Lin v. Holder , 586 F. App'x 796 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •          13-37
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    A077 297 344
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 16th day of October, two thousand fourteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    8                BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    9                DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       JIAN LING LIN, AKA JIAN LING,
    14                 Petitioner,
    15
    16                       v.                                       13-37
    17                                                                NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _____________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONERS:              Chunyu Wang, Flushing, N.Y.
    24
    25       FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    26                                     General; John S. Hogan, Senior
    27                                     Litigation Counsel; Andrea N. Gevas,
    28                                     Trial Attorney, Office of
    29                                     Immigration Litigation, United
    30                                     States Department of Justice,
    31                                     Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Petitioner Jian Ling Lin, a native and citizen of
    6   China, seeks review of the December 27, 2012, order of the
    7   BIA denying her motion to reopen.       In re Jian Ling Lin, No.
    8   A077 297 344 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2012).       We assume the parties’
    9   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    10   of the case.
    11       We lack jurisdiction to consider whether Lin should
    12   have been granted prosecutorial discretion.       See 8 U.S.C.
    13   § 1252(g); see also Wayte v. U.S., 
    470 U.S. 598
    , 607 (1985)
    14   (observing that “the decision to prosecute is particularly
    15   ill-suited to judicial review”); Gasparian v. Holder, 700
    
    16 F.3d 611
    , 614 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]mmigration statutes do
    17   not confer jurisdiction on [the] court to review acts of
    18   prosecutorial discretion.”).
    19       However, we review the BIA’s denial of Lin’s motion to
    20   reopen for an abuse of discretion.       See Kaur v. BIA, 413
    
    21 F.3d 232
    , 233 (2d Cir. 2005).       Aliens seeking to reopen
    22   proceedings may file a motion to reopen no later than 90
    2
    1   days after the date on which the final administrative
    2   decision was rendered.     8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i);
    3   
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2).     In this case, it is undisputed
    4   that Lin’s 2012 motion to reopen was untimely because her
    5   order of removal became final in 2005.     CAR at 626.     See
    6   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R.
    7   § 1003.2(c)(2).   An untimely motion may be excused if an
    8   alien received ineffective assistance of counsel or
    9   demonstrates changed country conditions.     See Zhang v.
    10   Holder, 
    617 F.3d 650
    , 658 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C.
    11   § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    12       The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it found Lin
    13   failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.         In
    14   order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
    15   counsel, a movant must show that the alien demonstrated
    16   “due diligence” in pursuing her claim during “both the
    17   period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel
    18   was or should have been discovered and the period from that
    19   point until the motion to reopen is filed.” See Rashid v.
    20   Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    , 132 (2d Cir. 2008).
    21       Lin failed to demonstrate due diligence.     Lin argues
    22   that she should have discovered the ineffective assistance
    3
    1   in June 2012, after she was picked up by the immigration
    2   authorities.   She states that in June 2005, when her removal
    3   order became final, she did not understand that she was
    4   removable because she still had an application pending for
    5   derivative asylee benefits.     However, Lin’s former attorney
    6   emphatically stated that there was no such pending
    7   application, and Lin has not submitted evidence of one.        Her
    8   former attorney also submitted evidence that Lin had been
    9   informed of the consequences of a removal order.      Further,
    10   Lin’s alternative argument that she sought subsequent legal
    11   advice undermines her claim that she did not know that she
    12   had been the victim of ineffective assistance.       See Cekic v.
    13   I.N.S., 
    435 F.3d 167
    , 171 (2d Cir. 2006).      Thus, the BIA
    14   also did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin failed
    15   to demonstrate due diligence.       Rashid, 
    533 F.3d at 131
    .
    16       Lin also failed to demonstrate a change in country
    17   conditions in China.     Lin submitted the 2005 and 2011
    18   Country Reports, which stated that enforcement of family
    19   planning laws varied significantly by location and used
    20   identical language with regard to enforcement in Lin’s home
    21   province of Fujian.    The BIA may reasonably require evidence
    22   of how the family planning laws are implemented in the
    23   alien’s home province.     See Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    ,
    4
    1   163-65 (2d Cir. 2008).    Moreover, while Lin argues that IUD
    2   insertion for women with only one child has increased, the
    3   BIA has held that IUD insertion does not constitute
    4   persecution absent aggravating factors.    Matter of M-F-W- &
    5   L-G-, 
    24 I&N Dec. 633
    , 636 (BIA 2008); see also Mei Fun Wong
    6   v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 64
    , 70-71 (2d Cir. 2011).    Thus, the
    7   BIA’s determination that there had been no change in country
    8   conditions did not constitute an abuse of discretion.    See
    9   Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d Cir. 2006).
    10       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    11   DENIED.    Petitioner’s pending request for oral argument in
    12   this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    13   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    14   34.1(b).
    15                                FOR THE COURT:
    16                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    17
    18
    5