El-Shabazz v. State of New York Committee on Character & Fitness for the Second Judicial Department , 428 F. App'x 95 ( 2011 )

10-2323-cv
El-Shabazz v. State of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 5th day of July, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
Pierre N. Leval,
Rosemary S. Pooler,
Circuit Judges,
Denise Cote,*
District Judge.
__________________________________________
W. El-Shabazz,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 10-2323-cv
State of New York Committee on Character
and Fitness for the Second Judicial
Department, Patricia Collins,
individually and in her official
*
Judge Denise Cote, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
capacity, Leslie S. Nizin, individually
and in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: W. El-Shabazz, pro se, South Ozone
Park, New York.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Barbara D. Underwood, Esq.,
Solicitor General; Michael S.
Belohlavek, Esq., Senior Counsel;
Ann P. Zybert, Esq., Assistant
Solicitor General, New York State
Office of the Attorney General,
New York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983; the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq. (“ADA”);
N.Y. Correct. Law Art. 23-A; New York State Human Rights Law,
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1); and New York City Human Rights Law,
N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-102(16), as well as the district court’s
denial of his motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
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We review a district court’s denial of a motion for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 for an abuse of
discretion. In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113,
120 (2d Cir. 2010). A “district court has abused its discretion
if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a
decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible
decisions.” In re: Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.
2008)(citation omitted). Generally, district courts will only
amend or alter a judgment pursuant to Rule 59 “to correct a clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” In re
Assicurazioni, 592 F.3d at 120. The denial of a motion for
leave to amend the complaint is also reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Nettis v. Levitt, 241 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.
2001). “When the plaintiff has submitted a proposed amended
complaint, the district judge may review that pleading for
adequacy and need not allow its filing if it does not state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff-Appellant’s contentions are barred by preclusion
principles. See Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting that this Court “may affirm a district court’s
dismissal of a complaint on any basis supported by the record.”).
Federal courts must give a New York state court judgment the same
preclusive effect that New York courts would, and if New York law
would bar Plaintiff-Appellant from relitigating the claim in a
subsequent state-court suit, he may not relitigate those factual
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issues in a federal forum. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Genova v. Town of
Southampton, 776 F.2d 1560, 1561 (2d Cir. 1985). Under New York
law, collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from contesting in
a subsequent action issues clearly raised in a prior proceeding
and decided against that party, irrespective of whether the
tribunals or causes of action are the same; New York courts apply
collateral estoppel “‘if the issue in the second action is
identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and
material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action.’”
LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 271 (2d Cir. 2002)(quoting
Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343,349(1999));
see also Genova, 776 F.2d at 1561; Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62
N.Y.2d 494, 500 (1984).
Here, the crux of Plaintiff-Appellant’s federal claims is
that Defendants-Appellees engaged in practices that unlawfully
discriminated against him, thereby improperly prolonging action
on his application. In denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s petition
and finding “no merit” to his contentions that the Committee
“unreasonably delayed action” on his application, the Appellate
Division actually and necessarily decided that the Committee had
did not engage in discriminatory practices. Because Plaintiff-
Appellant raised his discrimination claims in both his state-
court petition and request for leave to appeal, he had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the discrimination issues in his
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state court proceedings. Accordingly, collateral estoppel bars
Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims.
Further, because the district court correctly dismissed
Plaintiff-Appellant’s amended complaint, the court’s May 4, 2010
order denying his motion for reconsideration did not constitute
an abuse of discretion. Finally, because an amendment to
Plaintiff-Appellant’s complaint would not have cured the defects,
the district court acted within its discretion in denying him
leave to amend.
We have considered Plaintiff-Appellant’s other arguments on
appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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