Rexhepi v. Holder , 433 F. App'x 46 ( 2011 )


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  •     10-2916-ag
    Rexhepi v. Holder
    BIA
    Morace, IJ
    A096 257 699
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 29th day of September, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    PETER W. HALL,
    DENNY CHIN,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    RIZA REXHEPI,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                 10-2916-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Susan E. Zak, Medford,
    Massachusetts.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Christopher C. Fuller,
    Senior Litigation Counsel; Paul F.
    Stone, Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Riza Rexhepi, a native and citizen of
    Albania, seeks review of the June 22, 2010, decision of the
    BIA affirming the July 21, 2003, decision of Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”) Philip L. Morace denying his application for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Riza Rexhepi, No.
    A096 257 699 (B.I.A. June 22, 2010), aff’g No. A096 257 699
    (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 21, 2003). We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    IJ’s decision. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    
    489 F.3d 517
    , 523 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards
    of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 
    510 F.3d 377
    ,
    379 (2d Cir. 2007); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    ,
    110 (2d Cir. 2008).
    Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse
    credibility determination. In finding Rexhepi not credible,
    the IJ reasonably relied in part on Rexhepi’s inconsistent
    testimony regarding the location of his 1997 arrest and the
    procurement of his Democracy Party membership card. See Zhou
    Yun Zhang v. U.S. INS, 
    386 F.3d 66
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2004)
    (noting that the Court generally will not disturb adverse
    credibility determinations that are based on “specific
    examples in the record of inconsistent statements . . .
    about matters material to [an applicant’s] claim of
    persecution”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled
    in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    494 F.3d 296
    (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Moreover, a
    reasonable fact finder would not be compelled to credit
    Rexhepi’s explanations for these inconsistencies. See
    Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Furthermore, contrary to Rexhepi’s contention, the IJ
    did not err in recognizing that Rexhepi’s testimony was of a
    “generalized nature” and lacked “details and specifics.” We
    have recognized that “[w]here an applicant gives very spare
    testimony, . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the
    testimony is fabricated,” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 
    329 F.3d 140
    , 152 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled in part on other grounds
    2
    by Shi Liang 
    Lin, 494 F.3d at 305
    , but have held that “a
    finding of testimonial vagueness cannot, without more,
    support an adverse credibility determination unless
    government counsel or the IJ first attempts to solicit more
    detail from the alien,” Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 141
    ,
    147 (2d Cir. 2008). In this case, the IJ did not err by
    noting the generalized nature of Rexhepi’s testimony,
    particularly when both the IJ and the government attorney
    probed Rexhepi for additional details regarding his claims
    and when the IJ also relied on material inconsistencies in
    the record to find him not credible. See 
    id. Accordingly, because
    the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination was supported by substantial evidence, the IJ
    did not err in denying Rexhepi’s application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and CAT relief as those claims were
    based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,
    
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    3