Hong Chen v. Holder ( 2012 )


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  •     11-4010
    Chen v. Holder
    BIA
    A078 691 807
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 24th day of July, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    HONG CHEN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                    11-4010
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Hong Chen, pro se.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General; Greg D. Mack,
    Senior Litigation Counsel; Colin J.
    Tucker, Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
    review is DENIED.
    Hong Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China, seeks review of a September 14, 2011,
    order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen.    Hong Chen,
    No. A078 691 807 (B.I.A. Sept. 14, 2011).    We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history of this case.
    We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s
    admonition that such motions are “disfavored.”    Ali v.
    Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
    (quoting INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992)(quotation
    marks omitted)).    “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not
    be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence
    sought to be offered is material and was not available and
    could not have been discovered or presented at the former
    hearing . . . .”    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1); Norani v.
    Gonzales, 
    451 F.3d 292
    , 294 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
    curiam) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the
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    hearing as the date before which the evidence must have been
    unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable).     Failure to
    offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which
    the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s
    failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying
    substantive relief sought.   See INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    ,
    104-05 (1988).
    In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Chen’s motion to reopen.     Although Chen attempted to
    rehabilitate the inconsistency in his prior testimony
    regarding his 2001 attempt to gain admission to the United
    States, he failed to demonstrate that his explanation was
    based on evidence that was both new and unavailable at the
    time of his November 2008 hearing.     See Norani, 
    451 F.3d at
    294 & n.3; 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1).
    Further, the agency reasonably determined that Chen
    failed to demonstrate that the evidence he submitted with
    his motion to reopen regarding his health condition would
    change the outcome of his proceedings.     See Matter of
    Coehlo, 
    20 I. & N. Dec. 464
    , 473 (BIA 1992).     The letter
    from Chen’s physician in China was inconsistent with his
    testimony and the evidence he had previously submitted in
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    support of his application regarding the physician’s
    diagnosis of his condition.    Because the agency could
    reasonably rely on these inconsistencies to find that Chen
    was not credible, see 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii);      Xiu
    Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
    curiam), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding
    that Chen failed to demonstrate that the new evidence
    regarding his medical treatment in China would have changed
    the outcome in his case.
    Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
    concluding that Chen failed to demonstrate prima facie
    eligibility for asylum based on his fear of forcible
    sterilization in China.    The BIA reasonably concluded that
    Chen’s claim, based on his fiancée’s pregnancy with their
    first child and their intent to have more children, absent
    further evidence, was too speculative to merit relief.      See
    Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir.
    2005) (per curiam) (noting that, absent “solid support” in
    the record that his fear is objectively reasonable, an
    alien’s claim that he fears future persecution is
    “speculative at best”).
    Finally, to the extent that Chen’s argues that the BIA
    erred in not specifically addressing his withholding of
    4
    removal and CAT relief on the basis of his fear of
    sterilization, we decline to remand.    Given Chen’s failure
    to satisfy the standard for asylum, and because his claims
    for withholding of removal and CAT relief were based on the
    same factual predicate as his asylum claim, it necessarily
    follows that he failed to satisfy the higher burden of proof
    for withholding of removal and CAT relief.    See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b); Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir.
    2006).    Accordingly, remand would be futile. Cf. Xiao Ji
    Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 335 (2d Cir.
    2006).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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