Hua Zheng v. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •          13-4149
    Zheng v. Lynch
    BIA
    A079 114 543
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 9th day of February, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    8                ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    9                GERARD E. LYNCH,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       HUA ZHENG,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                        v.                                    13-4149
    17                                                              NAC
    18
    19       LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20       ATTORNEY GENERAL,*
    21                Respondent.
    22       _____________________________________
    23
    24       FOR PETITIONER:                Nataliya I. Gavlin, New York, New
    25                                      York.
    *
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically
    substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
    1   FOR RESPONDENT:          Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    2                            General; Katharine E. Clark, Senior
    3                            Litigation Counsel; Patricia E.
    4                            Bruckner, Trial Attorney, Office of
    5                            Immigration Litigation, Civil
    6                            Division, United States Department
    7                            of Justice, Washington D.C.
    8
    9          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    12   is DENIED.
    13          Petitioner Hua Zheng, a native and citizen of China,
    14   seeks review of a September 30, 2013 decision of the BIA
    15   denying her motion to reopen her case.       In re Hua Zheng, No.
    16   A079 114 543 (B.I.A. Sept. 30, 2013).       We assume the
    17   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    18   procedural history.
    19          “We review the denial of motions to reopen immigration
    20   proceedings for abuse of discretion.”       Ali v. Gonzales, 448
    
    21 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d Cir. 2006).       A motion to reopen must be
    22   filed within 90 days of a final administrative order of
    23   removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R.
    24   § 1003.2(c)(2).    Zheng filed this motion more than three
    25   years after the agency entered an order of removal against
    26   her.    Her motion was therefore untimely.
    2
    1       Zheng argues, however, that the time limitation should
    2   be tolled, because her counsel was ineffective by not
    3   pursuing cancellation of removal before the immigration
    4   judge.   In order to benefit from equitable tolling, a
    5   petitioner must comply with certain procedural requirements,
    6   and must show prejudice as a result of the ineffective
    7   assistance of counsel.   Rashid v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    ,
    8   130-31 (2d Cir. 2008).   A showing of prejudice requires that
    9   an alien make a prima facie showing of eligibility for the
    10   requested relief.   Rabiu v. INS, 
    41 F.3d 879
    , 882 (2d Cir.
    11   1994).
    12       Zheng claimed prejudice from her attorney’s failure to
    13   pursue cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)
    14   and her attorney’s statement, without investigating or
    15   consulting with Zheng, that she could not establish
    16   continuous presence in the United States, as required under
    17   that statute.   She argues that the BIA abused its discretion
    18   in concluding that she had not made a prima facie showing of
    19   eligibility for cancellation of removal.   Specifically, she
    20   argues that the BIA should have credited an identification
    21   card issued in the United States in 1996 and photographs of
    22   herself allegedly in the United States in 1996, 1997, and
    23   1998.
    3
    1       The BIA found that Zheng had failed to demonstrate ten
    2   years of continuous physical presence in the United States, as
    3   required   for    cancellation         of    removal.             See    8   U.S.C.
    4   § 1229b(b)(1)(A).       As to the documentary evidence that Zheng
    5   argues the BIA should have credited, the BIA either discounted
    6   or did not explicitly address it in its opinion.                        To support
    7   her presence in the United States during the years 1996 and
    8   1997,    Zheng   submitted      a      New       York       Language     Institute
    9   identification card issued in the name of “Wanda Zheng.”                          But
    10   Zheng has not explained whether she is also known by Wanda,
    11   and on her applications for cancellation and removal, she
    12   responded “no” when asked whether she uses any alias or other
    13   names.     See   INS    v.    Abudu,       
    485 U.S. 94
    ,   109-10     (1988)
    14   (recognizing     that   the    alien        “bears      a    heavy      burden”    in
    15   demonstrating that reopening is warranted, and that facts and
    16   ambiguities need not be viewed in the light most favorable to
    17   the movant on a motion to reopen).                   While the BIA did not
    18   address Zheng’s personal        photographs, we do not require the
    19   BIA to expressly refute each argument or piece of evidence,
    20   and we presume that it has taken into account the evidence
    21   before it unless the record suggests otherwise. Jian Hui Shao
    22   v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008); Xiao Ji Chen v.
    23   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006).
    4
    1       We find no abuse of discretion here.            The photographs
    2   either were not identifiable as taken in the United States or
    3   do not have legible date stamps.     Aside from the card and the
    4   photographs, Zheng offers no other evidence of her alleged
    5   presence in the United States from 1996 to 1999.           Given that
    6   the record supports the BIA’s findings concerning Zheng’s
    7   evidence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that
    8   she had not made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
    9   cancellation. Absent prima facie eligibility, she cannot show
    10   prejudice   required   to   except   her   motion   from    the   time
    11   limitation.
    12       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, the pending motion
    14   for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    15
    16                                  FOR THE COURT:
    17                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    18
    19
    20
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-4149

Judges: Gerard, Leval, Lynch, Pierre, Pooler, Rosemary

Filed Date: 2/9/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024