Won Kyeng Kim v. Lynch ( 2015 )


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  •      14-2779
    Kim v. Lynch
    BIA
    Cheng, IJ
    A091 253 226
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
    CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
    PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
    SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
    CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
    THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
    COUNSEL.
    1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    2   the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
    3   York, on the 3rd day of November, two thousand fifteen.
    4
    5   PRESENT:
    6               DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    7               CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    8                     Circuit Judges,
    
    9               SIDNEY H. STEIN,
    10                     District Judge.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   WON KYENG KIM, AKA XX KIM WON K,
    14   AKA KYOUNG K. WON, AKA WONK YENG
    15   KIM, AKA KYENG W. KIM, AKA KIM WON
    16   KYONG, AKA KIM WON KYENG, AKA
    17   KYENG KIMWON,
    18
    19                  Petitioner,
    20
    21                  v.                                                         14-2779
    22
    23   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    
    The Honorable Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
    New York, sitting by designation.
    1   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    2
    3               Respondent.
    4   _____________________________________
    5   FOR PETITIONER:            DAVID K. S. KIM, Flushing, New York.
    6
    7   FOR RESPONDENT:                    HILLEL R. SMITH, Attorney; Joyce R. Branda,
    8                                      Acting Assistant Attorney General;
    9                                      Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director,
    10                                      Office of Immigration Litigation,
    11                                      United States Department of
    12                                      Justice, Washington, D.C.
    13
    14          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration
    15   Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
    16   petition for review is DISMISSED.
    17          Petitioner Won Kyeng Kim, a native and citizen of South Korea, seeks review of a July 7,
    18   2014, decision of the BIA affirming the December 27, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge
    19   (“IJ”) denying cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion and ordering Kim removed. In re
    20   Won Kyeng Kim, No. A 091-253-226 (B.I.A. July 7, 2014), aff’g No. A 091-253-226 (Immig. Ct.
    21   New York, N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
    22   procedural history, and issues on appeal in this case.
    23          We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal as a matter of
    24   discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 
    516 F.3d 35
    , 38-40 (2d Cir.
    25   2007). Nevertheless, we retain jurisdiction insofar as the petition for review raises “constitutional
    26   claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which we review de novo, Pierre v. Holder,
    27   
    588 F.3d 767
    , 772 (2d Cir. 2009). To determine whether jurisdiction exists in a particular case,
    28   we “study the arguments asserted,” and consider, “regardless of the rhetoric employed in the
    29   petition, whether it merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual findings or justification for
    2
    1    the discretionary choices, in which case [we] lack jurisdiction, or whether it instead raises a
    2    ‘constitutional claim’ or ‘question of law,’ in which case [we may] exercise jurisdiction to review
    3    those particular issues.” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 329 (2d Cir. 2006).
    4    “[W]e lack jurisdiction to review any legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous as to be
    5    inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” 
    Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 40
    .
    6           Kim argues that the agency erred as a matter of law in failing to consider all of his positive
    7    equities, in weighing the positive and negative factors in his case, and in determining, on the basis
    8    of the record, that he lacked remorse and failed to accept responsibility for his criminal behavior.
    9    We lack jurisdiction to consider these contentions: they raise no colorable legal arguments and
    10   thus merely challenge the agency’s factual findings and discretionary choices. See Carcamo v.
    11   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    498 F.3d 94
    , 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]bsent clear proof that the factual basis
    12   for an IJ’s decision was unambiguously contradicted by the record, a petitioner raises no
    13   ‘constitutional claim[ ] or question[ ] of law’ for us to review.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D))
    14   (alterations in original)); Morales v. INS, 
    208 F.3d 323
    , 328 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Where, as here, the
    15   Board has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate findings, we will not
    16   require that it address specifically each claim the petitioner made or each piece of evidence the
    17   petitioner presented.” (quoting Martinez v. INS, 
    970 F.2d 973
    , 976 (1st Cir. 1992))); Henry v. INS,
    18   
    74 F.3d 1
    , 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Even in section 212(c) waiver cases, the Marin [equitable] factors are
    19   only illustrative. They do not comprise an invariable checklist.”). Kim further argues that the
    20   agency offered an insufficient rational explanation for its decision. Both the BIA and the IJ
    21   carefully examined and weighed Kim’s positive and negative factors in reaching their decisions.
    3
    1    “[T]he BIA is not required to ‘write an exegesis on every contention.’” Mansour v. INS, 
    230 F.3d 2
       902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 
    829 F.2d 996
    , 1000 (10th Cir. 1987)).
    3           We also lack jurisdiction to consider Kim’s frivolous argument that the agency committed
    4    legal error in relying on the criminal complaints filed against him.        “[P]olice reports and
    5    complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are
    6    appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”
    7    
    Carcamo, 498 F.3d at 98
    ; see also In re Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713, 722 (BIA 1988) (“[T]he
    8    admission into the record of the information contained in the police reports is especially
    9    appropriate in cases involving discretionary relief from deportation, where all relevant factors
    10   concerning an arrest and conviction should be considered to determine whether an alien warrants a
    11   favorable exercise of discretion.”). Although the agency is “hesitant to give substantial weight to
    12   an arrest report, absent a conviction or corroborating evidence of the allegations contained
    13   therein,” In re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995), the IJ did not rely on
    14   uncorroborated criminal complaints in Kim’s case, but rather considered only criminal complaints
    15   that ultimately led to convictions. And, contrary to Kim’s contention, the allegations of domestic
    16   violence in the criminal complaint that resulted in Kim’s conviction for disorderly conduct were
    17   corroborated by the issuance of an order of protection to protect Kim’s wife.
    18          Accordingly, because Kim’s arguments merely challenge the IJ’s factual findings, we lack
    19   jurisdiction over his petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); 
    Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 38-40
    ;
    20   Xiao Ji 
    Chen, 471 F.3d at 329
    .
    21          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED.
    22                                                FOR THE COURT:
    23                                                Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    4