8   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    9   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    10   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.      Any pending request for
    11   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    12   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    13   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    14                                 FOR THE COURT:
    15                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    16
    17
    18
    7