Infrassure, Ltd. v. First Mutual Transportation Assurance Co. ( 2016 )


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  • 16-306
    Infrassure, Ltd. v. First Mut. Transp. Assurance Co.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    August Term, 2016
    (Argued: September 15, 2016              Decided: November 16, 2016)
    Docket No. 16-306
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
    INFRASSURE, LTD.,
    Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
    - v.-
    FIRST MUTUAL TRANSPORTATION ASSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
    Before:                     JACOBS, LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, RAKOFF,
    District Judge.*
    Defendant First Mutual Transportation Assurance Company appeals from
    the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
    The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court for the
    *
    Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    York (Daniels, J.), awarding declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff Infrassure,
    Ltd., a reinsurance company. Affirmed.
    ALBERT L. WELLS, JR., Covington &
    Burling LLP, New York, NY (with Jennifer
    O. Farina and David B. Goodwin on the
    brief), for Appellant.
    WILLIAM B. ADAMS, Quinn Emanuel
    Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY
    (with Jane M. Byrne on the brief), for
    Appellee.
    DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge:
    Parties to a facultative reinsurance certificate differ as to which of two
    arbitration provisions govern the resolution of a dispute that has arisen between
    them. Arbitration under one provision, set out in the body of the form, states
    that “[a]ll arbitrators will be disinterested active or former officers of insurance or
    reinsurance companies.” J. App’x at 150. Arbitration under the other provision,
    introduced by endorsement, does not limit the arbitrators to current or former
    insurance executives. This difference is evidently of considerable significance to
    the parties.
    First Mutual Transportation Assurance Company (“First Mutual”), the
    ceding company, sought to compel its reinsurer, Infrassure, Ltd., to submit to
    arbitration governed by the endorsement. Infrassure initiated this lawsuit in the
    United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a
    declaratory judgment that the arbitration provision contained in the body of the
    form is controlling. First Mutual’s counterclaims requested the district court to
    find that the endorsement governs the dispute, and to compel Infrassure to
    submit to arbitration under that provision. The district court held that the form’s
    procedures governed, granted declaratory relief in favor of Infrassure, dismissed
    First Mutual’s counterclaims, and denied the request to compel arbitration.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    Because we construe the district court’s declaratory judgment as a grant of
    summary judgment, see Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine &
    Trading Inc., 
    697 F.3d 59
    , 63-64 (2d Cir. 2012), we review the district court’s
    interpretation of the reinsurance certificate at issue here de novo, see Dormitory
    Auth. of N.Y. v. Cont’l Cas. Com, 
    756 F.3d 166
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2014); Bank of N.Y.
    Tr. Co. v. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 
    726 F.3d 269
    , 275 (2d Cir. 2013).
    The printed body of the certificate, after setting out the declarations and
    other standard provisions, contains a provision that requires “any dispute arising
    out of the interpretation, performance or breach of this Certificate” to be
    submitted to arbitration pursuant to a specified set of rules. J. App’x at 150.
    Infrassure, the reinsurer, stands upon these terms.
    First Mutual, the ceding company, contends that the other provision,
    contained in Endorsement No. 2, must control. This provision also purports to
    cover “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
    agreement or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof,” and prescribes
    separate rules governing the arbitration. J. App’x at 160. The endorsement is
    headed “LONDON ARBITRATION AND GOVERNING LAW (UK AND
    BERMUDA INSURERS ONLY).” J. App’x at 160 (bolding in original). Since
    Infrassure, a Swiss company, is neither a United Kingdom insurer nor a Bermuda
    insurer, it argues that the endorsement is inapplicable on its face.
    The salient argument of First Mutual is that the tension between the two
    competing arbitration clauses is resolved by Paragraph AA (the “Titles Clause”),
    which states: “The several titles of the various paragraphs of this Certificate (and
    endorsements . . . attached hereto) are inserted solely for convenience of
    reference and will not be deemed in any way to limit or affect the provisions to
    which they relate.” J. App’x at 153. First Mutual argues that the parenthetical
    “(UK AND BERMUDA INSURERS ONLY)” is part of the endorsement’s title,
    and by operation of the Titles Clause, does not limit the endorsement to insurers
    of those countries.
    3
    This is a thin argument, but it requires us to construe wording that
    apparently has not been construed before, and that is in a contract that may share
    features with other standard forms and endorsements. Hence, this opinion.
    We conclude that the contract is unambiguous. The arbitration clause in
    the body of the certificate controls: it is not displaced by the endorsement because
    the endorsement is expressly limited to UK and Bermuda insurers.1 That
    limitation is not part of the title itself, though it shares the same line and bolded
    format. The purpose of the Titles Clause is not to strip away an express
    indication as to the context in which a particular provision is operative, but to
    ensure that the text of a provision is not discounted or altered by the words of its
    heading.
    Our reading of the facultative certificate is easily confirmed by consulting
    other provisions. In some instances, critical clauses would have no meaning at all
    if the Titles Clause were mechanically applied. For example, Paragraph 14 of the
    Certificate reads in its entirety:
    14. Program Policy Limits
    Various as per the attached schedule.
    J. App’x at 144 (bolding and underlining in original). If we were to apply the
    Titles Clause to this paragraph in the same way that First Mutual asks us to apply
    it to Endorsement No. 2, we would be left with the cryptic provision, “Various as
    per the attached schedule.” The heading “Program Policy Limits” instructs the
    reader that the phrase “Various as per the attached schedule” refers to program
    policy limits, as opposed to some other concern of the reinsurance agreement.
    Other provisions beside Paragraph 14 likewise would be rendered meaningless if
    the Titles Clause were applied in the way pressed by First Mutual.
    1
    Given this conclusion, we also find that the district court correctly
    dismissed First Mutual’s counterclaims and properly declined to compel
    arbitration under the endorsement’s arbitral provisions.
    4
    Infrassure argues that even if the endorsement is held to control, certain
    provisions of the arbitration clause in the body of the certificate should
    nevertheless be enforced, such as the requirement that all arbitrators be former or
    current insurance executives. We need not reach this argument, which is just as
    well for Infrassure.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the appellant’s other
    arguments, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Docket 16-306

Judges: Jacobs, Rakoff

Filed Date: 11/16/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024