Xue Feng Lin v. Holder ( 2011 )


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  •     10-1392-ag
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    Rohan, IJ
    A 095 688 005
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 14th day of July, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT D. SACK,
    REENA RAGGI,
    PETER W. HALL,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________________________________
    XUE FENG LIN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     10-1392-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Dehai Zhang, Flushing, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Douglas E. Ginsburg,
    Assistant Director; Karen L. Melnik,
    Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Xue Feng Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks
    review of an April 1, 2010 order of the BIA affirming the
    June 2, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Patricia
    A. Rohan, which denied Lin’s application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Xue Feng Lin, No. A095 688
    005 (B.I.A. Apr. 1, 2010), aff’g No. A095 688 005 (Immig.
    Ct. N.Y.C. June 2, 2008).    We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have
    considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
    sake of completeness.”     Zaman v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 233
    , 237
    (2d Cir. 2008).   The applicable standards of review are well
    established.    See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic
    v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 90
    , 95 (2d Cir. 2008); Salimatou Bah v.
    Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    , 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
    The agency reasonably concluded that Lin did not suffer
    past persecution based on her mother’s forced sterilization.
    See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    494 F.3d 296
    ,
    2
    308 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that “applicants can
    become candidates for asylum relief only based on
    persecution that they themselves have suffered or must
    suffer”); Shao Yan Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    417 F.3d 303
    , 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that children of people
    persecuted under a coercive family planning policy are not
    per se eligible for asylum).   The agency also reasonably
    concluded that Lin’s experiences, including being detained
    for one day and being unable to register at a vocational
    school, did not rise to the level of persecution.     See
    Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 172
    , 182 (2d Cir. 2006)
    (upholding agency’s determination that applicant was not
    eligible for withholding of removal based on “brief”
    detention after which he was released “without harm”); Ai
    Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    416 F.3d 192
    , 198 (2d
    Cir. 2005) (upholding agency’s determination that applicant
    had not been persecuted where applicant “was detained only
    briefly, and was not mistreated while in custody”),
    overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang 
    Lin, 494 F.3d at 305
    ; Damko v. INS, 
    430 F.3d 626
    , 636-37 (2d Cir. 2005)
    (concluding that applicant’s expulsion from university,
    while “not fair,” did not constitute persecution, where it
    did not result in “economic deprivation so severe that her
    life or her freedom was threatened”), vacated on other
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    grounds and superseded by Damko v. INS, 178 F. App’x 85(2nd
    Cir. 2006).   The agency also reasonably concluded that,
    without a spouse or children, Lin’s claim that she fears
    future persecution because she is of child-bearing age and
    wants to have children is “speculative,” and insufficient to
    demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.     See
    Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005)
    (holding that, absent solid support in the record for the
    petitioner’s assertion that he would be subjected to forced
    sterilization, his fear was “speculative at best”).
    Furthermore, the agency reasonably determined that Lin
    failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or
    eligibility for CAT relief based on her illegal departure
    from China.   See Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
    962 F.2d 234
    , 239 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Punishment for violation of a
    generally applicable criminal law is not persecution.”); see
    also Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    432 F.3d 156
    ,
    159-60 (2d Cir. 2005) (evidence that some individuals who
    leave China illegally are imprisoned, and that human rights
    violations including torture occur in Chinese prisons, is
    insufficient to establish a clear probability of torture for
    a particular illegal emigrant); Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft,
    
    320 F.3d 130
    , 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding relevant
    4
    inquiry in determining whether a particular petitioner is
    eligible for CAT relief is whether someone in the
    petitioner’s “particular alleged circumstances” is more
    likely than not to be tortured).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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