Kacupaj v. Holder , 396 F. App'x 756 ( 2010 )


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  •     09-4546-ag
    Kacupaj v. Holder
    BIA
    Straus, IJ
    A077 721 820
    A095 476 782
    A095 476 783
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 19th day of October, two thousand ten.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    PETER W. HALL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    ARDIAN KACUPAJ, AFERDITA KACUPAJ,
    a.k.a. ALFADIDA KACUPAJ, EUGERT
    KACUPAJ a.k.a. UBER KACUPAJ,
    Petitioners,
    v.                                 09-4546-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONERS:              Saul C. Brown, New York, New York
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
    Director; Russel J.E. Verby, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    Petitioners, natives and citizens of Albania, seek review of
    an October 7, 2009, order of the BIA, affirming the July 25,
    2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus,
    which denied their application for asylum and withholding of
    removal. In re Kacupaj, Nos. A077 721 820, A095 476 782/783
    (B.I.A. Oct. 7, 2009), aff’g Nos. Nos. A077 721 820, A095 476
    782/783 (Immig. Ct. Hartford July 25, 2008). We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
    history in this case.1
    As an initial matter, we review the denial of relief in
    “asylum-only” proceedings under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), because
    the denial of relief in these circumstances is the functional
    equivalent of a removal order. See Kanacevic v. INS, 
    448 F.3d 129
    , 134 (2d Cir. 2006). Under the circumstances of this case,
    we consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
    completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 233
    , 237 (2d Cir.
    2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established.
    See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    , 110 (2d Cir. 2008);
    Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    494 F.3d 281
    , 289 (2d Cir.
    2007).
    We find no error in the agency’s determination that,
    although he experienced past persecution, Kacupaj no longer has a
    well-founded fear of persecution in Albania due to changed
    country conditions. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1). The agency
    supported its finding of a fundamental change in circumstances in
    Albania, stating that the Democratic Party had returned to power
    in 2005, a fact we have noted as well, see Latifi v. Gonzales,
    
    430 F.3d 103
    , 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). The agency also reasonably
    relied on Department of State reports, noting that according to
    the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights
    Practices in Albania for 2007, the Albanian government “generally
    1
    Because Ardian Kacupaj was the lead applicant, we refer to him
    as “Kacupaj.”
    2
    respected the human rights of its citizens.” See Xiao Ji Chen v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 341-42 (holding that the
    agency did not err in its reliance on State Department reports
    because they are “usually the best source of information on
    country conditions”) (internal citations omitted). The IJ also
    considered the testimony of Petitioners’ expert, Dr. Bernd J.
    Fischer, acknowledging that there was ongoing political turmoil
    in Albania, but noting Dr. Fischer’s testimony that Shkoder, the
    area of Albania in which Kacupaj lived, was a stronghold of the
    Democratic Party. Moreover, Dr. Fischer testified that violence
    in Albania decreased since 2000, when Kacupaj suffered
    persecution for his activities on behalf of the Democratic Party.
    Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that a fundamental
    change in circumstances in Albania rebutted Kacupaj’s presumption
    of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Hoxhallari v.
    Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 179
    , 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Niang v. Mukasey, 
    511 F.3d 138
    , 149 (2d Cir. 2007). Likewise, the agency did not err
    in denying withholding of removal, insofar as that claim was
    based on the same alleged facts as Petitioners’ asylum claim.
    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
    Absent a well-founded fear of future persecution, the agency
    may grant humanitarian asylum based on the severity of past
    persecution. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(iii)(A). Here, we
    find no abuse of discretion in the agency’s conclusion that
    Kacupaj did not endure the type of atrocious persecution for
    which humanitarian asylum is reserved. See Mirzoyan v. Gonzales,
    
    457 F.3d 217
    , 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that humanitarian
    asylum is reserved for “certain rare cases”).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
    in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    3