Seadinovski v. Holder , 453 F. App'x 118 ( 2012 )


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  • 10-4412-ag
    Seadinovski v. Holder
    BIA
    A079 329 253
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
    York, on the 4th day of January, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    DENNY CHIN,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________
    DEMIR SEADINOVSKI,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                    10-4412-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _________________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                  Andrew P. Johnson, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                  Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
    Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director;
    Roseanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Demir Seadinvoski, a native of Yugoslavia and
    a citizen of Macedonia, seeks review of the October 26, 2010,
    decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen.               In re Demir
    Seadinovski, No. A079 329 253 (B.I.A. Oct. 26, 2010).                      We
    assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history of the case.
    The BIA’s denial of Seadinovski’s motion to reopen was
    not an abuse of discretion.           See Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    ,
    233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).             In denying reopening, the
    BIA   noted    that    Seadinovski     failed     to   submit    an   asylum
    application     with   his   motion    as    required    under    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).       Because Seadinovski fails to challenge
    this dispositive finding of the BIA, he has abandoned the
    issue.    See LNC Invs., Inc. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, N.J.,
    
    308 F.3d 169
    , 176 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002) (“While we no doubt have
    the power to address an argument despite its abandonment on
    appeal,   we    ordinarily    will     not   do   so    ‘unless    manifest
    injustice     otherwise   would   result.’”       (quoting      Anderson   v.
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    Branen, 
    27 F.3d 29
    , 30 (2d Cir. 1994))).             Here, no “manifest
    injustice” results from the denial of Seadinovski’s petition,
    as the relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen
    proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for
    relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for
    relief    and     all     supporting     documentation.”        
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1).         As the plain language of the regulation
    provides, failure to comply with the requirement is a ground
    for denial of the motion.              See Zhen Nan Lin v. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    459 F.3d 255
    , 262 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Lin Xing
    Jiang v. Holder, 
    639 F.3d 751
    , 757 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding
    that it was within the discretion of the BIA to deny a motion
    to   reopen     because    it   was    not   accompanied   by   an   asylum
    application). Because no manifest injustice results, and this
    finding is a dispositive basis for the denial of the motion to
    reopen, we deny the petition for review.              See Steevenez v.
    Gonzales,
    476 F.3d 114
    , 118 (2d Cir. 2007)(denying petition for
    review because petitioner failed to challenge dispositive
    ground for relief).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
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    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in
    this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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