Lanying Wang v. Lynch , 628 F. App'x 44 ( 2015 )


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  •     14-971
    Wang v. Lynch
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A200 752 645
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.     WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
    APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 14th day of October, two thousand fifteen.
    PRESENT:
    DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    LANYING WANG,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                               14-971
    NAC
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                            Matthew J. Harris,
    Brooklyn, New York.
    1
    FOR RESPONDENT:                               Joyce R. Branda, Acting
    Assistant Attorney General;
    Derek C. Julius, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Karen
    L. Melnik, Trial Attorney;
    Tyler C. King, Law Clerk,
    Office of Immigration
    Litigation, United States
    Department of Justice,
    Washington D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Lanying Wang, a native and citizen of the
    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 26,
    2014    decision      of   the   BIA,    affirming       the   June    14,   2012
    decision       of   an     Immigration        Judge   (“IJ”),    denying       her
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under    the    Convention       Against       Torture    (“CAT”).        In    re
    Lanying Wang, No. A200 752 645 (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2014),
    aff’g No. A200 752 645 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 14, 2012).
    We   assume     the      parties’   familiarity       with     the    underlying
    facts and procedural history in this case.
    2
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions.                       See Zaman v. Mukasey,
    
    514 F.3d 233
    ,    237       (2d    Cir.     2008)    (per    curiam).       The
    applicable standards of review are well established.                              8
    U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).                   For asylum applications like
    Wang’s,   governed         by    the    REAL     ID    Act,    the   agency   may,
    “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances . . . base
    a   credibility      determination         on    the    demeanor,     candor,    or
    responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
    plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” and
    inconsistencies       in        an    applicant’s       statements    and     other
    record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the
    heart        of      the        applicant’s            claim.”          8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    ,
    163-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).                       Here, the agency’s
    adverse       credibility            determination        is     supported       by
    substantial evidence.
    The IJ reasonably found Wang’s testimony inconsistent
    and implausible.            Wang testified to intense surveillance
    3
    from    family    planning   officials      that    consisted    of   daily
    visits to monitor her body shape and eating habits.                   Wang’s
    asylum     application       included       no     reference     to     that
    monitoring.       The IJ properly relied on this omission in
    making    her    adverse   credibility      determination,      since   the
    kind of constant pressure Wang testified to was at the
    heart of her claim of persecution based on Chinese family
    planning policies.         See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland
    Sec., 
    446 F.3d 289
    , 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see
    also Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 166
    n.3 (explaining that
    inconsistency      and   omission    are    “functionally      equivalent”
    for credibility purposes).
    Furthermore, the IJ reasonably found implausible Wang’s
    testimony that family planning officials did not require
    her to undergo any gynecological exams to make sure the IUD
    remained in place.         An IJ is entitled to consider whether
    an asylum applicant’s testimony is inherently implausible.
    Gas v. U.S.Atty.Gen., 
    400 F.3d 963
    , 964 (2d Cir. 2008)(per
    curiam).        Our review of an IJ’s credibility finding is
    highly     deferential.        
    Id. (internal quotation
          marks
    4
    omitted).     However, the IJ’s findings must be “tethered to
    record evidence.”            Yan v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 63
    , 67 (2d Cir.
    2007) (per curiam).
    Here, the IJ’s finding is based on Wang’s testimony
    that    family        planning      officials           had     access    to    medical
    facilities       to     perform      abortions.               If    family     planning
    officials have access to medical facilities, then it makes
    little sense to eschew those facilities in favor of daily
    monitoring.       Moreover, the IJ reasonably found implausible
    Wang’s testimony that officials checked on her body shape
    multiple     times       a    day.               Wang       submitted     no     country
    conditions    evidence         to    show        how    often      Chinese     officials
    typically     monitored          violators             of   the     family      planning
    policy, and “the reasons for [the IJ’s] incredulity are
    evident.”     
    Id. It makes
    little sense that officials would
    devote such manpower and resources to one individual, when
    more efficient methods of monitoring were available, such
    as periodic gynecological testing.
    Finally, the IJ reasonably gave little weight to the
    letters     from        Wang’s       neighbors.                 The      letters     are
    5
    substantially similar to one another and contain several
    sentences             that     appear          unaltered        in      each     letter.
    “[S]triking            similarities            between         affidavits        are     an
    indication that the statements are ‘canned.’”                             Mei Chai Ye
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    489 F.3d 517
    , 524 (2d Cir. 2007)
    (citation omitted).                 Submission of a canned affidavit is
    itself       a    sufficient         basis       for     an    adverse     credibility
    determination.               
    Id. at 526
           (“[W]illingness     to    submit     a
    false    document            is     in    itself         sufficient      evidence        of
    incredibility.”).                  Moreover,           these    letters        were     all
    submitted by Wang in support of her claim, thus increasing
    any suspicion their similarity arouses.                           Singh v. BIA, 
    438 F.3d 145
    , 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).                             The IJ was not
    required         to    credit      Wang’s      explanation,       as    her    statement
    that she asked for letters, but did not tell her neighbors
    what    to       write,      did   not    clarify        why   the     letters    are   so
    similar.         See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir.
    2005).            Accordingly,           the    IJ      reasonably       found    Wang’s
    supporting documents insufficient to rehabilitate her
    6
    incredible testimony.         See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.     As    we   have   completed   our   review,    any   stay   of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot.              Any pending request
    for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance
    with    Federal   Rule   of   Appellate    Procedure      34(a)(2),     and
    Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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