Jiang Ling v. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •      15-1388
    Ling v. Lynch
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A205 083 153
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   8th day of September, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    8            PETER W. HALL,
    9            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   JIANG LING,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                   v.                                              15-1388
    17                                                                   NAC
    18   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                     Zhen Liang Li, New York, N.Y.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    26                                       Assistant Attorney General; Anthony
    27                                       P.   Nicastro,   Acting   Assistant
    28                                       Director; Sabatino F. Leo, Trial
    29                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration
    30                                       Litigation,      United      States
    31                                       Department of Justice, Washington,
    32                                       D.C.
    1        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    4    DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Jiang Ling, a native and citizen of the People’s
    6    Republic of China, seeks review of a March 30, 2015, decision
    7    of the BIA, affirming an April 9, 2013, decision of an
    8    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ling’s application for asylum,
    9    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
    10   Torture (“CAT”).    In re Jiang Ling, No. A205 083 153 (B.I.A.
    
    11 A.K. Marsh. 30
    , 2015), aff’g No. A205 083 153 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
    12   Apr. 9, 2013).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    13   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    14       Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the
    15   IJ’s and BIA’s decisions.      Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 16
      391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005).      The applicable standards of review
    17   are well established.     8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin
    18   v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
    19       For asylum applications like Ling’s, governed by the REAL
    20   ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
    21   circumstances,”    base   a   credibility    finding   on   an   asylum
    22   applicant’s   “demeanor,      candor,   or   responsiveness,”      and
    23   inconsistencies in her or her witness’s statements, “without
    2
    1    regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of
    2    the applicant’s claim.”      8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
    3   Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64
    .            “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
    4   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    5   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
    6   make such an adverse credibility ruling.”         Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d 7
      at 167.    As discussed below, substantial evidence supports the
    8   adverse credibility determination.
    9       The agency reasonably rested its adverse credibility
    10   determination on inconsistencies between Ling’s testimony and
    11   her mother’s letter.     
    Id. at 166-67.
            First, Ling testified
    12   that her mother took her to a chiropractor for treatment after
    13   she was released from detention, but when asked why her mother’s
    14   letter omitted that visit, responded that her testimony was
    15   correct.     See 
    id. at 166-67
    & n.3 (“An inconsistency and an
    16   omission are . . . functionally equivalent” for credibility
    17   purposes).      The agency was not required to credit this
    18   explanation because it did not account for why Ling’s mother
    19   omitted this information from the letter.                See Majidi v.
    20   Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
    21   do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
    22   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
    23   reasonable    fact-finder   would       be   compelled   to   credit   his
    3
    1    testimony.”).        Second, Ling testified that she hid at her
    2    friend’s home after escaping a police raid in 2010, but her
    3    mother’s letter stated that Ling hid at a relative’s home.     The
    4    agency was not required to credit Ling’s explanation that her
    5    mother considered her friend as her son.      See Majidi, 
    430 F.3d 6
       at 80.    The agency also reasonably found both inconsistencies
    7    significant because they related to events that occurred in the
    8    immediate aftermath of Ling’s only two encounters with police,
    9    which called into doubt whether those encounters had occurred
    10   at all.     See Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    11       The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistencies
    12   between     Ling’s     testimony   and   credible-fear   interview
    13   concerning her treatment in detention.         See Ming Zhang v.
    14   Holder, 
    585 F.3d 715
    , 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009) (observing that
    15   inconsistencies arising from a credible-fear interview may
    16   serve as an appropriate basis for an adverse credibility
    17   determination).       First, Ling testified that, while detained,
    18   she had been kicked in the stomach and slapped, and had her hair
    19   pulled.     But when asked at her credible-fear interview whether
    20   anything happened to her in detention, she responded: “They
    21   interrogated me and did not give me any food or drink for one
    22   day.”     The agency was not required to credit Ling’s explanation
    23   that her testimony was correct because it did not account for
    4
    1    why she omitted this information during her credible-fear
    2    interview.     See 
    Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80
    .    Second, Ling testified
    3    that the police destroyed her bible in detention but omitted
    4    this from her application and credible-fear interview.           Ling
    5    does not challenge the agency’s reliance on this omission in
    6    her brief.    See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 
    145 F.3d 114
    , 117 (2d Cir.
    7    1998).       The    agency,   moreover,   reasonably     found   both
    8    inconsistencies to be significant because they concerned the
    9    sole incident of alleged persecution.        See Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d 10
      at 163-64.
    11       We decline to consider Ling’s unexhausted challenge to the
    12   reliability of the credible-fear interview.             Ling did not
    13   challenge the reliability of that interview before the BIA, the
    14   BIA did not address the issue, and the Government asserts
    15   exhaustion.     See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 16
      104, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that judicially imposed
    17   issue exhaustion is mandatory).
    18       The agency also did not err in concluding that Ling’s
    19   corroborating evidence was insufficient to rehabilitate her
    20   credibility.       See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d
    21   Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “[a]n applicant’s failure to
    22   corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on credibility,
    23   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
    5
    1    applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
    2    been called into question” or is viewed as suspicious).                  The
    3    agency     reasonably   gave      diminished        weight      to   Ling’s
    4    corroborating     evidence:    the       letter   from   her    mother   was
    5    inconsistent with Ling’s testimony, and the letters from fellow
    6    church members in China were from interested parties not subject
    7    to cross examination.       See Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. &
    8    N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010), rev’d on other grounds by Hui
    9    Lin Huang v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
    (2d Cir. 2012); see also Y.C.
    10   v. Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the
    11   agency's determination of the weight afforded to an alien's
    12   documentary evidence.”).
    13        Given the foregoing inconsistencies, omissions, and Ling’s
    14   insufficient corroborating evidence, the totality of the
    15   circumstances supports the credibility ruling.                 Xiu Xia Lin,
    
    16 534 F.3d at 167
    .    Because Ling’s claims for relief were based
    17   on   the   same   factual     predicate,      the   adverse-credibility
    18   determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal,
    19   and CAT relief.    Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir.
    20   2006).
    21        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    22   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    23   that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    6
    1   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    2   is DISMISSED as moot.   Any pending request for oral argument
    3   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    4   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    5   34.1(b).
    6                               FOR THE COURT:
    7                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    7