Ling Lin v. Holder , 526 F. App'x 54 ( 2013 )


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  •     11-2672-ag
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    Hom, IJ
    A088 350 749
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 6th day of June, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:
    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    REENA RAGGI,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    LING LIN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     11-2672-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Jennifer P. Williams,
    Senior Litigation Counsel; Lauren E.
    Fascett, Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Ling Lin, a native and citizen of the
    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 6, 2011
    order of the BIA that affirmed the March 20, 2009 decision
    of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying her application for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Ling Lin, No.
    A088 350 749 (B.I.A. June 6, 2011), aff’g No. A088 350 749
    (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 20, 2009).    We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA’s decision.     See Xue
    Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d
    Cir. 2005).    The applicable standards of review are well
    established.    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    The agency relied on an inconsistency and similarities
    between Lin’s statement and statements provided by her
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    mother and boyfriend to find her not credible.     Petitioner
    challenges both bases for the determination.     Assuming
    without deciding that the IJ’s inconsistency finding was
    flawed, we nonetheless uphold the agency’s determination.
    Remand is not appropriate when “there is no realistic
    possibility that, absent the error[], the IJ or BIA would
    have reached a different conclusion” regarding Lin’s
    credibility, Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    428 F.3d 391
    , 401 (2d Cir. 2005).   The striking similarities between
    the statement Lin submitted in support of her asylum
    application and statements from Lin’s mother and boyfriend
    provide ample support for the agency’s adverse credibility
    finding.
    The documents closely resemble each other in length,
    structure, content, and phrasing.   Among other parallelisms,
    each of the documents contains five paragraphs, and the text
    of each paragraph contains similar information: for example,
    the second paragraph of each letter discusses Lin’s
    relationship with her boyfriend and when she became
    pregnant; the third paragraph discusses her discovery of the
    pregnancy and the circumstances of the ensuing abortion; and
    the fourth paragraph discusses the 8,000 renminbi (“RMB”)
    3
    fine imposed on her and an alleged threat of arrest as a
    consequence of nonpayment of the fine.   Moreover, the texts
    resemble each other as well.   For example, Lin’s statement,
    “One week after the abortion, the family planning officials
    told me to pay RMB 8,000 fine,” approximates Lin’s
    boyfriend’s statement, “One week after the abortion, the
    family planning officials asked her to pay RMB 8000 of
    fine.”   And Lin’s statement, “My mother and I kept begging
    them to let go of me and the innocent fetus in my abdomen,”
    echoes Lin’s mother’s statement, “We were very scared and
    begged them to let go of my daughter and the baby in her
    abdomen.”
    Despite Lin’s repeated assertions that, although she
    asked her mother and boyfriend to write letters on her
    behalf, she did not dictate the contents of their
    statements, the agency reasonably found implausible that the
    similarities between the documents were merely coincidental,
    particularly, as the IJ noted, in light of the “different
    educational background of the authors, who resided at
    different residences.”   As we have stated, “striking
    similarities between affidavits are an indication that the
    statements are ‘canned,’” and as such, undermine an
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    applicant’s credibility.   Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    489 F.3d 517
    , 524 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Surinder
    Singh v. BIA, 
    438 F.3d 145
    , 148 (2d Cir. 2006).    Thus, in
    making its credibility determination, the agency reasonably
    relied on the remarkable similarities between the documents
    Lin provided.   See Mei Chai Ye, 
    489 F.3d at 526
     (holding
    that once an IJ has noted remarkable similarities between
    affidavits and complied with procedural safeguards, it is
    reasonable to conclude that an applicant’s general
    credibility is undermined).
    The agency’s adverse credibility determination was thus
    supported by substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin v.
    Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).    We therefore hold that the
    agency did not err in denying asylum, withholding of
    removal, and CAT relief.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, the pending motion
    for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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