Sesay v. Lynch , 659 F. App'x 698 ( 2016 )


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  •      15-847
    Sesay v. Lynch
    BIA
    A095 405 335
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   1st day of September, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    8            ROBERT D. SACK,
    9            REENA RAGGI,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   MOHAMED SESAY,
    14
    15                    Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                             15-847
    18                                                                   NAC
    19   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21
    22            Respondent.
    23   _____________________________________
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONER:                     Thomas V. Massucci, New York, New
    26                                       York.
    27
    28   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    29                                       Assistant Attorney General; Francis
    30                                       W.   Fraser,    Senior   Litigation
    1                                   Counsel; W. Daniel Shieh, Trial
    2                                   Attorney, Office of Immigration
    3                                   Litigation,     United      States
    4                                   Department of Justice, Washington,
    5                                   DC.
    6
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    10   DENIED.
    11       Petitioner Mohamed Sesay, a native and citizen of Sierra
    12   Leone, seeks review of a March 10, 2015, decision of the BIA
    13   denying of his motion to reopen.      In re Mohamed Sesay, No. A095
    14   405 335 (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2015).           We assume the parties’
    15   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    16   in this case.
    17       We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
    18   discretion,     but   review   any    findings   regarding   country
    19   conditions for substantial evidence.       Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
    20   
    546 F.3d 138
    , 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).       When, as here, an alien
    21   files a timely petition from the denial of a motion to reopen,
    22   we review only the denial of the motion, and not the agency’s
    23   underlying decisions.      See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of
    24   Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001).
    2
    1          An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one
    2    motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which
    3    the final administrative decision was rendered.                   8 U.S.C.
    4    § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).                However,
    5    that time limitation is excused if the motion “is based on
    6    changed      country    conditions    arising    in   the    country    of
    7    nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,
    8    if such evidence is material and was not available and would
    9    not   have    been     discovered    or   presented   at    the   previous
    10   proceedings.”        8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8
    11   C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
    12         The BIA had the discretion to discredit Sesay’s evidence
    13   based on the underlying adverse credibility determination
    14   against him.     See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 143
    , 147
    15   (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA may decline to credit
    16   documentary evidence submitted with a motion to reopen if it
    17   has “legitimate concerns about [the petitioner’s] credibility”
    18   based on a previous adverse credibility determination and the
    19   petitioner offers no other corroborating evidence).                  Sesay
    20   submitted a newspaper article and affidavits from his sister
    21   and friends.      As a general matter, these documents largely
    3
    1    reiterated   his   original    asylum   claim,   which   the   agency
    2    previously rejected as lacking credibility.          Moreover, the
    3    article conflicted with Sesay’s original application with
    4    respect to his father’s name and the number of siblings he has,
    5    and despite focusing on Sesay’s father, omitted mention of his
    6    father’s 1999 murder.   The BIA was entitled to question whether
    7    the article actually related to Sesay or another person with
    8    the same name, particularly given Sesay’s credibility problems.
    9    See Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    , 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no
    10   abuse of discretion when the BIA “clearly explained that the
    11   evidence submitted by petitioner in support of her motion was
    12   not ‘material’ because it did not rebut the adverse credibility
    13   finding that provided the basis for the IJ’s denial of
    14   petitioner’s underlying asylum application”).
    15       Additionally, the BIA found that most of the information
    16   in the newspaper article was previously available.              That
    17   finding was also sound.       The article reports that Sesay fled
    18   Sierra Leone to escape the Poro Society persecution.           If so,
    19   then that persecution occurred long before Sesay’s merits
    20   hearing in 2008: Sesay left Sierra Leone in 1999.        See 8 U.S.C.
    21   § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
    4
    1        Sesay asserts that his motion detailed a new threat from
    2    the Poro Society, a different rebel group from the RUF described
    3    in his first application.   Sesay did not make this distinction
    4    to the BIA and the agency did not discuss it.   His argument is
    5    therefore unexhausted, and so we decline to consider it.    See
    6    Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 104
    , 122 (2d Cir.
    7    2007) (providing that judicially imposed issue exhaustion is
    8    mandatory).
    9        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    10   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    11   that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    12   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    13   is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for oral argument
    14   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    15   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    16   34.1(b).
    17                                 FOR THE COURT:
    18                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5