United States v. Rivera-Rios ( 2022 )

20-1773-cr
United States v. Rivera-Rios
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 25th day of October, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT: Jon O. Newman,
Guido Calabresi,
Steven J. Menashi,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 20-1773
RUDOLFO RIVERA-RIOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________
For Appellee: Amy Busa, Devon Lash, Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Seth D. DuCharme,
Acting United States Attorney, Eastern
District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
For Defendant-Appellant: Rudolfo Rivera-Rios, pro se, Pine Knot, KY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Cogan, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court entered May 18, 2020, is
AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Rudolfo Rivera-Rios, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion for a discretionary sentence modification
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the motion because
Rivera-Rios’s offense was committed prior to November 1, 1987, and he was
therefore ineligible to move for such relief on his own behalf. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
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An inmate’s motion for a discretionary sentence modification for
“extraordinary and compelling reasons,” under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is “often
colloquially called a motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Saladino,
7 F.4th 120, 121 (2d Cir. 2021). “We review the denial of a motion for
compassionate release for abuse of discretion, which incorporates de novo review
with respect to questions of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 122.
Rivera-Rios is serving a sentence for acts committed in 1970, prior to the
amendments to the federal sentencing regime in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040 (1984). At that time, under 18
U.S.C. § 4205(g), a court could reduce a federal inmate’s sentence “[a]t any time
upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons.” 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (repealed 1984, repeal
effective 1987). Section 212 of the Sentencing Reform Act repealed that provision.
In its place, the Act created 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which provided that a court
could reduce a term of imprisonment “in any case … upon motion of the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons … after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.
§] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such reduction,” so long as the reduction was
consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (1986). Like the former § 4205(g), the new statute “gave BOP
exclusive power over all avenues of compassionate release” by providing that
“any motion for compassionate release had to be made by the BOP Director.”
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2020).
Subsequent amendments established that the Sentencing Reform Act,
including § 3582(c)(1)(A), applied only to prisoners who offended on or after
November 1, 1987. See Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (amending the Sentencing Reform Act to
provide an effective date of November 1, 1987); Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-182, § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266 (1987) (inserting “shall apply only to offenses
committed after the taking effect of this chapter” into the text of the Sentencing
Reform Act); United States v. Argitakos, 862 F.2d 423, 424 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that the Sentencing Reform Act, including § 3582, “applies only to offenses
committed after November 1, 1987”).
Consistent with the transition to the new § 3582(c), the Sentencing Reform
Act provided that the old § 4205(g) would remain in place for a period of five years
after the effective date with respect to individuals whose convictions predate the
effective date. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 1837, 2032 (leaving
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Chapter 311 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which includes § 4205(g), in place “for
five years after the effective date”). However, Congress has repeatedly extended
the timeline, most recently through November 2022. United States Parole
Commission Extension Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-159, § 4202, 134 Stat. 709, 741
(2020). Congress thereby provided that § 4205(g) would continue to apply to
inmates whose convictions predate November 1, 1987.
Rivera-Rios argues that the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132Stat. 5194 (2018), expanded eligibility for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief to people
incarcerated for offenses committed prior to 1987. We disagree.
The First Step Act expanded the availability of compassionate release by
amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) to permit inmates to petition a court directly for relief.
See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 231-33 (discussing the history of compassionate release and
the First Step Act). Under the First Step Act, the court may reduce a term of
imprisonment “in any case” on “motion of the defendant”—provided certain
exhaustion requirements are met—“after considering the factors set forth in
[§] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that … extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But
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it did not expand eligibility for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief to inmates serving sentences
for offenses predating November 1, 1987.
Two other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See United States v.
King, 24 F.4th 1226, 1228-32 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. Jackson, 991 F.3d 851,
852-54 (7th Cir. 2021). As the Seventh Circuit explained, the “in any case” language
of § 3582(c)(1) did not extend the section to people who committed crimes prior to
November 1, 1987, because that language originated in the Sentencing Reform Act,
which until 2018 allowed § 3582(c) motions to be made only by the BOP. Jackson,
991 F.3d at 853. The First Step Act did not alter any of the transition rules in the
Sentencing Reform Act that limit the scope of § 3582(c) to inmates who committed
crimes on or after November 1, 1987. “People whose crimes predate November 1,
1987, continue to be governed by the law in force at the time of their offenses.” Id.
at 852. This conclusion is “reinforced when we consider Congress’ recent extension
of the applicability of § 4205(g) to these inmates through 2022.” King, 24 F.4th at
1230.
The federal regulations that address compassionate release also provide that
§ 4205(g) “remains the controlling law for inmates whose offenses occurred prior
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to” November 1, 1987, and that “[f]or inmates whose offenses occurred on or after
[that date], the applicable statute is [§] 3582(c)(1)(A).” 28 C.F.R. § 572.40.
The district court correctly concluded that Rivera-Rios is categorically
ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and was ineligible for
§ 4205(g) relief because the Bureau of Prisons had not moved for a sentence
reduction on his behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g). The Bureau of Prisons may wish
to give particular attention to the applications of a prisoner such as Rivera-Rios
who, because of the date of his offense, cannot move for compassionate release on
his own motion, but it is not required to do so. Because Rivera-Rios is not eligible
for compassionate release under either statute, we need not consider his
arguments concerning administrative exhaustion, the existence of extraordinary
and compelling reasons for release, or the § 3553(a) factors.
* * *
We have considered Rivera-Rios’s remaining arguments, which we
conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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