Jinsheng Chen v. Lynch , 633 F. App'x 798 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •          13-2608
    Chen v. Lynch
    BIA
    Burr, IJ
    A205 047 821
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 14th day of December, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                DENNIS JACOBS,
    8                SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    9                CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       Jinsheng Chen,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                       v.                                     13-2608
    17                                                              NAC
    18       LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _____________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:               Lewis G. Hu, New York, NY.
    24
    25       FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    26                                     General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant
    27                                     Director; Kathryn L. Deangelis,
    28                                     Trial Attorney, Office of
    1                             Immigration Litigation, United
    2                             States Department of Justice,
    3                             Washington, D.C.
    4
    5       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    8   is DENIED.
    9       Jinsheng Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s
    10   Republic of China, seeks review of a June 17, 2013 decision
    11   of the BIA affirming the October 1, 2012 decision of
    12   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sarah M. Burr, which denied his
    13   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    14   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).    In re
    15   Jinsheng Chen, No. A205 047 821 (B.I.A. June 17, 2013),
    16   aff’g No. A205 047 821 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 1, 2012).
    17   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    18   and procedural history.
    19        Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    20   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision, i.e.,
    21   minus the arguments for denying relief (Chen’s lack of
    22   doctrinal knowledge) that were rejected by the BIA.      See Xue
    23   Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d
    24   Cir. 2005).   The applicable standards of review are well
    2
    1   established.    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    2   Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    3       For asylum applications that like Chen’s, are governed
    4   by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[c]onsidering
    5   the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility
    6   finding on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or
    7   responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and
    8   inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether
    9   they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” so long as
    10   they reasonably support an inference that the applicant is
    11   not credible.    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia
    12   Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008).       We “defer
    13   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    14   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    15   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
    16   credibility ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .     In this
    17   case, the agency reasonably based its adverse credibility
    18   determination on inconsistencies between Chen’s testimony
    19   and that of his witness, and the lack of a plausible
    20   explanation for those inconsistencies.
    21       The IJ found that Chen failed to meet his burden of
    22   proof for asylum because his account of his Falun Gong
    3
    1   activities was inconsistent with the testimony of his
    2   friend, Chen Long Dong (“the witness”).   Substantial
    3   evidence supports the IJ’s findings that Chen testified
    4   inconsistently with the witness with respect to where he and
    5   the witness first met, whether they arranged in advance to
    6   practice Falun Gong together, and how many Falun Gong
    7   positions Chen practices.
    8       While the inconsistency regarding where Chen and the
    9   witness first met is relatively minor, the agency was
    10   nonetheless entitled to rely on the “cumulative effect” of
    11   the inconsistencies.   See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 
    446 F.3d 395
    ,
    12   402 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that “even where an IJ
    13   relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken
    14   separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the
    15   claim,. . . the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed
    16   consequential by the fact-finder”(internal quotation marks
    17   omitted)); see also Liang Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 
    454 F.3d 18
       103, 106-107 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n IJ need not consider the
    19   centrality vel non of each individual discrepancy or
    20   omission” and can instead “rely upon the cumulative impact
    21   of such inconsistencies,. . . and may conduct an overall
    22   evaluation of testimony in light of its rationality or
    4
    1   internal consistency and the manner in which it hangs
    2   together with other evidence.”(internal quotation marks
    3   omitted)). Furthermore, Chen had an opportunity to address
    4   the inconsistencies, but Chen failed to address them.      See
    5   Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 
    439 F.3d 111
    , 120-21 (2d Cir. 2006) (An
    6   IJ need only give an applicant a chance to reconcile
    7   inconsistences that are not self-evident; otherwise, it is
    8   the applicant’s “responsibility to proffer, with or without
    9   prompting, an explanation for what appears on its face to be
    10   a clear contradiction.”).
    11       The totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s
    12   adverse credibility determination.   See 8 U.S.C.
    13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .      Because
    14   the only evidence of a threat to Chen’s life or freedom
    15   depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility
    16   finding necessarily precludes success on his claims for
    17   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.     See Paul v.
    18   Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    19       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    20   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    21   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    5
    1   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    2   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    3                              FOR THE COURT:
    4                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5
    6
    6